A THEISTIC EVALUATION OF JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Harold H. Eymann

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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" A THEISTIC EVALUATION OF JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION "

Being a thesis presented by

Harold H.Eymann

to the University of St.Andrews

in application for the degree of Ph.D.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following Thesis is based on research carried out by me, that the Thesis is my own composition, and that it has not previously been presented for a Higher Degree. The research was carried out at St. Andrews University.

[redacted]

CERTIFICATE

I certify that Harold H.Eymann has spent at least nine terms in Research Work, that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance No. 16 (St.Andrews) and that he is qualified to submit the accompanying Thesis in application for the degree of Ph.D.

CAREER

In 1923 I graduated from the University of California with degree of B.S. In 1930 I graduated from Union Theological Seminary New York City with degree of B.D. In the same year, after special work at the Teacher's College of Columbia University, I received the degree of M.A. for work in the field of Education.

On October tenth, 1949 I commenced the research for the Thesis now being submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

From 1928 to 1930 I studied at Columbia University, Teacher's College, a teacher training centre where Dr. John Dewey's influence was very great, and was at its height in that period. This study was combined with work at Union Theological Seminary for the B.D. degree. After twenty years in the ministry and religious education the opportunity came for further study. I decided to re-orient myself in the field of religious education. Knowing about Scotland's long tradition of interest in religious education, I decided to do my research in the University of St. Andrews.

In order to carry forward the lines of my previous study, and make it most valuable in terms of the situation in the United States, I decided to evaluate Dr. Dewey's educational philosophy from the perspective of Christian theism. My research has taken me into the fields of theology, philosophy and education.

Since he began writing in the field of philosophy in 1882, Dr. Dewey has had a profound influence upon American thought, and almost from the very beginning he has been profoundly interested in education. His influence has not been limited to the United States. Dr. Dewey has been a prolific writer. He was born in 1859, began making serious contributions to philosophical and educational discussion before the close of the century, and is still commenting on the American and world scene. I have read twenty one of Dr. Dewey's books in preparation for this dissertation, and have found the following most basic to an understanding of his educational system : Democracy and Education; Experience and Nature; Logic, the Theory of Inquiry; The School and Society; Human Nature and

Conduct;Education To-day; Reconstruction In Philosophy;Art as Experience; A Common Faith;Experience and Education;Quest for Certainty:and Freedom and Culture.

To understand and evaluate the basic ideas upon which Dewey builds his educational system is complicated by the fact,as Dewey admits,that such basic concepts as 'knowledge' and'experience' do not have a consistent meaning throughout the wide range of his writings. I have devoted four chapters to setting forth his metaphysic,epistemology, ethic,and the educational structure he builds on these. My evaluation in these chapters is made from a Christian theistic perspective,which I characterize as a revised liberal theology. That is,its early roots were in the liberal theological tradition,and in later years my thought has been influenced to some extent by the neo-orthodox movement.

I have brought three theistic positions into my study,the liberal, the neo-orthodox,and the Roman Catholic. I selected these three because they represent the major theistic positions in the United States. All of them have had to take account of Dewey's influence. They have varied in their attitude toward Dewey,from wide acceptance of his views to complete hostility. This has made it possible to show more clearly the issues between Dewey's naturalism and various forms of supernaturalism.

A final chapter has been devoted to the more practical aspects of the problem by considering the issues Dewey raises connected with teaching religion in the public schools. I have included here,the results of my study of the English and Scottish approach to these problems.

CHAPTER ONE

DEWEY'S NATURALISTIC WORLD-VIEW

John Dewey, and other educators of the experimentalist school have not been primarily interested in metaphysics. However there are metaphysical assumptions in their method and educational theory. Sidney Hook, in his book The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, makes the following statement :

> "The title of this study has been selected with malice prepense. It conjoins two terms whose connotations are generally regarded as opposite in order to make more emphatic the belief that 'method' is dogged by a pack of metaphysical consequences." 1

Dewey wrote a foreword to this book in which he gave assent to the thesis that pragmatism must examine the generic traits of existence. Underlying Dewey's educational system is his world-view. It has a bearing upon his epistemology, psychology and social idealism. Experience and Nature written in 1925 is his major metaphysical essay.

We will first examine Dewey's attitude toward metaphysics. Then some of his reasons for abandoning the Christian Weltanschauung and the classical philosophical tradition. His theory of nature is difficult to separate from his anthropology, because his view is that man is continuous with nature. For purposes of analysis however they can be studied separately.

1. Dewey's Attitude Toward Metaphysics.

(a) Christian Theism

Dewey's early essays in ethics are within the general context of theism. In a paper on Ethics and Physical Science published in 1887, he maintains that evolutionary ethics as interpreted by Herbert Spencer destroys ethical foundations by making ethics a physical science. Dewey wrote :

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1) Sidney Hook, "The Metaphysics of Pragmatism", p.6

> "in spite of the vigor and ardor with which these ideas are urged, some of us,at least,remain unmoved. We believe that the cause of theology and morals is one,and that whatever banished God from the heart of things,with the same edict excludes the ideal,the ethical from the life of men." 2

The first fifteen years of Dewey's philosophical reflections were greatly influenced by G.S.Morris. Dewey studied under Morris at Johns Hopkins University,and was his colleague at the University of Chicago. He came to share Morris' antipathy toward speculative metaphysics. Morris waged a long battle against the British empiricists. He charged them with making all knowledge and experience sensible,and thus,after cutting away the only basis for a world-view,indulging in vain metaphysical speculation. Later Dewey became a radical empiricist,but he was never as strongly opposed to British empiricism as Morris. Dewey held the idealist position against the wax tablet, tabula rasa conception of the mind,and the idealist position against dualism.

Morris introduced Dewey to Hegel. The conception of Absolute Mind and the organic unity of the universe were accepted,and they form the background of Dewey's later naturalism. Coming to Kant through Hegel,Dewey found Kant's emphasis upon mind as active,congenial,but he brings his favorite charge of dualism against Kant. Dewey was not searching primarily for arguments for the existence of God. His main interest was in keeping the human and the non-human united. Objective,Universal Mind,gave him the context in which knower and known object were held in unity.

(b) Dewey's Extreme Anti-Metaphysical Position.

Dewey at first interpreted pragmatism as a philosophical method with-

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2) Andover Review V11 576 Quoted from M.G.White "The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism. p.97

out interest in,or need for metaphysics :

> "It is often said that pragmatism unless it be content to be a mere methodology must develop a theory of Reality. But the chief characteristic of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality is general,uberhaupt is possible or needed." 3

This statement was made in 1917. Though this position was later modified it was not an isolated statement. In 1910,in the Journal of Philosophy he had written an article maintaining that it was self-contradictory for pragmatism to claim to supply a world-view.

> "Philosophy is itself a mode of knowing,and of knowing where reflective thinking is much in play. It is hence self-contradictory for an instrumental pragmatism to set up claims to supplying a metaphysics or ontology.." 4

By the end of the second decade Dewey's attitude toward the need for metaphysical thinking had changed. But we shall maintain that his philosophical method and assumptions fail to provide adequate metaphysical foundations for the educational structure Dewey builds.

(c) Dewey's Theory of Nature

In his book Experience and Nature Dewey considers the problem of the relationship pf existence to value. His position is naturalistic.Man must learn to live within the bounds and according to the conditions set by nature. Man must know nature in order to control it for his own ends :

> "Fidelity to the nature to which we belong,as parts however weak, demands that we cherish our desires and ideals till we have converted them into intelligence,revised them in terms of the ways and means which nature makes possible." 5

In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey's major work in social psychology, he gives further evidence of a concern for the 'whole'. His outlook has

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3) Creative Intelligence. 1917 p 55
4)Journal of Philosophy V11 (1910) 478. Quoted from W.T.Feldman "The Philosophy of John Dewey. p 8
5) Experience and Nature p 420

changed since the criticism made of Spencer. Then,Dewey maintained that theology and morals were inseparable,and the banishment of God from the heart of things excluded the ethical from the life of man. Now the 'whole' is thought of in naturalistic terms.

> "Yet the last word is not with obligation,not with the future.Infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist." 6

The infinite relationships are with man and nature. Though Dewey uses the term enduring,we shall find in our study of his metaphysics that he means relatively enduring.

(d) Summary

- The theistic assumptions of Dewey's early writings are not held in the major portions of his work. Ethical interests always claimed Dewey's attention,and he has been sceptical about the value of metaphysical thinking. He first held that pragmatism had no interest in,and nothing to say about ultimate Reality. Later he worked out a metaphysical position on naturalistic lines.

2. Dewey's Opposition to the Metaphysical Outlook of Classical Philosophy and Christianity.

To further understand Dewey's world-view we must consider his reasons for rejecting classical philosophy and Christian theism. We may consider these together,because Dewey holds the view that they are pracially synonymous. He does not take into account the revisions that have been made in theistic thought which take cognizance of modern scientific findings in biology,physics and psychology. So we cannot well separate his strictures

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6) Human Nature and Conduct p 350

against classical philosophy from those against Christianity.

(a) Dualism

To be able to label a view dualistic is to condemn it in Dewey's eyes. And he finds much to label dualistic. In his Reconstruction In Philosophy, first published in 1920, he makes a sweeping criticism of classical philosophy for isolating the practical affairs of men from the philosopher's interest.

> "All philosophies of the classic type have made a fixed and fundamental distinction between two realms of existence. One of these corresponds to the religious and supernatural world of popular tradition which in its metaphysical rendering became the world of highest and ultimate reality..Over against this absolute and noumenal reality which could be apprehended only by the systematic discipline of philosophy itself, stood the ordinary empirical, relatively real, phenomenal world of everyday experience." 7

Dewey says this dualism inherited from the Greek philosophers made time, movement, change signs of non-being somehow infecting true being. And the classic tradition though modified somewhat by Hebrew-Christian influences held to this concept of the Real as the changeless.

> "That Plato and Aristotle in somewhat different fashion, and Plotinus and Marcus Aurelius and Saint Thomas Aquinis, and Spinoza and Hegel all taught that Ultimate Reality is either perfectly Ideal and Rational in nature, or else, absolute ideality and rationality as its necessary attribute, are facts well known to the student of philosophy." 8

Dewey asserts that all forms of supernatualism place God completely outside of nature, fixing a gulf between sacred and secular, between philosophy and active daily life. We shall maintain that theism need not fix such a gulf.

(b) Sloth

Quite in contrast to his fellow pragmatist William James, who found a moral dynamic in religion, Dewey holds the view that man constructs his

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7) Reconstruction In Philosophy pp 22-23
8) Ibid p.106

belief in a Supreme Being out of his moral laziness. He projects a Reality that will accomplish what man in his love of ease will not attempt.

> "The sense of incompentency and the sloth born of desire for irresponsibility have combined to create an overwhelming longing for the ideal and rational antecedant possession of actuality, and consequently something upon which we can fall back for emotional support in time of trouble." 9

Fear of life, and inability to cope with his problems, account in Dewey's mind for man's creation of supernaturalism. Ideals are projected into a supernatural order for support, safekeeping, and sanction. He has dropped out all recognition of support given by belief to ethical action.

(c) Intellectual Formalism and Dishonesty

According to Dewey, the doctrines and dogmas of religion stand in the path of scientific inquiry, and therefore must be swept aside. He charges religion with making false claims of discovering Reality through mystical and other special experiences. In defense of these special insights it becomes intolerant. As science gains ground it makes the religious position untenable. Dewey sees no losses in this.

> "The assumption that these objects of religion exist already in some realm of Being seems to add nothing to their force, while it weakens their claim over us as ideals, in so far as it bases that claim upon matters that are intellectually dubious." 10

(d) Individualism

Dewey brings the criticism against both militant atheism and supernaturalism that they are preoccupied with 'man in isolation'. The drama of sin and redemption goes on within the lonely soul of man and exalts his importance as against the whole of nature. Atheism also passes over the ties that bind man to nature.

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9) Quest For Certainty p 286
10) A Common Faith p.41

"What I have in mind especially is the exclusive preoccupation of both militant atheism and supernaturalism with man in isolation". 11

(e) Summary

Against classical philosophy,and Christianity which he thinks is inextricably bound up with it,Dewey wages a running battle. Holding to the idea of unchanging perfection they divide life into separate realms . Religion in its traditional forms has been an escape mechanism. And its dogmatism has stifled inquiry. Religious doctrines will be gradually supplanted by scientific knowledge. And religion like atheism has promoted an individualism that isolated man from nature.

That many of these charges have a basis in fact can hardly be denied. But in our theistic critique of Dewey's educational philosophy we will see that Dewey's sweeping generalizations do not give a fair picture. He does not do justice to the prophetic tradition in his 'sloth' theory. Nor has he given full consideration to types of theistic philosophy that find a place for both the creative and the redemptive,both the transcendent and the immanent,in their thought of God.

3. Dewey's Theory of Nature.

We have seen Dewey's anti-metaphysical bias,and outlined his case against classical philosophy and religion. Though some reviewers of Dewey's philosophy have contended that he takes a position very close to that of theism,and others maintain that he does not exclude theism,I would hold that in the main body of his writings he accepts an outright naturalistic position. His metaphysical outlook is difficult to define,for in no part

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11) A Common Faith p 53

of his extensive writing is he more elusive than in his naturalistic metaphysics. Some of the underlying concepts that we must consider are-an open universe;existents as particular events;continuity;emergence;organism; histories;and man as continuous with nature.

(a) An Open Universe

We have noted Dewey's objection to philosophies 'of the classic type' for holding that the real is changeless. In Reconstruction In Philosophy he contrasts the cosmology of the ancient world with the view of the universe given by modern science. This is worked out in further detail in Experience and Nature. Greek philosophies and all world-views based on them are memorials 'to what is finished'.

> "The cosmically real is one with the finished,the perfect,or wholly done.Even with Aristotle,a coldly defining theory,called metaphysics,of the traits of Being,becomes a theology,or science of ultimate and eternal reality to which only ecstatic predicates are attributable." 12

Dewey makes much of certain anthropologists emphasis upon the perilous and precarious,and the part played by these in generating religion,law,art, and industry. This aspect of Dewey's thought can hardly be over-emphasized. In his study of primitive religion he subsumes the idea of the holy under man's effort to deal with the sinister forces and placate them. Because of this interpretation of the holy,Dewey brushes aside religion not only in its primitive forms,but in its philosophical and ethical forms. For him religion is a futile quest for certainty in a radically precarious world.

> "Our magical safeguard against the uncertain character of the world is to deny the existence of change,to mumble universal and necessary law,the ubiquity of cause and effect,the uniformity of nature, universal progress,and the inherent rationality of the universe." 13

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12) Experience And Nature p 91
13) Ibid p 44

Science broke away from all these metaphysical chains,especially from the assumption of a final cause. It was thus set free for inquiry in "a universe with the lid off",words of William James,which pragmatists often quote.The concept of 'change' is all-inclusive. Nothing is everlasting or enduring. Change is omnipotent".

> "A thing may endure secula seculorum and yet not be everlasting;it will crumble before the gnawing tooth of time,as it exceeds a certain measure. Every existence is an event." 14

The direct bearing of this emphasis and interpretation upon the educational outlook of the experimentalist is evident. Dewey's epistemology is based upon an analysis of thinking which arises out of problematical situations. He finds no place for cognitive experiences outside of problematical situations. Esthetic and intuitional experiences are not cognitive. Man's intellect is a tool fashioned for survival and for the exploitation of the uncertain possibilities of nature. Education is an adventure in a precarious world.

(b) The Relatively Stable.

The eventual character of all existences is a basic assumption in Dewey's metaphysics. He will not however,idealize flux into a deity,and he criticizes Bergson for romanticizing change. Nor will he assign all existence to the realm of mere appearance. It is obvious to him that change implies something that changes. His constants are existents that change more slowly than others.

> "The important thing is measure,relation,ratio,knowledge of the comparative tempos of change. In mathematics some variables are constants in some problems;so it is in nature and life. The rate of change in some things is so slow,or is so rhythmic,that these changes have all the advantages of stability in dealing with more transitory and irregular happenings-if we know enough. 15

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14)Experience and Nature p.71
15) Ibid p.71

The modes and tempos in the interaction of existents are the characteristics philosophy is concerned about. Dewey's metaphysics seems to be a noting and registering of the interactions of the relatively stable and precarious existents. If he admittedly stopped short at this point he would then be consistent with his pragmatic theory of knowledge as functional. We shall see however that he attempts to give an account of the origin of mind and creative intelligence. And we shall question whether he adequately accounts for the existence of mind on his purely naturalistic basis which denies the necessity of one Subject to whom no beginning or ending can be assigned.

(c) Ends and Histories

Fundamental to Dewey's division of experience into cognitive and non-cognitive is his theory of ends and histories in nature. In the changing flux of events there are finalities and consummations.

> "But in every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive." 16

He censures idealists and materialists alike for blindness in overlooking the 'irreducible, infinitely plural, undefinable qualities', which a thing must have in order to enter into relations and become the theme of discourse. Science, since the seventeenth century has recognized that its proper field is not with the nature of these immediate qualitative ends, but with their relations. All knowledge, according to Dewey's definition of knowledge, is about the relations, and not the immediate existences. Through reflective thinking regulation of the occurrence of immediate experiences is possible. Knowledge prepares for consummatory enjoyments and direct appropriations. These experiences contain everything of worth and significance. But there is great instability in them because of their dependence upon a diversity of

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16) Experience and Nature p.85

events.

> "Thus the things that are most precious, that are final, being just the things that are unstable and most easily changing, seem to be different in kind from good, solid, old-fashioned substance." 17

Physics has shown that matter is not the solid, lumpy thing it was once supposed to be. It is now best described as a series of events. Dewey sees only a relative difference between the precious qualities of immediate experience and the events of physical nature. Both are natural events and both are evanescent. The changes that occur at the physical level are slower than those at the level of values. If in the fact of this one is tempted to pessimism, Dewey reminds us that man has his labor, his arts, his ideals and accomplishments and his striving, and these are enough. He should not waste time trying to discern the connection of these with Reality, for they are real. Man's time and energy and thought should go into their enjoyment and enrichment. Dewey defends this attitude against the charge of utilitarianism on the grounds that esthetic realities should not be missed, or crowded out by desire for food and comforts.

(d) Rhythm.

Futher light is thrown on Dewey's epistemology and theory of value, by the importance he attaches to the rhythmic character of experience, indicating a rhythmic character in nature. Science, poetry, painting and music are made possible by this property of nature. In Art As Experience he develops this theory.

> "All interactions that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is ebb and flow, systole and diastole ordered change. The latter moves within bounds. To overpass the limits which are set is destruction and death, out of which however new rhythms are built up." 18

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17) Experience and Nature p.115
18) Art As Experience p.16

Primitive man, says Dewey, knew these rhythms in a crude way. Science is the refined grasp of them. They are the basis of artistic form in all the arts. In man's more primitive days, his philosophy was the story of these natural rhythms of nature in story form. Law also had its origin in nature's harmony and regularity. Experience was not fragmentized. Dewey finds here another root of religion in the esthetic experience of the rhythms of nature. The other root as we have seen was found in the precarious character of nature which leads man to try to control nature by magical devises.

(e) Summary of Dewey's Theory of Nature

Nature as Dewey conceives it is an affair of events. No existent endures, for there are only more or less rapidly changing events. There are immediate qualities in events, as well as relational aspects. Nature has regularities, rhythms which form the basis of science and art. We noted before that Dewey has little interest in 'speculative metaphysics' and how he dropped theism and all idea of a Perfect Being from his later writings. It is a major contention in this study that Dewey's metaphysics is vague and inadequate. His motive of rescuing the significance of time, and the events in time from philosophical systems that overlook them, or view them as mere appearance, is sound. But we shall question whether his naturalism gives adequate support to his educational system, and attempt to show where theism gives a more profound basis for an educational philosophy.

4. Dewey's View of Human Nature.

Dewey is passionately interested in orienting the total life of man within nature. He looked at one time, upon Thomas Huxley as a staunch champion of the continuity of man with nature. He was shocked and baffled by Huxley's Romanes lecture, Evolution and Ethics given in 1893. Dewey wrote a reply

in 1898. He could not tolerate a view that made a radical break between man and nature. He reports the reaction of his fellow-Darwinists and himself :

> "Those who recall the discussion following the lecture will remember that many felt as if they had received a blow knocking the breath out of their bodies. To some it appeared that Mr.Huxley had executed a sudden volte-face and had given up his belief in the unity of the evolutionary process,accepting the very dualistic idea of the separation between the animal and the human,against which he had previously directed so many hard blows." 19

We have seen in our survey of Dewey's naturalism that he insists upon contingent and precarious factors in nature. Dewey does not hold the view that nature in all its aspects is friendly to man. In his reply to Huxley he is concerned to show how ethical values arose in the course of evolution. They are the modification of one part of man's environment with reference to another part.

We turn then to Dewey's account of the origin of mind and value.

(a) The Mind-Body Problem

Dewey thinks that many of the difficulties in philosophy and in education are due to a wrong solution of the mind-body problem. He sets out to show the errors of dualistic views,and gives his own solution to the problem.

> "The evils which we suffer in education,in religion--for example the fundamentalist attack about the evolution of men rests upon the idea of complete separation of mind and body--in the materialism of business and the aloofness of 'intellectuals' from life,the whole separation of knowledge and practice--all testify to the necessity of seeing mind-body as an integral whole." 20

What then is his solution ? His theory of the instrumental nature of thinking, and the efficacy of intelligence in the control of nature, would seem to imply that consciousness and mind were efficacious at the physical and

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19) Monist V111 523 Quoted from White "The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism" p 1
20) Philosophy and Civilization p 302

biological levels. But Dewey abandoned belief in final causation. This leaves him with only a descriptive account of the emergence of mind. When he goes beyond mere description he ends with an account of mind as epiphenomenal with respect to the body.

> "Empirically speaking, the most obvious difference between living and non-living things is that the activities of the former are characterized by needs, by efforts which are active demands to satisfy needs, and by satisfactions." 21

Just how psychic energies emerge from such a situation is not fully shown. These biological, psychological terms like 'need', 'effort', and 'satisfaction' are translated into 'physical energy'. How chemico-physical energies combine to bring forth psychic qualities except by his own definition of terms is not made clear. In a chapter called 'Body and Mind' in Philosophy and Civilization he says :

> "The remainder of the story is that chemico-physical processes go on in ways and by interactions which have reference to the needs of the organism as a whole and thus take on psychical quality." 22

This seems to reduce mind to a state of epiphenomena of the body. Since Dewey builds his educational philosophy around the power of the mind to control nature and society it looks like he has proved a case against himself. At times he accepts the epiphenomenal view in order to avoid the dilemma of dualism, and ends in a radical behavioristic psychology :

> "Instrumentalism means a behavioristic theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active...Put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean any transcendent states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but that the operations of knowing are (or artfully derived from) natural responses of the organism". 23

Dewey does not consistently accept this extreme form of behaviorism. He

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21) Experience And Nature p.252
22) Philosophy and Civilization p.307
23) Essays in Experimental Logic p.14

recognizes the fact of conscious awareness and makes a great deal of the factor of reflective thinking. Dewey's major work in Psychology appeared in 1887, and was followed soon after by Applied Psychology his first venture into the field of education. In these books he held the view that individual consciousness reproduced Universal Consciousness. The individual manifests a larger organism which is constituted by Absolute Mind. This is the Hegelian origin of Dewey's later social psychology. The social influences upon individual thought and attitudes have occupied Dewey's attention far more than the mind-body problem. The biological influence upon Dewey's thought is most clearly seen by the importance he gives to thought as active and arising out of situations of friction and strain. He turns away from metaphysics to pragmatic thinking. In Philosophy and Civilization this is clearly stated :

> "I shall not try to prove this unity..In just the degree in which action, behavior, is made central, the traditional barriers between mind and body break down and dissolve." 24

The mind as active in understanding the relationship of existents, occupies far more of Dewey's attention than arguments for a naturalistic theory of the psychic and mental. But we shall see when we set out his espistemology that the biological theory of the origin of mind is by no means nugatory in his educational outlook.

(b) Value

In many respects Bertrand Russell and John Dewey are in agreement in their philosophical outlook. But on the question of the place of ethics in philosophy they disagree. Russell thinks that ethics does not belong to philosophy. On the other hand Dewey holds that 'goods' and their realization

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24) Philosophy and Civilization p 302

are the major philosophical interest. Santayana, in a review of Dewey's Experience and Nature asserted that Dewey's naturalism was not thoroughgoing, because Dewey is an ethical thinker whose basic assumptions are not naturalistic. These three naturalists then take a different view of the relation of truth to value.

The close relation of moral judgements and scientific knowledge is central to Dewey's entire educational theory. The following passage from Philosophy and Civilization shows what he considers the general relation to be, and also throws light on his pragmatic conception of moral judgements.

> "The pragmatist at least tries to face and not dodge the question of how it is that moral and scientific 'knowledge' can both hold of one and the same world. And whatever the difficulties in his proffered solution, the conception that scientific judgements are to be assimilated to moral, is closer to common sense than is the theory that validity is to be denied to moral judgements because they do not square with a preconceived theory of the nature of the world to which scientific judgements must refer. And all moral judgements are about changes to be made." 25

Dewey, wishing to integrate the whole of man's experience finds man fundamentally a valuing creature. He is 'constituted to think in terms of welfare'. He does not think in terms of faculty psychology and a moral faculty. He thinks of man in interaction with his environment, adapting himself to it, seeking to control it and make it serve his manifold needs and interests. He thinks of man as participating in a group life which is always changing. Thinking arises out of situations when in satisfying needs two courses are open, and a choice must be made.

> "Reflection also implies concern with the issue—a certain sympathetic identification of our own destiny, if only dramatic, with the outcome of the course of events. The flagrant partisanship of human nature is evidence of the intensity of the tendency to identify ourselves with one possible course of events, and to reject the other as foreign... We desire this or that outcome. One wholly indifferent to the outcome does not follow or think about what is happening at all." 26

25) Philosophy and Civilization p 45
26) Democracy and Education p 172

The entire pragmatic approach to truth and value is centred in the purposive,impulsive,striving nature of man. The conative aspect of man's life is the basis from which the cognitive is derived. This has important implications for religion and education,and will be further examined in a more detailed treatment of Dewey's epistemology and theory of value.

(c) The Social Nature of Man

We have seen that Dewey criticizes both militant atheism and supernaturalism for being preoccupied with 'man in isolation'. In his first book, Psychology,while still under strong Hegelian influence,a supernatural environment is assumed. But in this same book the empirical concept of the influence of cultural environment began to emerge. Dewey later points to this change :

> "the metaphysical idea that an absolute mind is manifested in social institutions dropped out...the idea,upon an empirical basis of the power exercised by cultural environment in shaping ideas,beliefs, and intellectual attitudes of individuals remained." 27

William James, Psychology,which emphasizes the interaction of man with his environment, greatly influenced Dewey. The social emphasis was stimulated also by Franklin Ford,at one time editor of Bradstreet's in New York. From his belief in a world unified by Absolute Mind,Dewey moved toward the view that the world is potentially one,and may be controlled by intelligence.

This task is to be accomplished by applying the scientific method to social problems. The 'social lag' analysis of man's social predicament is developed in Freedom and Culture, and Philosophy and Civilization ,and other ethical writings. In the latter work he says :

> "Here lies the heart of our present social problem. Science has hardly been used to modify men's fundamental acts and attitudes

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27) P.Schlipp "The Philosophy of John Dewey" p.17

> in social matters. It has been used to extend enormously the scope and power of interests and values which anteceded its rise. Here is the contradiction in our civilization. The potentiality of science as the most powerful instrument of control which ever existed puts to mankind its one outstanding challenge." 28

We shall see that Dewey's social goal is a free democratic culture. Education for him means education for democracy. The aim of education is the fullest possible realization of human possibilities and potentialities. Science, free from metaphysical dogmas, directed its inquiry toward correlations that exist between observed changes in nature. Now science must turn its attention to the correlations between man and his cultural environment. It must decide the issue between a culture which eventuates in war, after war, or a peaceful society. Education is the scientific method to the whole range of man's interests.

We must note here an ambiguity in Dewey's theory of values. We have quoted a statement of his to the effect that scientific judgements are to be assimilated to moral judgements. We now quote a statement which shows that he finds the seat of moral authority in scientific knowledge.

> "If knowledge, even the most authenticated kind, cannot influence desires and aims, if it cannot determine what is of value and what is not, the future outlook as to formation of desires is depressing." 2

We shall have to ask in our chapter on Dewey's theory of values whether in his naturalistic world view there must be an inherent vagueness and ambiguity. Dewey makes value judgements that are not based on his metaphysical theory. The value of the individual, freedom, and equality are moral 'goods' that Dewey believes in. To him they seem self evident. Nature with which man is linked, which brought man into being, in which there is nothing

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28) Philosophy and Civilization p 324
29) Freedom and Culture p 140

that is everlasting,which has no mind of its own,would seem to be an inadequate foundation upon which to build an optimistic faith in man and culture.

(d) Summary of Dewey's Anthropology

His position on the mind-body problem seems to waver between a purely descriptive,phenomenalist view,and a view of mind in an epiphenomenal relationship to the body. Yet he believes that man is essentially a moral, evaluating creature. At cross-road situations his evaluations are called into action. The scientific method is sufficient to define ends and control desires and control nature,and the social end man strives for is a free democratic culture that emancipates his potentialities.

5. Summary of Dewey's World-View

In the beginning of his career Dewey was a theist concerned about the problem of reconciling the claims of religion and science. He accepted the the idealist world-view. He shared G.S.Morris' antipathy toward metaphysical speculations. At first he denied that pragmatism could or should say anything about untimate Reality. Later he developed his own metaphysics along naturalistic lines. Equating classical philosophy and Christianity, Dewey made a break with them on the grounds that they were dualistic, escape mechanism, dogmatic,and individualistic.

Nature,according to Dewey,is an affair of events. There are immediate qualities in events.These are not cognitive,nor are they atomistic. The cognitive aspects of events are relational. All events,in all respects are changing. Nature has regularities,rhythms which form the basis for man's science and his arts. Man is completely subsumed in nature. Dewey seeks to explain the emergence of the psychic and mental in terms of physico-

chemical reactions. New organic activities produce psychic qualities. This epiphenomenal relationship of mind to body is not consistently carried over into his educational theory, for there he makes a great deal of the power of the mind to control nature.

Man is fundamentally an evaluating creature. He thinks of the best ways of meeting his needs and interests when tension arises. Man moves within a total environment consisting of nature and culture. We shall examine his epistemology, theory of values, and educational aims based upon his naturalistic world-view.

CHAPTER TWO

DEWEY'S EPISTEMOLOGY

Because of its bearing on his theory of education, we will examine Dewey's epistemology. We have seen that the general matrix in which his thought moves is-individual organism, culture and nature. His theory of knowledge is developed on these naturalistic assumptions.

His epistemology is so radically different from classical theories, that a brief historical sketch of his ideas will be given. For Dewey, inquiry, not truth or knowledge in the usual sense, is the essence of logic. He developed his logic of inquiry over a period of almost half a century in four major volumes: Studies in Logical Theory ; Essays in Experimental Logic ; How We Think; Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. Central in all these is the idea of thought connected with the problematical. In the most recent volume, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry written in 1938 Dewey points to the main distinction between this and his former writings :

> "While connection with the problematic is unchanged, express identification of reflective thought with objective inquiry makes possible I think, a mode of statement less open to misapprehension than were the previous ones." 1

1. The General Background of Dewey's Theory of Inquiry

(a) Organism and Continuity.

Mechanical analogies have always been foreign to Dewey's thinking. Hegel's concept of organic relations helped Dewey combat all forms of mechanistic dualism, and relationships mechanically conceived. He assumed at first that his Hegelian concept of organism was illustrated by biology.

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1) Logic, The Theory of Inquiry iii

The second book Dewey wrote was Leibnitz' New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding ,published in 1888. The emphasis Leibnitz makes on unity,and continuity,is congenial to Dewey. He suggests that Leibnitz did not derive these ideas from biology,but found confirmation of them in biology. This is a statement that could equally well be applied to Dewey's thinking at this stage.

(b) The Doubt-Inquiry Process

Hegel and Darwin contributed also to Dewey's theory of the place of the problematical situation in the origin of thought. In his paper on Kant, written in 1889,Dewey asserted that all philosophical reflection began in situations in which there were 'contradictions'. When Darwinian influences took precedence over Hegelian,the idea of contradictions was transposed into situations of tension that arise in adjustment to environment.

In a review,including Lester Ward's The Psychic Factors Of Civilization ,Dewey approves in the main of Ward's analysis of the origin of the power of mental exploration. In summarizing Ward's theory Dewey states a principle that guided much of his own thought.

> "When a desire having a certain amount of active vigor at command meets obstacles,the result is that the animal is no longer simply checked". Because,although"external motion is arrested internal motility is increased." With the increase of "internal motility", the animal develops new points of attack,and thus by an indirect or flank movement finally reaches its goal. "This advantageous method would be selected and perpetuated until,finally,the power of mental exploration is developed." 2

The only exception Dewey takes to Ward's account is that he thinks this situation of tension is repeated in all subsequent thinking,while Ward looks upon it as an explanation of the origin of mental powers which later out loose from the conditions in which they originated.

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2)Psychological Review 1 pp 400-411 Quoted from White "The Origin and of Dewey's Instrumentalism" p 120

(c) Thought and Action

Though at first much more Hegelian than Kantian, Dewey agreed with Kant that thought is active. But he saw in Kant a gulf between formal thought, and the particulars and materials of thought. The theory of mind as active was combined with the concept of continuity, and with the Darwinian emphasis upon adjustment to environment. Thus one cannot understand Dewey's difficult view that thinking changes the object thought about, unless one remembers that he includes bodily action and the consequences of an act in the total process of thinking.

> "(Thinking)..involves the explorations by which relevant data are procured and the physical analyses by which they are refined and made precise; it comprises the reading by which information is got hold of, the words which are experimented with, and the calculations by which the significance of the entertained conceptions or hypotheses is elaborated. Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain." 3

As Dewey well recognizes, this is a radical re-definition of thinking.

(d) Having and Knowing

We have noted that Dewey makes a fundamental distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive experiences. In Psychology (1887) he distinguishes between a 'thing', and its 'function'. In terms of experience this means the difference between immediate 'felt' experience, and its functional aspects. The image is particular, and the concept is something the image accomplishes, and is thus its meaning. The percept is identified with the image. Thus, the concept is constructed by the percept, by realizing its full meaning. The meaning that was implicit in the percept becomes explicit. Thus 'meaning', becomes a mode of mental action, of

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3) Essays In Experimental Logic p 14

construction. Later Dewey comes to think of the 'concept' in a far less mentalistic sense, by linking thought to physical action. However this is the psychological root of his instrumentalism.

In Applied Psychology, continuity between sensation and thought is emphasized, and the mediate character of all knowledge asserted. Sensations are the last antecedants of a physical state aroused by bodily stimulus. They are immediate. The mind does not have to think or remember to have these things. Thus they are not 'knowledge'. They stimulate images, which as we have seen, are identical in Dewey's psychology, with percepts. These percepts construct meaning. This is the psychological basis for his distinction between 'having' and 'knowing', and the view that all knowledge is 'mediate'. We shall later more fully examine this view, because it is the basis for much of Dewey's writings on espitemology and value. The important issue of the validity of vision and intuition rests on this analysis.

(c) The Scientific Method

Dewey was first introduced to experimental psychology under G. Stanley Hall at Johns Hopkins University. The experimental approach was so congenial to his mind that he called his philosophical outlook "experimental idealism." Biology and sociology were also of great interest to Dewey. We have mentioned the writings in which Dewey developed his theory of logic. In all of them he is concerned with the method of inquiry as followed by science. When Venn's book, Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic appeared, Dewey considered it an important contribution to the new

logic. However he objected to Venn's view that logic was different from the disciplines of physics and psychology. This seemed dualistic to Dewey, and in his own theory he includes the biological and cultural matrix in which inquiry proceeds.

> "The theory in summary form, is that all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions..it means that while inquiry into inquiry is the causa cognoscendi of logical forms, primary inquiry itself is causa essendi of the forms which inquiry into inquiry discloses." 4

(f) Summary of the Background of Dewey's Logic of Inquiry.

Hegelian and Darwinian concepts of organism and continuity are used against all forms of dualism. He stands against all separation of knower from known object, percept from concept, mind from body, thought from action. 'Contradictions' in Hegelian dialectic became transferred to situations of tension according to the Darwinian emphasis upon adaptation of organism to environment. This is further developed into the problematical matrix of all thinking. Kant's emphasis upon thought as active was transformed into thought as action, including physical acts. Sensations, the final physical antecedents of mental activity, are immediate. They furnish the stimulus to the image and perceptual function of the organism, and concepts follow. The concept is the power of the image to convey meaning or intellectual value. This 'constructivism' is fundamental to Dewey's distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive experiences, and between having and knowing.

2. The Specific Background of Dewey's Theory of Inquiry.

(a) Pragmatism.

The final cast taken by these various influences was Pragmatism.

4) Logic. The Theory of Inquiry. pp 3,4.

This is not to suggest that Dewey's treatment of any philosophical issue falls neatly into pigeon-holes. There have been three terms used to designate the movement in American philosophy associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey-Pragmatism, Instrumentalism, and Experimentalism.

C.S.Peirce, the son of a celebrated mathematician, is credited with originating the pragmatic movement. Dewey, in Philosophy and Civilization, traces the history of Pragmatism, and calls attention to the fact that Peirce took the word 'pragmatism' from Kant. In his writing Kant distinguished between 'praktisch' and 'pragmatisch'. Peirce, with a laboratory habit of mind, was troubled by the wide separation of the meaning of these two terms. The former seemed to Peirce to move in a region far removed from daily experience. The latter seemed to make concrete connection with human purpose. The attitude of the scientist was described by Peirce as follows :

> "Whatever assertion you make to him, he will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he will see no sense at all in what you say." 5

In Dewey's comments on Peirce's essay in which he develops his theory he calls attention to the Kantian background of Peirce's thought :

> "There is a remarkable similarity here to Kant's doctrine. Peirce's effort was to interpret the universality of concepts in the domain of experience in the same way in which Kant established the law of practical reason in the domain of the a priori". 6

The meaning of a proposition, according to Peirce is to be found in its

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5) Monost Vol.15 p.165. Quoted from Dewey, Philosophy of Civilization. p 14
6) Philosophy and Civilization p 15

application to human conduct,and universals can thus be arrived at by

> "defining accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply." 7

Peirce was primarily a logician and scientist,and he worked out his theories in a limited field of discourse,to guide scientific research. That he held a radically different view of theism and the nature of perception from that of Dewey,can be seen in the following passage from his Collected Papers :

> "Where would such an idea say as that of God come from,if not from direct experience ?..as to God,open your eyes--and your heart, which is also a perceptive organ--and you see him. But you may ask,Dont you admit there are any delusions ? Yes: I may think a thing is black and on close examination it may turn out to be bottle green. But I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing as black...It is the nominalists,and the nominalists alone,who indulge in such skepticism,which the scientific method utterly condemns." 8

In Peirce's review of George Berkeley which appeared in The North American Review in 1871,his theories were set forth. These became the core of pragmatism. H.W.Schneider in A History of American Philosophy summarizes Peirce's propositions as follows:

> (1) The question of the validity of knowledge may be approached and settled inductively as a scientific problem.
> (2) Experimental verification is based on faith in an eventual agreement among observers,and the universals eventually held by the community of knowers constitute reality and truth.
> (3) Kant's doctrine that the real object is determined by the mind is to be interpreted as meaning that the objectively valid universals in our experience of objects are normal products of a community of 'mental action',not incognizable causes.
> (4) Science is to be freed from contamination with nominalism, individualism,and materialism by reviving realism through mathematical logic.
> (5) Philosophy and mathematics must discard their leisurely elegance and take on a practical form by addressing themselves to proving the reality of community. 9

7) Monist vol.15 p 162 Quoted from Dewey,Philosophy and Civilization p 14
8) Collected Papers Vol VI Charles Sanders Peirce From Charles Hartshorne's "Man's Vision of God". p 299
9) Schneider, "A History of American Philosophy" p 519

Dewey,who drew heavily upon Peirce,was eager to guard against two popular misconception about his views. Action was not held to be an end in itself. Its role is that of an intermediary. One must be able to apply concepts to experience to attribute meaning to them. As Peirce,used the term,action did not mean brute exercise of strength,but action as it tends toward generalization and regularization. For Peirce a habit is the biological embodiment of a general idea.Belief is a rule of action :

> "the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place it is also a new starting place for thought..The final upshot,of thinking is the exercise of volition,and of this thought no longer forms a part;but belief is only a stadium of mental action,an effect upon our nature due to thought,which will influence future thinking." 10

Peirce thus thought he had proved that a universal as distinguished from a particular state of consciousness could be defined in terms of habits of belief,and these in terms of habits of action. Dewey insists that Peirce was not interested primarily in individual reactions to particular situations. This would have left him open to the charge of utilitarianism. He was interested rather in universals and community. So action is not for its own sake,but a way in which the existent comes to embody universals.

William James (1842-1910) carried on the work begun by Peirce. He was more of an individualist than Peirce,and his primary interests were education and religion. His first published essay on pragmatism was an article written in 1878 for the Journal of Speculative Philosophy called "Brute and Human Intellect". Holding that philosophy was too remote from the active life of mankind,much of his concern was motivated by the desire

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10) Schneider "A History of American Philosophy" p 522 The quotation is from "Peirce,The Philosophy of Peirce. Selected Writings" ed.by James Buchler (New York 1940) -pp 36,37

to show that beliefs have consequences in conduct-that beliefs really matter.

In his Gifford lectures The Varieties of Religious Experience delivered in Edinburgh (1901-1902), he spoke as a psychologist interested in 'the religious propensities of man'. In these lectures he criticizes types of philosophy and theology that overlook the fact that man's thinking is organically related to conduct.

> "The Continental schools of philosophy have often overlooked the fact that man's thinking is organically connected with his conduct. It seems to me to be the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers to have kept the organic connection in view." 11

Dewey considers James more of a nominalist than Peirce,and holds that he particularizes the pragmatic theory. A philosophical proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in practical experience whether active or passive. The main point lies in the fact that the experience must be particular,rather than in the fact that it must be active.

James was interested in looking toward fruits,consequences,and facts, rather than toward first things, 'categories' or necessities. Combining pragmatism with empiricism he identified truth in a particular case with verification,and then pushed the argument to the point of holding that truth in general was determined by consequences.

How closely Dewey follows James may be seen in this summary of his instrumentalism :

> "Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts,of judgements and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences." 12

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11) Varieties of Religious Experience pp 442,443
12) Philosophy and Civilization p 26

Although Dewey resents the implication sometimes made that instrumentalism is simply a reflection of American activism, he does grant that the progressive and changing character of American life has had a part in bringing this philosophy into being. And John L. Childs, a disciple of Dewey, in Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism, suggests four factors in American culture that have had an effect on the thought of the experimentalists :

(1) The absence of a rigidly fixed system of ancient traditions, customs and institutions.
(2) The primitive quality of life on the frontier where modern trained men were obliged to live in an uncultivated environment..
(3) The reality given to ideals of social democracy and human progress in a new world where natural resources were abundant and men were relatively scarce.
(4) Extensive industrial development, and the unparalleled use made of the machine..The 'metaphysics of the instrument' came more naturally to a people who had witnessed man and his tools subduing a continent. 13

3. Dewey's Formulation of the Theory of Inquiry

(a) The Naturalistic Matrix of Logic

In Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (1938) Dewey says there is agreement in contemporary logical theory with regard to proximate subject matter. But there is controversy with regard to ultimate subject matter. He deplores the fact that logic is tied to theories of metaphysics.

The difficulties that arise from metaphysical theories, he says, can be overcome by cutting logic away from all of them and accepting the task of working logic out as a science of inquiry. In Quest For Certainty, he asserts that the entire difficulty about logic can be traced to the single error of dualistic metaphysics. He wants a system of logic

13) John L. Childs "Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism" pp 18, 19

which rests upon no epistemological or metaphysical assumptions. Yet we must note that he begins with several far reaching assumptions. One is the complete denial of the supernatural. And the other is the ultimacy of inquiry. E.S.Ames has worked out the implications of Dewey's philosophy as it pertains to religion. According to Ames the true view is "to regard science as the method of all possible knowledge".[14] J.L.Childs is equally explicit :

> "However if one proclaims that the experimental method is the all-inclusive method, does he not in so doing express a belief that the general nature of the world is such that this one method is adequate to discover all important meanings discoverable by any valid method." 15

We conclude then, that Dewey has not been able to construct his theory of inquiry apart from metaphysical assumptions. It is frankly based on naturalistic presuppositions. We will question whether he gives a convincing account of the continuity between lower (less complex) and higher (more complex activities and forms) . And we will question the adequacy of his theory of truth.

(b) Continuity

We saw that in Dewey's approach to the mind-body problem he either ended with a descriptive account of things, or when he went beyond this, he left mental processes in the status of epiphenomena with regard to the body. Yet we know he builds his educational theories on the efficacy of creative intelligence. Does he clarify this ambiguity ?

(1) Emergence and Continuity

The height reached by creative intelligence is to be seen in bringing

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14) E.S.Ames "Religion" p 74
15) Childs "Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism" p 46

novelties into being:

> "As a matter of fact, the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends to free experience from routine and from caprice...the use of itelligence to liberate and liberalize action is the pragmatic lesson." 16

He goes beyond adjustment to environment. Intelligence is more than functional in the survival sense. It involves memory and forecast, and brings them to bear upon the present. Real 'emergence' is here assumed. In Chapter VII, of Experience and Nature, he develops this view which we summarize.

Dewey's context is a serial order of natural events which fall into definite well marked stages. Once on this earth no living being existed. The difference between living and non-living things is that the former are characterized by needs, efforts to satisfy the needs, and satisfaction. The difference lies in the way physico-chemical energies are connected and operate, leading to different consequences. The activity of an oganism is designated as psycho-physical. Organization is one mark of the psychic. How does this occur ? If this cannot be fully explained, Dewey says, it is not because there is a mysterious supernatural power at work, but because it is complex. He is sure that all theories that bring in a special force at this point call 'life', or 'soul force' are mistaken. He accounts for sensitivity in the following manner :

> "When ever the activities of the constituent parts of an organized pattern of activity are of such a nature as to conduce to the perpetuation of the patterned activity, there exists the basis of sensitivity. Each 'part' of an organism is itself organized, and so of the parts of the part. Hence its selective bias in interactions with environing things is exercised so as to maintain itself, while also maintaining the whole of which it is a member. The root-tips of a plant interact with chemical properties of the soil in such ways as to serve organized life activity..This pervasive

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16) Creative Intelligence p 63

> operative presence of the whole in the part and of the part in the whole, constitutes susceptibility--the capacity of feeling--whether or no this potentiality be actualized in plant life. Responses are not merely selective, but are discriminatory, in behalf of some results rather than others. This discrimination is the essence of sensitivity." 17

There are some questions we would ask. Why does the constituent part of an organized activity act so as to perpetuate the whole ? Why does it so act as to maintain itself and the whole, and the whole so act as to maintain the part ? Are the selective, discriminatory responses best described in chemico-physical terms or in psychic terms.? And can we believe that this complicated process can best be thought of in terms of epiphenomenal reflexes, of the play of physico-chemical energies ? Why is it not more reasonable to suppose that the psychic qualities, if there are both physical and psychis present, have the leading role.? These same questions persist as we pass on to the animal level.

> "..in animals in which locomotion and distance-receptors exist, sensitivity and interest are realized as feelings, even though as vague and massive uneasiness, comfort, vigor and exhaustion." 18

These actions become differentiated into preparatory and consummatory. This is suffused with the

> "consummatory tone of sex, or food, or security, to which it contributes. Sensitivity, the capacity is then actualized as feeling." 19

Animals have differentiated feelings which vary in quality, corresponding to different phases of activity. They are not aware of these. Life at this level is psycho-physical but not 'mental'. Mental is defined as awareness of meaning. Mental phenomena do not appear before language.

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17) Experience and Nature p 256
18) Ibid p 256
19) Ibid p 258

> "..mind is an added property assumed by a feeling creature when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language,communication." 20

The nature of thinking,and the difference between the animal and human level of life,is closely bound up with Dewey's theory of language. Animal feelings,as indications of acts performed and to be performed ,and of signs and their consequences,are meaningful. That is they make sense,they are 'sensé'. Animal experience is by wave after wave,with little residue except in habit,and the animal lives mostly in the present. Man has an awareness of things not perceived at the movsent;and this is not washed out by new waves of experience. Language 'objectifies' the feelings.

> "Without language,the qualities of organic action that are feelings are pains,pleasures,odors,colors,noises,tones,only potentially and proleptically. With language they are discriminated and identified. They are then 'objectified' they are immediate traits of things." 21

This objectification is not a miraculous ejection into things by a 'soul'. The qualities were always qualities of interactions between extra-organic things and organisms. When the qualities are 'named' they stand for things that are no longer in experience and can be retained. These representative elements taken up through language are a system of signs. For example,hunger denotes a quality of active relationship of organism and environment. It refers to food,and directs the organism toward the satisfaction of this feeling. Basic to Dewey's theory of language and value is the following passage :

> "..the qualities were never 'in' the organism;they were always qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake. When named,they enable identification and discrimination of things to take place as means to a further course of inclusive interaction. Hence they are as much qualities of the things engaged as of the organism..The notion that sensory affections discriminate and identify themselves apart from discourse,as being colors and sounds etc..and thus ipso facto constitute certain

20) Experience and Nature p 259
21) Ibid 258,259

> elementary modes of knowledge,even though it be knowledge of their own existence,is inherently so absurd that it would never have occurred to any one to entertain it,were it not for certain preconceptions about mind and knowledge. Sentiency in itself is anoetic;it exists as any immediate quality exists,but never-the-less it is an indispensable means of any noetic function." 22

Though we may agree with Dewey that these new organic activities and the 'objectifying' of feelings are not to be accounted for by a special 'stuff' called 'soul', or 'mentality',we may well ask what makes all the meaning, and the naming of qualities possible ? Why is it not reasonable to hold that a creative,noetic energy plays the leading part in language and in meaning? It cannot be denied that thinking involves certain organic relationships. But an epiphenomenal account of mind hardly seems an adequate explanation of the complex context involving physical energy,immediate qualities,and meanings. That Dewey is correct in placing values within the total reaction-context may be granted. But we question whether his naturalistic context is the complete matrix in which meanings and values come into existence and become known to man. We would grant that sensory affections do not discriminate and identify themselves apart from discourse,but we take the view that the field of discourse includes far more than Dewey allows. Dewey stops with the natural and cultural matrix. And we maintain that he has not given a convincing account of the continuity between physical and creative intelligence. The distinction between physical,psychophysical,and mental,as simply one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction between natural events,is hardly more than a partial description,and surely not an explanation. Dewey will not allow the possibility of final causation which could supply the missing factor

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22) Experience and Nature p.259

in his theory. He certainly has not escaped a tendency toward mythical thinking. He sees the need for the term 'causation', but insists on naturalizing it :

> "As far as the conception of causation is to be introduced at all, not matter but the natural events having matter as a character 'cause' life and mind." 23

He is not using 'natural events' strictly within the bounds of scientific categories. He has covered over a very complex, shadowy area where physics, psychology, biology and metaphysics all move without complete assurance, by a description based upon assumptions and definitions which oversimplify, and we believe distort the picture. Why he should insist that 'natural events' and not 'supernatural events', bring about the effects he describes seems hard to explain except on the basis of his anti-theistic, anti-supernatural bias. Dewey shows his pragmatic concern by turning from his complicated description of the continuity of lower and higher levels and saying that :

> " 'effects' which mark the release of potentialities are more adequate indications of the nature of nature, than are just 'causes'." 24

(c) <u>The Nature of Thought</u>

The have questioned whether Dewey gives a convincing account of continuity of physical and psychic energies. We now turn to his account of the thinking process. We noted that in his earliest psychological studies he made perception identical with 'image', and meaning implicit in the 'image'. Perception was simply an earlier stage of inferential thinking.

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23) Experience and Nature pp 261
24) Ibid 262

My contention is that Dewey's naturalistic world-view enters strongly into his interpretation of perception. If nature is man's environment, and nature is an affair of events, if everything is changing and nothing endures, if mind and qualities are produced by physico-chemical energies, then thinking can be reduced to functional terms. Since it is assumed that there is no Perfect Being, no Creator who is present in His world man's thoughts must then be turned to more practical matters. Perception in a naturalistic world frame takes on a radically different meaning than perception in a theistic world frame.

(1) Perception and Inference

Bertrand Russell in An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth maintains that there are two schools of philosophy, the Hegelians and Instrumentalists, which deny the distinction between data and inference. They maintain that the test of knowledge is coherence rather than conformity with 'fact', and that in all our knowledge there is an inferential element. He does not deny an element of truth in this view, but thinks if it is taken as the whole truth it makes no room for the part perception plays in knowledge. He admits that the data we obtain are never completely certain, but doubts the ineffability of perceptive experience .

What is Dewey's view of perception ? We may begin our analysis at the highest level and move from there to its elementary foundations. In A Common Faith , Dewey takes a particular religious experience and gives his interpretation of it. He quotes a certain writer :

> "I broke down from overwork, and soon came to the verge of nervous prostration. One morning after a long and sleepless night..I resolved to stop drawing upon, myself so continuously and begin

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> drawing upon God. I determined to set apart a quiet time every day in which I could relate my life to its ultimate source, regain the consciousness that in God I live, move and have my being. That was thirty years ago. Since then I have had literally not one hour of darkness or despair."25

Dewey says he does not doubt the authenticity of the experience. Actually, however he does doubt the essential nature of the experience, because he assumes that the writer is mistaken about being in touch with reality beyond nature and culture. He seeks to reduce the expedience to naturalistic explanations, and says a fatalist would have one interpretation, and a Christian Scientist another. In other words he denies the validity of the intuitional insight.

Why does Dewey assume that the religious background of the man led him to false conclusions? Knowing Dewey's anti-metaphysical bias, and his naturalistic world frame, it would seem fair to ask whether he stops short of the profound nature of the experience because of these assumptions. Futhermore, his theory of perception throws further light on his interpretation.

(2) The Nature of Perceptual Experience

Dewey assumes that the function of perceptual experience is not to know the nature of the object or the event as such. Its aim is to get the organism through a confused and problematical situation.

> "It is only when an object of focal observation is regarded as an object of knowledge in isolation that there arises the notion that there are two kinds of knowledge, and two kinds of objects of knowledge. When it is seen that in common sense inquiry there is no attempt made to know the object or event as such, but only to determine what it signifies with respect to the way in which the entire situation could be dealt with, the opposition and

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25) A Common Faith p 11,12.

> do not arise. The object or event in question is perceived as part of the environing world,not in and by itself;it is rightly (validly) perceived if and when it acts as clew and guide to use-enjoyment" 26

For Dewey,perception is an attitude of awareness and anticipation. It is a prediction as to possible creative action that will resolve the difficulty and gain an end. Thus it is the first step in an inferential process of thought that completes itself in 'taking thought' and resulting in action. When this review of accumulated experience in the light of the new situation results in rapid connection,this may be called intuition . Perception and its most intense form,intuition, constitute the first stage of conceptual thinking. That which is felt and seen but vaguely,becomes clear when thought is given to it. And its purpose is to give a clue,to give guidance to experiences of enjoyment,or to avoidance of pain and frustration.

Dewey criticized the idealists for exalting thought too highly,but in some of his moods he seems to give fantastic powers to perception. In Philosophy and Civilization he criticizes Bergson's view of perception as a stimulus to action. Dewey's view is that we through perception invest the environment with new meanings,and thus create the stimulus. We choose the response by forming the stimulus.

> Thus if at any point we let go of the thread of the process of the , "organism's determining its own eventual total response through determining the stimulus to that response by a series of partial responses,we are lost." 27

The outcome of this is strange. It would seem that man literally shapes his environment by looking at it. Action of course is part of the total process. It is a process of 'determining the indeterminate'.

Dewey criticizes the realists for claiming to have immediate apprehension of the nature of things as they exist independently.All 'spectator

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26) Logic,The Theory of Inquiry p 67

theories of knowledge' have his condemnation. He rejects perceptual idealism also, on the grounds that it misconceives the nature of signifying. It was right in its view that qualities directly experienced were taken as signs of something beyond themselves. But he thinks, that by isolating this insight from the doubt-inquiry process, idealists wrongly concluded that knowledge was the development of an idea according to the character inherent in thought itself. And of the rationalists he says :

> "The rationalist school was right in so far as it insisted that sensory qualities are significant for knowledge only when connected by means of ideas. But they were wrong in locating ideas in intellect apart from experience." 28

And traditional empiricism engaged in a "one sided selection of perceptual material, and interpreted it in an atomistic manner.

The importance of Dewey's work at this point is in his emphasis upon the kinesthetic elements in the phenomenology of experience, and in his stress upon action in the knowing process. But the role Dewey assigns to perceptual thinking surely cannot be supported by his epiphenomenal view that lies at the base of his naturalism. And, to hold that there is no difference in kind between perceptual awareness and conceptual activity, has been questioned by many philosophers besides Bertrand Russell. A scientist would maintain that he is in some kind of rapport with objects which he has not created, but which he has discovered. He might agree with Dewey that the 'wax tablet' theory is not sound. But he would be realistic in the sense of holding that he is in touch with reality and not producing it by the activity of his mind. Likewise in our theistic approach to

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28) Quest For Certainty p 110

the problem, we would insist with the scientist that man discovers Reality outside himself. Not 'outside' in the sense of being isolated from, but in the sense that man does not produce, but rather discovers this Reality. And we would maintain that man is interested in knowing whether there is such a Reality, and in something about its essence. This is the crucial concern. We are rightly warned by Dewey that rationalization is a real danger. And we are rightly reminded by him that our active minds and our bodies enter into perceptual thinking. We cannot assume that we are not subject to vagueness and to error, both in our perception of Reality, and in our attempts to communicate such experience. Dorothy Emmett, in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, in her discussion of perceptual experience, concludes with this warning, which includes many of Dewey's warnings, but does allow for the possibility of perception being a valid way of securing data.

> "If we could say that our perceptual experience is some sort of 'projection' of events in the external world, preserving their proportionate structure, we should have all we want for analogical knowledge at least of their relationships. But we have seen that we cannot say with assurance that this is so; the most we can say with assurance is that our perceptual experience, if we take all possible precautions for checking and correcting it, is a systematic distortion preserving some sort of concomitant variation with its differential conditions in the external world. 29

Coming back then to the illustration of the man who claimed to have a consciousness that God sustained him, we can see more clearly why Dewey rejects the basic assumption of such an experience. He is not prepared in the first place to accept any reality other than nature and culture. And he makes all perceptual experience inferential. Our view is that both

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29) The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking pp. 86,87.

the general context in which perceptual thinking takes place,and the nature of perceptual experience are open to another interpretation. If as Christian theism holds,man stands in continuous relationship to a Power greater than himself,a Power best described in personal analogies, then this relationship is the fundamental fact of all 'knowing'. It furnishes the crucially important 'data' distinct from inferential thought. We may hold that the relationship is direct and is a conscious relationship without assuming that the apprehension is complete. The knowledge gained is not primarily a self-development of thought as the idealist would maintain. We do not need to assume that everything in principle is permeable to man's thought,but can maintain that it is permeable to a Mind other than man's mind.

(3) Knowledge of Persons.

A kind of 'knowing' that is most relevant to our inquiry is the knowledge of persons. We noted the psychological point of view at the base of Dewey's distinction between 'knowledge about' and 'acquaintance with'. Experience cannot be dissolved into relations. There is something unique to which relations are attached. There is a 'this-ness' inherent in all experience. It is not to be thought of atomistically. There is a 'qualia' that binds experience together in a unified whole. It organization is non-logical in character. We pointed out that in Dewey's view, nature has 'ends and histories',as well as relational aspects. We now note that Dewey makes the same distinction between 'having' and 'knowing', when he thinks of knowledge about persons.

> "The interaction of human beings,namely,association,is not different in origin from other modes of interaction. There is a peculiar absurdity in the question of how individuals become social,if the question is taken literally. Human beings illustrate the same traits of both immediate uniqueness and connection,relationship,as do other things." 30

Dewey's logic of inquiry is supplemented by 'acquaintance-knowledge'. He grants the validity of the distinction between 'knowledge about',and the acquaintance one has of neighbours. In the latter there is a directness and intimacy lacking in the former.

> "the distinction between the two modes of knowledge was embodied in linguistic expressions long before theoretical attention was called to it: Cognoscere and scire; connaitre and savior;kennen and wissen."

But as we have seen,Dewey does not give intuition and perception a unique place in his epistemology. Therefore he is not among those psychologists who stress the necessity of both inference and intuition in the study of personality. Gordon Allport,in Personality a Psychological Interpretation, maintains that,though inference accounts for many facts in coming to know people,it is inadequate as a method. It suffers from the same defects as the theory of association. Reviewing the theories of intuition as developed by W.Köhler,the innate knowledge and identity theories of Plato,Hegel,and C.G.Jung,the immediate knowledge theory of Bergson,and Dilthey's psychology of 'Verstehen ', Allport concludes that intuition is the crucial method of relating personality traits to the life stream of each separate personality studied. Though Dewey is critical of the extreme behavioristic position,he is closer to behavioristic views,than the one represented by Allport.

And the school of thought represented by Dr.Eberhard Grisebach,Dr. Heim

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30) Experience and Nature pp 174,175.
31) Logic,The Theory of Inquiry p 151.

and Dr.Martin Buber,in which the problem of knowing other minds received fresh attention,develops a line of thought to which Dewey gave little attention. Professor John Baillie, in Our Knowledge of God, calls this re-opening of the question of our knowledge of one another the "hopeful element in the philosophy of our time."32 In opposition to the school of thought that holds that our knowledge of one another and of God is inferential,Professor Baillie quotes a statement from Cook Wilson which illustrates the direct approach :

> "If we think of the existence of our friends;it is the direct knowledge which we want;merely inferential knowledge seems a poor affair. To most men it would be ..surprising,..to hear it could not be directly known whether there were such existences as their friends, and that it was only a matter of (probable) empirical argument and inference from the facts which are directly known. And even if we convince ourselves on reflection that this is really the case,our actions prove that we have a confidence in the existence of our friends which cannot be derived from an empirical argument (which never can be certain) for a man will risk his life for his friends. Could he possibly be satisfied with an inferred God." 33

Dewey would agree with Dr.Buber that man is conscious of being confronted by another center of experience. But Dewey would deny,on the basis of his theory of perception,that in this relationship there are intuitive insights into the nature of the person. Nothing can really be said about that question. He is satisfied with personal relationships carried forward on the basis of practical enjoyment,and with intelligent inferential thinking that leads to action in the solution of tension,and the enrichment of the social experiences. Whether persons are real or not in a metaphysical sense, does not concern him. And whether man is in touch with a Reality other than human nature,and can discover God in these relationships,seems to Dewey a kind of metaphysical speculation that diverts philosophy from its

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32) J.Baillie "Our Knowledge of God p 201
33) Ibid p 207 Quotation from Cook Wilson "Statement and Inference" vol 11 page 853

main task.

(4) Summary and Critical Comments

Dewey holds that the problem of knowledge is the problem of an adequate theory of inquiry. A problem of knowledge in general, he says, is nonsense. Thinking arises in problematical situations. The pragmatic criterion of truth is "an idea is true when it keeps its promises". How thought functions in the experimental determination of future consequences, is the basic question for a theory of inquiry. And the matrix in which man's experiences move is nature and culture. The highest forms of intelligent action can be wholly naturalized, and continuity shown between them and the emergence of mind, in the interaction of physical energies. The basic pattern out of which mind emerges is need, effort to satisfy need, and its satisfaction. This brings physical energies into action in different ways, and the psycho-physical level is reached. Complex organizations occur, which are only mysterious because they are complex, and the supernatural is brought in because man has not yet fully explained the process. Man retains awareness as animals do not, and language objectifies man's feelings in a system of signs that make possible their recall and guides their further satisfaction.

All thinking, according to Dewey, is basically inferential. Perception does not discover new data. And it cannot discover the nature of Reality. Its purpose is to review data discovered in former processes of experimental inquiry, and to connect these with a new situation so as to provide clues for action. Perception 'determines the indeterminate'. There is an aspect of experience which is alogical. Things are enjoyed, felt, and entered into which are non-cognitive. Man cannot have knowledge of the nature of these existents, but can have knowledge about their relationships.

An epistemology in a theistic framework can profit by Dewey's emphasis upon the problematical and the concrete. Furthermore, his stress on the kinesthetic elements in the phenomenology of experience, and his linking of thought to action serve to remind us of the unity of experience. And his view that "an idea is true when it keeps its promises" has an affinity with the religious emphasis "by their fruits ye shall know them". 34

However, in a theistic epistemology perception and intuition in the approach to persons are held to give direct knowledge, and the analogy of personal relationships is basic to knowledge of God. Theism, in contrast to naturalism, maintains that the basic relationship in which man's life exists and functions, is his relationship to God. Thinking, thus is not only problematical, it is also intuitive and perceptual, and discovers data in the basic relationship of man with a Power greater than himself. This does not mean that knowledge of God is isolated from the relationships of other persons and nature. It is not direct in the sense that it by-passes man's natural powers and relationships. It comes through these. We will develop the theistic approach to education around the concept 'love'. It has a bearing upon epistemology in that man cannot know the love of God, apart from the love of persons. I agree with Peirce that the 'heart' is also a 'perceptive organ'. There are ways of seeing into the nature of reality, which no doubt can find correction in the 'doubt-inquiry' process, and are closely connected with the volitional life of man. But they are based upon what the theist believes is a fundamental fact, which the naturalist overlooks—the fact that deus est caritas.

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24) Matthew 7:20 (Authorized Version)

CHAPTER THREE

DEWEY'S ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

I. Value and Validity.

Dewey maintains that the dualistic views of most traditional philosophical systems have made arbitrary divisions between values and their natural sources. Thus having introduced artificial dualism, a place has to be found for values in a realm far removed from concrete existence.

> "Poignancy, humor, zest, tragedy, beauty, prosperity and bafflement, although rejected from a nature which is identified with mechanical structure, remain just what they empirically are, and demand recognition. Hence they are gathered up in the realm of values, contradistinguished from the realm of existence. Then the philosopher has a new problem with which to wrestle: What is the relationship of these two worlds.? " 1

We must, he says, return to Greek conceptions which found no room for a theory of values separate from nature. However, he does not return uncritically to the Greek philosophers. He rejects their idea that natural ends are identified with perfection. For him an end :

> "has no intrinsic eulogistic quality but is the boundary which writes 'Finis' to a chapter of history inscribed by a moving system of energies." 2

In the more positive sense in which he uses the term 'ends', they are objectives. Thus 'ends' are not predetermined, as in Greek thought, but are as numerous as the action they guide and delimit. Limits are experimentally determined.

Because values are elusive, changing, and precarious, the problem is not to unlock their inmost nature, but to select and criticize. We cannot think and discourse about their nature.

> "Values are values, things immediately having certain intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they

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1) Experience and Nature p. 394
2) Ibid p 395.

> are what they are..The notion that things as direct values lend themselves to thought and discourse rests upon a confusion of causal categories with immediate qualities." 3

It may be said in passing that many philosophers have not found the generate conditions in which values come into being easy to describe. Dewey would of course charge them with holding theories which obscure the simplicity of the naturalistic theory of values. He is interested in the symbolic meaning of values,and their functional character. Means and fulfillment are the full significance of values. They have different qualities,but that is accounted for by the fact that they are different affairs,different histories. In like manner,symphonies,operas,and oratories have different qualities.

When thought enters,it is for the purpose of discovering means and their relationship to consequences. And such thinking is 'criticism'. Thus philosophy is primarily 'criticism',and has to do with theories of value. Philosophy is not concerned about the nature of direct occurrence,for it is reflective,and sets forth reflective criteria.

> "Criticism is discriminating judgement,careful appraisal,and judgement is appropriately termed criticism whenever the subject-matter or discrimination concerns goods and values. Possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal. First an immature experience is content simply to enjoy. But a brief course in experience enforces reflection;it requires but brief time to teach that some things sweet in the having are bitter in the aftertaste and in what they lead to. Primitive innocence does not last. Enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem." 4

It is then the instability and ambiguity of values that creates the necessity for value-judgements. Not only does the environing medium change, but the person also changes. Taste must thus be cultivated that has the

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3) Ibid p.396
4) Ibid p. 398

ability to discover ever new meanings in the object. This evanescence of 'goods' accounts for the "so called paradoxes of pleasure and virtue, according to which they are not secured by aiming at them,but by attention to other things". 5. It is consistent with his entire outlook that he should discount this paradox,and affirm that there is no other way of attaining things than by giving direct attention to their causal conditions. We will remember,however,that Dewey is not using the term 'cause' in the sense of final cause.

In this alternative emphasis upon the mediate,and the immediate,Dewey finds the basic distinction between appreciation and criticism. In the rhythm of consummatory and instrumental,which he connects with William James' 'perchings and flights', he finds the basis for conscience and morals, and for taste in the fine arts.

> "Values of some sort or other are not traits of rare and festal occasions; they occur whenever any object is welcomed and lingered over..Similarly,criticism is not a matter of formal treatises.. It occurs whenever a moment is devoted to looking to see what sort of value-is present..6

The conflict between the immediate value-object and that which may be reached and justified by reflection is the context of good and bad,conviction and opinion. It is a question of the desired and desireable. We are here at an all-important point in Dewey's theory of value. We must follow his argument carefully. There are beliefs <u>de facto</u> and <u>de jure</u> in knowledge. There are desireable,reasonable goods,and immediate goods in morals. There are goods of perverted taste,and cultivated taste. The true good is no <u>more</u> good as an immediate existence,than the contrasting good called false.

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5) Ibid p 399
6) ibid p.400

> "Either then, the difference between genuine, valid, good, and a counterfeit, specious good is unreal, or it is a difference consequent upon reflection, or criticism, and the significant point is that this difference is equivalent to that made by discovery of relationships, of conditions and consequences." 7

Bound up with this conclusion is the supposition that immediate values simply occur and no theory applies to them. Also, philosophy is the critical operation become aware of itself, and its implications pursued systematically. And this is all preliminary to what Dewey calls the all-important matter that lies behind the acceptance or rejection of the value-object.

> "Properties and relations that <u>entitle</u> an object to be found good in belief are extraneous to the qualities that are its immediate good; they are causal, and hence found only by search into the antecedent and eventual. The conception that there are some objects or some properties of objects which carry their own adequate credentials upon their face is a snare and the delusion of the whole historic traditions regarding knowledge, infecting alike sensational and rational schools, objective realisms and introspective idealism." 8

Dewey thus bases his theory on intelligent critical judgement when possession and enjoyment pass inevitably into appraisal. His logic of doubt-inquiry is designed to bear the burden of this task. There are some values about which nothing can be said. His wholesale dismissal of all traditional theories of value is made on the grounds of his naturalistic and phenomenological assumptions. Dewey recognizes the importance of a world view upon these judgements.

> "The more sure one is that the world which encompasses human life is of such and such a character..the more one is committed to try to direct the conduct of his life, that of others as well as himself, upon the basis of the character assigned to the world." 9

When he speaks of the importance of discovery of relationships, he means of course relationships within his naturalistic matrix. This leaves man as the measure of all value. We would ask whether his theory of energy bring-

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7) Ibid pp 402,403
8) Ibid p.405
9) Ibid pp 413,414

ing forth mind as a functional instrument,and producing feeling organisms called man,is a sufficient subject to produce and be the measure of all values. Not being convinced that it is,we would stand with the traditional theories that are based on the assumption that qualities of truth,goodness and beauty have their source and their permanency in a Being other than man and culture. And we would question whether Dewey's metaphysics,with the view that everything is changing,is a sufficient basis for his optimistic theory that man can discriminate between good and bad,and promote the good.

He criticizes classical philosophies for two errors. For identifying the 'goods' man prizes with a real Being;and for severing the ideal from the realm of existence. All 'wholesale' conceptions about the real,and of existence as related to reality,are futile,according to his view. We would ask whether he does not have a 'wholesale' conception of the relation of existence to reality in such statements as this :

> "Good things change and vanish not only with changes in the environing medium but with changes in ourselves." 10

It is surely a presupposition with wide implications that all things change and vanish,as environment and man changes. It affects his entire philosophical and educational system.

2. Control of Human Nature

Dewey's chief work in the field of ethics is Human Nature and Conduct (1922). In his Reconstruction In Philosophy ,published two years earlier, he layed down the main outline of his ethical theory.The way out of confus-

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10) Ibid p 399.

ion and conflict in ethical theory is to recognize that 'moral goods and ends exist only when something had to be done.' 11 His thesis that there is a social origin of all philosophical theories finds expression in his assertion that the 'final' and 'ultimate' grew out of feudalistic society. When that order of society was disrupted, and when natural science got rid of the belief that the cosmos is bounded and ordered and favors rest to motion, the way was cleared for a revision of ethics. In Human Nature and Conduct, he attempts that revision.

(a) Habits

William James developed the theory that habits are narrow task-masters. Dewey modified this view, and uses the term 'habit', much as many psychologists use the term 'traits'. He does not look upon repetition as the essence of habit.

> "The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessability to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts." 12

Society has a great influence upon the formation of habits in the individual. He says that society does not change habits directly, but indirectly . It is important however to balance this influence by the emphasis he makes on the responsibility of the individual. This interaction is the basis of his educational theory as developed in Democracy and Education. Habit controls environment as well as being affected by it. He thinks of adjustment to environment in terms of control of the means of achieving ends.

(b) Habits and Will

To illustrate the connection between habit and will, Dewey uses the case of the whiskey drinking man. He cannot change his situation by a

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11) Reconstruction In Philosophy p 169 12) Human Nature and Conduct p 42

direct effort of the will,because habits have been formed. They intervene between desire to reform,and execution of the desire. But now we come again to what we consider an ambiguity in Dewey's thought. He says that if we could form a correct idea without a correct habit,then we might carry it out regardless of the habit. But an idea gets definite shape only as it gets a habit back of it. The result is strange :

> "Only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for proper execution. The act must come before the thought,and a habit before an ability to evoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses the actual state of affairs." 13

By ordinary psychology he seems to mean non-behavioristic psychology,and I would say it had a strong case against Dewey. We have been saying all along that Dewey does not give mind and thought the noetic place it deserves. Now to have ideas follow action is a position he does not himself consistently maintain. In Quest For Certainty he says :

> "Ideas are anticipatory plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstruction of antecedent conditions of existence." 14

We have already seen the extraordinary powers he assigns to perceptive thought in changing conditions. There would seem to be no difficulty according to this view for the whiskey-drinking man to cure himself. This position is certainly at the opposite extreme from the deterministic position he develops on behavioristic lines.

> "Only the man who can maintain a correct posture has the stuff out,of which to form that idea of standing erect which can be the starting point of the right act. Only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is." 15

This is surely pushing the idea that habits embody all the good a man can

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13) Human Nature and Conduct p 30.
14) Quest for Certainty p 160
15) Human Nature and Conduct p 32.

know,and the direct effect of habit on ideas,to a surprising conclusion.

And we would suggest that to make 'will' synonymous with habit,is to drop out essential factors in it. J.L. Stocks, in Reason and Intuition , says that one may think of will as setting habits in motion. He also speaks of it as that which gives man persistence in following a line of action pointed to by right and duty. Will,may thus,win victories over emotions that represent a lower line of action. And as it wins victories,it in a sense becomes habitual.

Gordon Allport, in Personality:A Psychological Interpretation , suggests that one may think of will as persistence. He discusses the theories of G.E.Müller, Otto Gross,G.Hermans and B.J.Shevach with regard to the meaning of will,and comes to the following conclusion :

> "The belabored concept of involuntary persefvation (sic) was the psychologists timid,half-hearted gesture toward a troublesome but inescapable problem of personality. The concept of persistence is far bolder,and in the long run should prove sounder." 16

Dewey is no doubt right in connecting will with the motivation of action. But we suggest that he overlooks the selective and determinative aspects of it. It is significant that reflective thinking to which he assigns the crucial role in moral action has none of the qualities that 'will' commonly connotes. He is right is saying that deeds cannot be judged without taking their 'animating disposition' as well as their concrete consequences into account. But we think he has oversimplified this complex experience.

(c) Custom

Dewey finds the basis of custom in the fact that,as well as being

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16) Personality: A Psychological Interpretation p 418

modified by the individual society is a pre-existent association of human beings prior to every particular human being. He thinks there is no problem so artificial as that of how individuals form society. The problem,as he sees it,is the way individuals get caught up into the social matrix,and what they do to modify it. The mind of the individual is not complete,but plastic,and at first helpless and dependent.

This plasticity and docility of the young also means that society tends to foster its bad habits by forcing them on children. A good society must be molded by its young as well as the force that molds them. A democratic society should encourage children to critcally examine customs,and change them if they discover better ways of living.

The real issue for Dewey is whether customs,which are for practical purposes the moral standards of society shall be accepted uncritically and blindly,or shall be intelligently examined and created. He is not interested in a metaphysical basis for ethics,and criticizes Plato for substituting a metaphysical ethic for the ethic of custom.

Dewey replies to the charge that he is removing all moral authority. He uses the illustration of the origin of language. He maintains that it started without standards of grammatical principles. These came after the trial and error of babblings and gestures. Language has such instrinsic worth that it lives on. The same pattern he says holds good for moral customs.

> "What is said of the institution of language holds good of every institution. Family life,property,legal forms,churches and schools, academies of art and science did not originate to serve conscious ends nor was their generation regulated by consciousness of principles of reason and right. Yet each institution has brought with its

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development, demands, expectations, rules, standards." 17

If Dewey meant to say that all our ideas of value, and truth, have some aspect of growth, and that all of them should be open to critical examination, this would be a healthy challenge to authoritarianism and dogmatism. But he does not stop there. He means to say that there are no objective aspects to truth and value, but that they are all relative to man's desires and interests.

This is the background of his 'social lag' theory of man's predicament.

> "Habits of thought and desire remain in substance what they were before the age of science, while the conditions under which they take effect have been radically altered by science." 18

This also has a direct bearing on his educational philosophy. He has confidence in education to solve the ills of society. The schools as they now exist are not capable of performing the task, but they can become equal to it by a full acceptance of the scientific method.

> "If for a single generation psychology and physical science were related systematically and organically to understanding not merely how society is going, but how it might be intelligently directed, then I would have no fear about the future of democracy." 19

In view of what has happened in the world in the past ten years, this sounds quite optimistic. Karl Mannheim, in Diagnosis of Our Time, grants that pragmatism has registered real gains.

> "In my view it is the strong point of Pragmatism as a philosophy that it makes the adjustment character of human behaviour quite explicit." 20

But he points out that Christianity goes beyond pragmatism, in that the Christian does not simply want to adjust himself to his environment but

17) Human Nature and Conduct p 80.
18) Philosophy and Civilization p 318
19) Problems Of Men p 53
20) Diagnosis of Our Time p 141

wishes to do it in harmony with his basic experiences of life. These 'paradigmatic' experiences give significance and guidance to conduct. He calls them archetypes,or primordial images :

> "the hero,the Sage,the Virgo,the Saint,the Repentant;or dominating the realm of Christian imagination: Baptism,Absolution,Agape,the Eucharist, the Good Shepherd,the Cross,Redemption." 21

He says that when these experiences evaporate,right and wrong only mean efficiency,means are emphasized and ends are lost from view. These basic experiences make up a Weltanschauung, and reveal the meaningof life. Mannheim also points out a fact that we have already mentioned,that the pragmatists have their own,often unconscious preconceived ideas.

So central is this naturalistic view of morality to Dewey's concepts of growth,development,progress and religion,that a further aspect of it must be considered. He assumes that standards of value need no further grounding in reality than their intrinsic worth and usefulness. Religion, which is man's attempt to find a basis for his morality hinders intelligent social progress. So Dewey minimizes the question of the ultimate long run of society and its values. He is critical of those who raise this issue.

> "Emergence and growth are not enough for them. They want something more than growth accompanied by toil and pain." 22

Charles Hartshorne in Man's Vision of God asserts that some pragmatists evade this crucial issue. However he shows that Peirce the founder of pragmatism,and William James,did not evade it. He quotes the following from Peirce's Collected Papers:

> "According to Peirce,rational action presupposes that our interests 'embrace the whole community' and that this community 'reach,however vaguely,beyond this geological epoch,beyond all bounds.' " 23

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21) Ibid p 135
22) A Common Faith pp 56,57
23) Man's Vision of God p 173

Hartshorne asks what reason there is for serving tomorrow's good, if the final state of things may be complete destruction of all values which man's efforts have created. He says, that those who see no point in this, and are willing to serve the present, and say that values will have been enjoyed, are smuggling in an assumption contrary to the hypothesis. For if after the hypothetical final catastrophe, it would have been true that values would 'have been realized', and it would have been better than if they 'had not been'; then some value would have escaped the catastrophe, a savoring of past enjoyments.

> "This assumption may be as inevitable as (it is not identical with) the assumption that what occurs will always have occurred, or that the past will be 'immortal' in some sense. It is none the less true that apart from the theistic idea of a cosmic memory, it is an assumption that we do not in the least understand.". 24

Even on pragmatic grounds, where belief means readiness for action, Hartshorne declines to accept the idea that anyone really doubts the existence in nature of some factor which is incompatible with final destruction.

In some of his moods Dewey admits the validity of this position.

> "Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies." 25

The 'whole' as we have seen is man and nature. And nothing is everlasting. If Hartshorne's logic is sound then Dewey's ethical optimism, and his deep conviction that values are worth striving for, must be grounded on an implicit belief that runs deeper than his explicit metaphysics.

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24) Man's Vision of God pp 156, 157
25) Human Nature and Conduct pp 331, 332.

Since Dewey wants to recall us to the naturalistic outlook of the Greeks who refused to separate man from nature we may quote a passage from William James with regard to the attitude of the Greeks toward life :

> "There was indeed much joyousness among the Greeks..But..the moment they grew systematically pensive and thought of ultimates,they became unmitigated pessimists..The beautiful joyousness of their polytheism is only poetic modern fiction. They knew no joys comparable in quality of preciousness to those we shall erelong see that Brahmans,Buddhists,Christians, Mohammedans,twice-born people whose religion is non-naturalistic,got from their several creeds of mysticism and renunciation." 26

(d) Conscience

Dewey notes the verbal connection of 'consciousness' and 'conscience'. He says,if the former is a unique factor, a unique power,why should not the latter also be a unique power. If reason is independent of verifiable realities of human nature, such as habits,why should there not be a conscience also independent of them. He rejects this argument,because he believes he has explained 'knowing' on naturalistic assumptions,and can therefore do the same for conscience.

> "On the other hand if it is recognized that knowing is carried on through the medium of natural factors,the assumption of special agencies for moral knowing becomes outlawed and incredible..The question fundamentally at issue is nothing more or less than whether moral values,regulations,principles,and objects form a separate and independent domain or whether they are part and parcel of a normal development of a life process." 27

He holds that there is a disposition to know,just as there is a disposition to run a typewriter. Having almost by accident come upon knowledge it may be desireable to retain it. Conscience is no more unique than dispositions toward knowledge or toward singing. The accepted view of conscience is that

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26) The Varieties of Religious Experience pp 142,143
27) Human Nature and Conduct p 185

it is a light that shines upon moral truths and objects, and without effort reveals them for what they are. Just what the objects of conscience are varies greatly. Some hold them to be individual acts, others principles, others an order of worth among motives, others a sense of duty in general, others the unqualified authority of right. All agree that a non-natural faculty of moral knowledge is the basic aspect of conscience.

Dewey rejects this view and gives his own.

A child acts, and those near him re-act. They approve or disapprove. This is as natural a consequence of action as the fire burning the hand that is plunged into it. It is natural not artificial.

> "In language and imagination we rehearse the responses of others, just as we dramatically enact other consequences. We foreknow how, others will act, and the foreknowledge is the beginning of judgement passed on action. We know <u>with</u> them; there is conscience." 28

Folke Leander in <u>The Philosophy of John Dewey</u> points out one essential respect in which this account falls short. He points out that there is an agreement to cooperate implicit in the social nature of thinking. it is <u>Verständigung</u> . This is the basis of punishment and reward. On this basis the child may accuse the parents of injustice if they do not keep their word.

> "Unless we would cease to be human beings we cannot but consent to cooperate with our fellows..we accept it freely, since we do consent to live the kind of life that our nature permits us to live. We cannot think without seeing things from a superindividual point of view..and the relevance of this fact to ethics need hardly be pointed out. But the noetic energy involved in such self-transcendence cannot be explained in terms of mere compulsion." 299

And from the theistic point of view the matter is still more complex.

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288 Human Nature and Conduct pp 314,315

29) The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp 98,99 Published in Goteborg's Kungl. Vetenskaps-och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlinger Femte Foljden Ser. A Band 7 No 2

John Oman in The Natural and the Supernatural asks how conscience can be anything more than an impressive name for custom. He makes the point that conscience is not only consciousness of the demands of society,but consciousness of the sacred. He admits that conscience is not infallible or innate,and distinguishes between an instructed and an educated conscience.

> "Wrongly it can be instructed to accept other people's verdicts; rightly it is only educated as it learns to depend on its own." 30

The authority of conscience is not limited because it is not inerrant.For

> "while it does not claim that its verdicts are infallible it insists on their right to be regarded as sacred..The highest conscientiousness is in seeking further enlightenment,nor is there any other true conscientiousness. But the very pursuit of more light requires absolute loyalty to the light we have." 31

He insists that without absoluteness nothing is sacred,and without sacredness there is no real morality. Sin thus is radical evil, not because our consciences are infallible guides to right and wrong,but from the sacredness of the environment in which we make our choices. Sin is the higher aspect of all failure to meet the conditions of the environment,and involves choices in which the true worth of the self is realized or denied.

> "This not only makes sin radical evil,but as a breach with this environment to be realized ever more fully by sincerity in insight, in aspiration and in consecration." 32

This takes us into an aspect of the question of conscience which Dewey thinks is unreal,because he denies the validity of belief in the supernatural. Sin is religious term,associated with man's relation to God,and therefore does not enter a naturalistic account of man's predicament.

David Roberts in Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man shows how in some ways psychology and psychotherapy have helped in the understanding of human nature. However,he points out the tendency for psychotherapists

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30) The Natural and the Supernatural p 316
31) Ibid p 317 32) Ibid p 328

to accept a naturalistic view to interpret conscience in terms of the conflict between the will to live and the will to cooperate, between the attitude of love and the tendency toward hostility.

> "An effective understanding of how to handle these tensions less destructively has been reached so recently, and is still so scantily dispersed, that no better result has been possible." 33

His account of the psychotherapists belief that man can solve his problems 'on his own' if he makes use of methods and knowledge science has given him, is very close to the position Dewey holds. And Roberts rightly points out that this overlooks the fact that man's worship of his own self-sufficiency is a major factor in the modern predicament.

The point would seem to be that if theism is right in its interpretation of conscience and the moral problem by putting it in the setting of man's need for a right relationship with a Power greater than himself, then to overlook this is to fail to understand either the seriousness of man's errors or the resources that are available for man to realize his true destiny. Roberts points this out :

> "And even though humanism may open the way to honesty and fellowship at the human level, it shuts man off from communion with the divine source of personal integrity and of interpersonal love. Finally it gives man nothing but himself and a vision of human possibilities to worship ..When a philosophy inevitably suppresses, or fails adequatly to express, this sense of thankfulness for mercies unearned and for goods that have been magnified beyond any human devising, then is can be claimed, partly on the basis of psychoanalytic principles themselves, that this philosophy is starving the most potent resource of all human transformation and beatitude." 34

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33) Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man p 113
34) Ibid pp 116,117

3. Individual and Society

(a) Individuality and Freedom

'Experimentalist' educators are seriously concerned about an educational system that takes full acount of individual differences in pupils, and cultivates individuality. In a broad sense they consider education as that process by which we become individuals. John L.Childs a disciple of Dewey writes :

> "Opposed to this theory of education as mere transmission and habituation, the experimentalist advances his theory of education for the development of individuality." 35

Dewey, concerned as always with continuity traces human individuality to a tendency throughout nature.

> "Plants and non-human animals act as if they were concerned that their activity, their characteristic receptivity and response should maintain itself." 36

He points out that in this matter of the nature of the individual, Greek and modern philosophy follow different paths. For the Greeks, self sufficiency, excluding deficiency, constituted the individual. What they called particulars, partial and imperfect specimens, moderns call individuals. The species, for them, was the real entity. Modern science has radically changed this conception.

> "The function of individualized mind in futhering experiment and invention and the directed reconstruction of events, together with the discovery that objects of sentiment and fancy, although rejected by the order of events in space and time, finds its legitimate outcome in the conception of experiencing.." 37

Dewey also connects the rise of individualism with religion in the middle ages because of its concern for the salvation of the individual soul.

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35) Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism p 142
36) Experience and Nature p 208
37) Ibid p 230

Economic and political individualism,and the Protestant reforms,all combined to emphasize the rights and duties of the individual. On the educational scene,there were reformers like Montaigne,Bacon,Locke,emphasizing the duty of the individual to achieve knowledge for himself. Dewey thinks the reaction against authority led to an over-emphasis upon personal observations,and tended to isolate the individual mind from the world of which it is a part.

He thinks the significance of the revolt against authority,and the release of the individual from authoritarian institutions,was not that man really wanted to be free from nature or society,and stand in isolation. He was seeking freedom in ,and through nature and society. This was the motive that brought the inductive method into being. Man had,of course,been using it for ages,but it was hampered by custom,and it was confined to practical affairs.

Individuality in education,Dewey says,has two meanings. One is an individual as one does his own thinking and has his own purposes. Unless one thinks for himself,he isn't really thinking,and isnt a fully developed individual. Also there are variations in point of view,in mode of attack, of response to objects ,and situations,from person to person.

> "When these variations are suppressed in the alleged interests of uniformity,and an attempt is made to have a single mold of method of study and recitation,mental confusion and artificiality inevitably result. Originality is gradually destroyed,confidence in one's own quality of mental operation is undermined,and a docile subjection to the opinion of others is inculcated,or else ideas run wild." 38

These principles of individuality and freedom are basic to Dewey's philosophy and he has spent a lifetime applying them to education. In Freedom and Culture he faces the challenge the world now brings to these principles,

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38) Democracy and Education pp 353,354

The individual must find his freedom within the society of which he is a member.

> "If we want individuals to be free we must see to it that suitable conditions exist:--a truism which at least indicates the direction in which to look." 39

He criticizes Rousseau for giving all the advantage to the side of human nature,and setting culture in opposition to it. Kant,and other German philosophers took up this challenge,and Dewey thinks,went to the opposite extreme. They interpreted history as the continuing process of culture, whereby human nature became tamed. Hence the German emphasis upon Kultur. They tended to identify Kultur with law,authority,and the state. All German totalitarianism bears the mark of this revolt against the emphasis upon freedom of the philosophers of the French Revolution. Dewey points out that this idea of the ultimate and authoritarian state left its imprint on Marx also.

Germany's educational system,Dewey claims,was designed to furnish intellectual fodder for totalitarian propoganda,and for a strong military system based on unquestioning nationalism. So,with the lowest rate of illiteracy in the world,literacy became a weapon in the hands of an oppressive government. Dewey was making these observations in 1939.

His answer to the problem of freedom is a scientific approach to all social problems. The influences that act upon us in the modern world are so complex,that we do not understand and cannot control them. Thus we are at the mercy of events. We are living in the final act of a three act drama in Western democracy. The first act was a simplification of human

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39) Freedom and Culture p 34

nature which was used to rationalize political systems. The second act was the authoritarian reaction against this, trying to avoid the danger of social anarchy. The third act, now playing, is the recovery of the moral significance of the relationship of human nature to democracy.

Dewey admits that he is making a moral judgement by advancing this view:

> "We have to see that democracy means the belief that humanistic culture should prevail; we should be frank and open in our recognition that the proposition is a moral one." 40

He believes that defence against fascism, and against communism, requires a constructive awakening to the meaning of faith in human nature. This faith should be strong enough to release energies for the development of every phase of culture: science, art, morals, education, politics, economics and religion. When he speaks of religion, however, it is the religion of naturalism, for he does not give Christianity credit for having resources for the task :

> "It used to be said (and the statement has not gone completly out of fashion) that democracy is a by-product of Christianity, since the latter teaches the infinite worth of the individual human soul." 41

Not only does Dewey think this view was mistaken, but he brings a more serious charge against Christianity. It held doctrines that were not subject to test and inquiry. And such an attitude is at odds with a free democratic way of life. He thinks German totalitarianism was fostered by the submissive attitude toward dogma.

> "Shrewd observers have said that one factor in the relatively easy victory of totalitarianism in Germany was the void left by decay of former theological beliefs. Those who had lost one external authority..were ready to turn to another one which was closer..42

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40) Freedom and Culture pp 124, 125
41) Ibid p 126
42) Ibid 151

That the Christian contribution to democracy has often been exaggerated, and the other side of the case often forgotten,must be granted.Herbert Butterfield in Christianity and History pays tribute to

> "the vast difference that ordinary Christian piety has made to the last two thousand years of European history" 43

But he issues a warning about over stating the case :

> "I notice that supporters of what I should call the ecclesiastical interpretation of history tend to speak of toleration,political liberty,the democratic form of government,and the establishment of social justice as though these were due to the operation of the Christian spirit in society,and even as though the credit should go to the churches. I have grave misgivings concerning that form of polemical history." 44

He then gives his opinion about the victory of toleration in Europe,and gives credit to secular interests and considerations.

We shall have further need to discuss Dewey's social theory in connection with his educational aims. Here we may grant the validity of his warning that religion has not always promoted freedom and individual responsibility. We have already questioned whether he has an adequate basis for his ethical idealism in his naturalistic metaphysics. We would broaden the question now and ask whether his faith in the method of inquiry into social problems,and his belief in freedom and the worth of the individual,are sufficient ground for an optimistic social theory. Christopher Dawson in Progress and Religion concludes from his study of the relation of religion to culture that :

> "Behind every civilization there is a vision—a vision which may be the unconscious fruit of ages of common thought and action, or which may have sprung from the sudden illumination of a great prophet or thinker." 45

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44) Christianity and History p 132
45) Progress and Religion pp 76,77

By vision, Dawson means a profound insight into the meaning of human life and destiny, and we have questioned whether the naturalistic metaphysics, and belief in scientific method, is an adequate substitute for religious vision. In this connection Dawson makes another observation that may throw light on the high moral idealism of Dewey.

> "For the moral idealism which is still so characteristic of the Western mind is the fruit of an age-long tradition of religious faith and spiritual discipline. Humanitarianism is the peculiar possession of a people who have worshipped for centuries the Divine Humanity--apart from all that even our humanism would have been other than it is. 46

4. Summary and Comments.

Dewey bases his theory of values on critical judgement, when possession and enjoyment pass into appraisal. The doubt-inquiry process enters to evaluate and to define ends. All values arise within the context of the organism interacting with its environment. And environment is thought of in non-supernaturalistic terms; it is nature and culture. We have suggested that this context is not adequate to give an account of the emergence of values in human experience, and gives no long view of man's efforts and struggles. Dewey thinks man should be satisfied with the possibility of making progress against difficulties, and need not worry about what is to happen to the entire enterprise. We maintain that man's assumptions about the ultimate nature of things, affect his social efforts. Religion cannot be given credit for all social progress, and has often been reactionary. But theistic assumptions about a cosmic Being other than man, from whom values are ultimately derived, and in whom they find permanency, seem to me to be a sounder view than naturalism.

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46) Progress and Religion 242

Likewise Dewey's account of 'will', minimizes certain vital aspects of the moral situation. It minimizes the selective and determinative factors, in favor of a behavioristic description. This fails to take into account the aspect of conflict of 'will' over higher and lower modes of action, and of persistence in the higher way, or failure in such persistence.

And conscience as wholly a matter of action and contemplated reaction between individual and society, may seem to overcome ancient dualisms, but omits the real meaning of conscience. It overlooks the noetic energy involved in conscious choice, and completely ignores the super-natural environment in which conscience functions. The religious idea of "sin" is dropped out because there is no recognition of man's responsibility to a Being higher than himself. That conscience has social implications, and is not an innate infallible light that shines upon conduct, we would grant. But that it can be reduced to individual awareness of social pressure, we seriously doubt.

In his discussion of individuality and freedom, he says freedom comes through reaction against authority, and the building of a better social order that does not coerce the individual. He is right in his view that wrong ideas, both about nature and about society have been disastrous. But he cannot solve this dilemma by placing all the emphasis upon the interaction of individual and social order, and ignoring the problem of the nature of the individual, and the basis for copporate living. Actually he is not without his own assumptions about the nature of man and society and admits that he makes moral judgements.

Though we would agree that the scientific method applied to social problems may be of immense value, we doubt the profundity of the 'social

lag' theory of man's social predicament. We agree with Karl Mannheim that society is adrift unless it gets a sense of meaning and direction through its religious tradition. And its religious insights warn against a superficial diagnosis of the human problem. The scientific method, we maintain, remains a tool without right control or purpose, unless it is part of a culture which finds its deepest insights elsewhere. An educational system cannot find its values and aims, or even its methods, wholly within naturalistic humanism. This shall become more evident as we study Dewey's educational aims in the light of the metaphysical, epistemological and the ethical theories which we have examined.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Dewey has always maintained that philosophy should focus about education as the supreme human interest. There, he believes, the problems of philosophy come to a head. This is consistent with his belief that an idea is not an idea in any full sense until it is enacted in an actual situation to effect some purpose. Dewey thus looked upon education as a necessary, and complementary phase of philosophy.

We may summarize some of the main principles that enter into his educational theory. Theism, and all philosophies based on a belief in a Perfect Being, are rejected on the grounds that they are dualistic, ethically conservative, intellectually formal and lacking in itegrity, and individualistic. Man is continuous with nature, and nature has ends and histories, but there is nothing which endures. There are only relatively stable events. Human nature has no supernatural orientation, and all supernaturalism is brushed aside as a pre-scientific superstition. Mind is continuous with nature, and is a quality of behavior. It appears in the conduct of the individual when outcomes are anticipated and become controlling factors in ordering events and activities.

Experience is both cognitive, and has a noncognitive element. There is no basic distinction between perceptual and conceptual experience. The problem of knowledge is to devise an adequate theory of inquiry. Inquiry is the ultimate in philosophy, and in education. Out of it come method, aim, and knowledge. Meaning is related to behavior. Man has created his meanings in the long experience of the race.

1. Method and Subject Matter

As method is the primary concern of Dewey's philosophy,so method takes central place in his system of education. The method of thinking that supplies useful knowledge,is the scientific,experimental method. And,as thinking is identical with reflection arising out of a problematical situation,the pupil must be put into a genuine experience where problems will arise. The pupil must be interested in the situation,be stimulated to think,by the problem;gather the information and make the experiments necessary to cope with it; be responsible for developing solutions in an orderly way;and test his ideas by application. The applications make the meanings clear,and test their validity.

He contrasts ancient,and modern scientific method,with regard to their treatment of subject matter. The essence of ancient science was demonstration,while the spirit of modern science is discovery. The former tried to attain a stable subject matter,while the latter looks upon systematic knowledge as existing for the sake of stimulating,guiding,checking further inquiries. 'Learning'in the former was transitive,and ceased to be when final and fixed objects became known :

> "It was thought of after the analogy of master and disciple;the former was already in possession of the truth,and the learner merely appropriated what already is there in the storehouse of the master. In modern science,learning is finding out what nobody has previously known. " 1

Differences in method accompany these two different views. On the one hand there is classification and definition,where objects of knowledge are taken to be final and complete. On the other hand there is observation,

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1) Experience and Nature p 152

inquiry and experimentation.

In Democracy and Education , Dewey gives his interpretation of method in education. He refers again to his thesis that most ills and errors in philosophy and education spring from dualisms. He believes method and subject matter have been treated as separate, because of the isolation of mind and self from the world of things. As we have seen in his logic, he considers thinking the directed movement of subject matter, and mind the deliberate and intentional phase of the process. He gives the following illustration of how this applies to method. Piano playing is an orderly way of using the keys of a piano. Order is found in the disposition of the acts which use the piano, and the hands and brain, so as to achieve the intended result.

> "It is the action of the piano directed to accomplish the purpose of the piano as a musical, instrument. It is the same with pedagogical method." 2

The only distinction he allows between method and subject matter is the effort to control the process. Thus he says the piano player who has perfect control of his instrument would not distinguish between his contribution, and that of the piano. In all well formed activities the same is true--in skating, conversing, hearing music, enjoying a landscape, and in all wholehearted play and work.

From this he concludes that <u>what</u> we experience and <u>how</u> we experience it arise only in reflection, and not in the act. This he says gives rise to the metaphysical error of assuming that there is a real distinction between the thing seen and the act of seeing. The practical issue of the whole matter is control. There are certain ideas of <u>how</u> an experience

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2) Democracy and Education p 195

proceeds,and from this we know what factors must be modified or secured in order that it may go on more successfully. Basically there is no difference between the growth of a plant and the development of an experience. It is not easy in either case to find the factors that make for the best development. But a study of many cases and making many comparisons will help seize upon the causes. When these causes are arranged in order,we have a method of procedure,or a technique.

Here,as in so many instances,Dewey presents us with a false,either/or. Either,we must think of method as authoritarian transmission of truths, in terms of propositions which must be accepted without question,as final and complete,or, we must accept the naturalistic metaphysics,which makes no distinction between perceptual and conceptual thinking,and accepts the scientific method as the ultimate and only method of gaining knowledge. We have criticized both these assumptions. We contend that Dewey leaves education with an elaborate method which applies well to the understanding and control of material things,and has some bearing upon social problems, but leaves the basic questions unanswered. Surely one such basic question which education traditionally asked,was how man can come to know and enter into relationship with God. We shall contend that any theory of education that refuses to face that issue,is really not taking neutral ground,but assuming a negative answer. Dewey assumes a negative answer, and builds his entire educational method on that assumption. He assumes that there is no God,and that there is no basic distinction between man and nature,and that man creates his own values,and reduces education to a method of inquiry into ways experience may be enriched. We would

contend, that though there is a relationship between *what* we experience and *how* we experience it, between *what* we see and *how* we see it, there is also a basic and real distinction. Though Dewey says the essence of the ancient method was demonstration, and the essence of the modern method discovery, the fault we find in his view is that the method of discovery never seems to lead to reality. It may lead to control, but we doubt whether it leads to control in those complex personal and social problems to which he would apply his method. Education needs a method that leads not only to control of natural forces, but a method that leads to self-knowledge. And self knowledge, according to the theistic view, is bound up with knowledge of the Self upon Whom all life depends. *What* man has discovered about that Reality involves methods and techniques, but to say that the methods and techniques are not intrinsically different from the Reality, is to make assumptions that beg the fundamental question.

Another way of bringing criticism to bear on Dewey's view of method and subject matter is to suggest that it is too impersonal. In our treatment of his epistemology we suggested that his doubt-inquiry process was inadequate to attain a knowledge of other persons, and though he admitted the fact of 'acquaintance knowledge' he made no use of it in his epistemology. It is not that Dewey is a physical scientist without interest in people and society. Quite the contrary, he is primarily a moral philosopher, and education is a paramount interest. But his psychological approach tends to be behavioristic, and his educational theory impersonal because of his world-view. His method may relate man well to the less personal aspects of his environment, but it has no light to throw on the basic, personal relationship. And we doubt whether one can

separate the two. This is not to suggest a complete dichotomy between the scientific method and the intuitions and methods of religion. But, if as we believe, love is the central religious experience, not only is it more like a high art, than like a scientific process, there is a distinction to be made between the method of loving God, and the Agape which is the essence of Reality.

2. Growth and Progress

(a) Growth

Since, for Dewey, the purpose of education is growth, we must examine his use of the concept. He takes the condition of growth to be immaturity. Immaturity is the ability to develop. He does not use it in the comparative sense, for that involves, he says, static and final goals. The fulfillment of growing is mistakenly thought of us 'ungrowth'.

Where there is life there is activity, and growth is not something done to these activities, but something they do. The two chief traits of immaturity are dependence and placticity. Dependence means helplessness, but there is the compensating power, namely social capacity.

> "Inattention to physical things (going with capacity to control them) is accompanied by a corresponding intensification of interest and attention as to the doings of people." 3

Dependence then, from the social point of view, denotes a power, and makes for interdependence.

The specific ability of the immature child that makes for growth is placticity. This does not mean being molded by external pressure. It is the ability to learn from experience. Human beings have more instinctive

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3) Democracy and Education pp 51.52

tendencies than animals,but animal instincts perfect themselves quickly, and are thus not as plastic as human instincts. The infant has a multitude of instinctive reactions. Thus the possibility of continuing growth is opened up. In learning one act,methods emerge that can be used in other situations. And the habit of learning is acquired.

> "The importance for human life of the two facts of dependence and variable control has been summed up in the doctrine of the significance of prolonged infancy." 4

Both the adult and the child are engaged in growing. The adult transforms his environment,and thus releases stimuli which redirect his powers and keeps them developing. The only difference in child growth is the difference of modes of growth suitable to different stages of development. In terms of education this means that the 'end' is continuous growth.

> "Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth,there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education."5

Dewey criticizes all theories of education which emphasize preparation for living in the future. This places children on the waiting list,and makes them candidates for living,rather than participators in life. This means loss of motive power,for children live in the present. It also puts a premium on procrastination. Another undesirable result is the setting up of average standards.In terms of the individual child this is a sure way to hamper his growth. And pressure must be used to make the child work because the future he is preparing for is far away and unreal.

Dewey also criticizes a certain theory of education that professes to be based on the idea of development of the child,but really isnt.

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4) Ibid p 54

Development is wrongly thought of as unfolding of talent toward a definite goal. Hegel and Froebel,he says ,both start with the conception of a whole, an absolute,which is immanent in human life. The perfect,and complete ideal, is not a mere ideal. It is operative here and now. But it is present only implicitly and in an enfolded condition. The method differs,by which what is implicit becomes explicit. In Hegel,a series of historical institutions embody different factors of the absolute. According to Froebel,mathematical symbols as well as other symbols correspond to traits of the absolute. For example,grouping children in a circle becomes a symbol for the collective life of mankind. He gives Froebel credit for many creative ideas in education,especially his recognition of the native capacities of children and his loving concern to foster their growth.

> "But his formulation of the notion of development and his organization of devices for promoting it were badly hampered by the fact that he conceived development to be the unfolding of a ready-made latent principle." 5

This made the remote goal of complete unfoldedness transcendental,and removed it from concrete experience.

Hegel,Dewey says,appreciated the nurturing influences of institutions. But,since he was haunted by the conception of an absolute goal,he arranged existing institutions on an ascending scale of approximation to perfection. Each in its time,was necessary,and against them individuals had no right. Development came through obedient assimilation of the spirit of existing institutions, In the late nineteenth century this type of idealism was merged with the doctrine of evolution,and often interpreted as the means by which Absolute Mind was working out its purpose regardless of individual efforts.Social progress was an 'organic growth',and an experiential selectio

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5) Ibid 67,68

(b) Progress

Since the concepts growth and progress,are so closely connected in Dewey's educational theory,we will consider his meaning of progress before we make critical comments on his theory of growth.

In Education Today he outlines what he calls his 'pedagogic creed'. In the section on 'The School and Social Progress' he says he believes that :

> "education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform. ..education is a regulation of the process of coming to share in the social consciousness;and that the adjustment of individual activity on the basis of this social consciousness is the only sure method of social reconstruction." 6

Because science marks the emancipation of the mind from loyalty to customary and traditional purposes,he considers it the chief agency for progress. And he distinguishes two type of progress. It may mean getting nearer to ends already sought. This is a minor form,for it requires only teahnical improvement. Progress in a more profound sense,means the enriching of prior purposes,and forming new ones. He assumes that desires are not a fixed quantity,and that there are no fixed limits to human satisfactions. Thus new possibilities are projected,and new means of execution constructdd, and progress takes place.

Dewey calls attention to the great crop of inventions that have arisen out of the scientific method. He admits that the social results have not kept pace with the teahnical results. Science has given the means for satisfying existing demands rather than modifying human purposes. This is because science is so recent that it has not come to dominate our educatiion, and has not yet been absorbed into the imaginative and emotional nature of mankind.

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6) Education Today p 15

It is the responsibility of education to use science so as to :

> "modify the habitual attitude of imagination and feeling,not leave it just an extension of our physical arms and legs." 7

Science has already modified men's thoughts in some areas. It has brought an interdependence of interests. It has turned men's eyes toward the future and its possibilities.

> "The problem of an educational use of science is then to create an intelligence pregnant with belief in the possibility of the direction of human affairs by itself. The method of science,engrained through education in habit,means emancipation from rule of thumb and from the routine generated by rule of thumb procedure." 8

(c) Critical Comments

One of the burning issues of religious education to-day is the question of the validity of the concept of growth in spiritual life. And the concept of progress which entered so deeply into the liberal theological view is also being re-examined. Christopher Dawson has balled the idea of progress 'the working faith of our civilization'. Professor John Baillie in The Belief in Progess calls the modern faith in progress a modern heresy. He asserts that the Christian faith gives a confident hope for the future of terrestrial history,but apart from the Christian faith Western culture has no real ground for belief in progress.

We may agree with Dewey in rejecting certain ideas of growth and development. We need not think of growth in terms of latent faculties that unfold. Nor in terms of an Absolute Mind coming to full expression in human life and institutions. We agree with Dewey that original impulses are ambiguous. And,we agree that his conception of interaction between the individual and his environment by which both the individual and the environment are modified, is a fruitful approach.

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7) Democracy and Education p 262
8) Ibid 263

Furthermore,in our chapter on the neo-orthodox criticism of Dewey and the liberal theological educators,we shall maintain that there is validity in the idea of spiritual development and nurture. As Dewey says,children are not merely candidates for living. And in terms of religious education we would say they are not simply candidates for some radical conversion experience which will introduce them to the spiritual world about them. Our radical criticism of Dewey is in his view of the environment in which growth takes place. Again he confronts us with a false either/or. We do not have to choose between a belief in the supernatural that creates a complete dualism between God and man,and a complete naturalism which sets man's growth simply within nature and culture. The theistic view we would defend emphasizes both the transcendence and the immanence of God. He is never absent from any of the relationships of life or from nature. Because the relationship is personal as well as impersonal,the kind of continuity Dewey pictures in terms of growth of a plant,is not adequate. There is something to which growth is relative,besides more growth,and education is not autonomous. It may be autonomous in the sense that no institution,church,or state should have complete authoritarian control over the education of the young. But man's entire life is dependent upon and relative to,a higher order ,and his life finds fulfillment through a right relationship to it. And growth is never full and complete if these resources are denied.

As for the idea that education,by the full use of the scientific method, can effect social progress and reconstruction,we have less confidence in this one method than Dewey has,and we do not think his theory of education complete enough to accomplish all he hopes it will. He is not aware of the close connection of religion to progress,nor the criticism religion brings

to a secular idealism with its optimistic view of man's unaided and untransformed powers.

3. Experience and Education.

Learning through experience, is a central doctrine of experimental education. It emphasizes expression and cultivation of individuality in active projects and enterprises. It stands against imposition from above or outside, of adult standards and subject matter.

Experience and education cannot be equated however, because some experiences are mis-educative. Everything depends upon the quality of the experience. And the quality of the experience has two aspects, immediate agreeableness, and its effect upon later experiences. Dewey advances his principle of continuity, and interpretation of habit in biological terms. Thus every experience takes up something from what has gone before, and by changing the person, modifies everything that comes after. And it changes the objective environment in which it takes place.

Thus direction can be given through a planned environment. Desks, blackboards, school yard, are not adequate environmental conditions. The entire community should be a resource for teaching. There is interaction between the individual and his environment. The educator must know the needs of the pupil and the resources and problems of the environment. No subject is an end in itself. It must be adapted to needs and stages of growth.

Most of the material learned in isolation from experience is forgotten, or must be relearned when it is needed. Unless material is related to experience, collateral learning is disastrous. It prompts attitudes of dislike and distaste for higher education. Therefore attention must be

given in order that present experiences may have intrinsic worth. And educators must study the relationship of present to possible future experiences, asking whether present experiences lead to further growth. Subject matter represents working resources. In primitive life, stories, traditions, songs, and liturgies, were a stock of meanings impressed upon the young. As social life becomes more complex it becomes more difficult to make these resources meaningful. The ties which connect them to the group life become concealed.

The educator must direct the young out of aimless activities into meaningful ones. This he does by using the experiences of the race and relating them to the experiences of the pupils. The danger is that he may forget the difference between subject matter that is meaningful to the teacher, and subject matter that becomes meaningful to the pupil. He must know his pupil, in order to know what is happening in the interplay between pupil and subject matter,

> "To the one who is learned, subject matter is extensive, accurately defined, and logically interrelated. To the one who is learning it is fluid, partial, and connected through his personal occupations." 9

The social nature of the subject matter is emphasized again and again, and the individualism of much of modern education is questioned. Life in the school should foster cooperation and social feeling.

> "The positive principle is maintained when the young begin with active occupations having a social origin and use, and proceed to a scientific insight in the materials and laws involved, through assimilating into their more direct experience the ideas and facts communicated by others who have had a larger experience." 10

(a) Critical Comments

Many of these ideas are not new, but Dewey deserves credit for rediscovering them, and stating them in terms of the modern situation. E.L.Cubberly

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9) Democracy and Education p 216
10) Ibid p 227

in History of Education, points out that Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1671) developed many of the ideas which have become part of modern education.

> "to advance by carefully graded steps, to tie new knowledge to old, to learn by observing and doing, and to learn by use rather than by precept--were still other of the present-day commonplaces which Comenius worked out and formulated in his Didactica Magna. 11

A.N.Whitehead, in The Aims of Education, emphasizes the need for the child making ideas his own, and understanding their application here and now in the circumstances of his actual life. M.L.Jacks, in Total Education, calls attention to the needs of the child which call out for immediate satisfaction. In a study made by the Scttish Education Department in 1947 on Secondary Education the point is made that the child is essentially active and interested in concrete 'whole' and that education must be related to these factors. So the 'experience centred' view of education, which Dewey has advocated, has deep roots in the past and wide acceptance to-day. We shall show that men like George Albert Coe, liberal religious educators incorporated many of these ideas into their educational systems. They drew inspiration not only from Dewey and other educators, but from theologians like Schleiermacher, who made a great deal of the volitional and experiencial aspects of the Christian faith.

One question I would raise about Dewey's theory of experience, has to do with the social experiences which are the resources for education. I fail to find in Dewey a full treatement of the meaning of history. We shall refer to this again in our discussion of democracy, and later in our theistic criticism of his view. We have shown that he does not think that the classical philosophical, or the Christian heritage, contain a body of experiences that should be transmitted to the young. His clue to the

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11) History of Education p 410

meaning of history seems to be that what man once did by rule of thumb he now can do by a perfected method of inquiry and control. The meaning of history seems to be that the experimental method has been evolved, and by means of this method man may enrich his experiences. And as we have shown, the test of 'growth' is not an adequate test of the validity and worth of experiences. We have arrived at a crucial question, which modern education must face. What are the racial experiences into which the young should be led ? We cannot evade this question by saying that indoctrination and authoritarian methods must not be used, and that catechetical teaching has no relation to the child's experience. It must be possible, at least in the Protestant tradition, to combine an adequate presentation of the important aspects of the religious tradition, with the principle of freedom and private judgement.

This question is of course closely associated with the one we have raised many times. Shall education move within a theistic framework or a naturalistic one ? We shall show in a later chapter how that question is being answered in Gt. Britain. In the United States, within the last fifty years, Dewey's position has been largely unchallenged except by Roman Catholic educators. We shall examine their criticism of Dewey, and his objections to their authoritarianism. The point we make here is that the crucial question about experience is whether man can experience a relationship to a Power greater than culture and nature. If such a Power exists, and is within all of life, than an educational system which makes no provision for evaluation of religious heritage, or for religious experience omits its fundamental factor.

4. Freedom and Democracy

Dewey has been among the educators who have pled for a less formal and fixed environment in the school room and school. This is consistent with his idea that pupils are active and should enter into activities in the school. Enforced quiet and acquiesnence are not conducive to a right teacher-pupil relationship,but tend to enforce artificial uniformity. They go with the older methods of passivity and receptivity . Silence elevated into a prime virtue revealed the non-social character of the old school.

But this outward freedom is not an end in itself.

> "The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence,that is to say,freedom of observation and of judgement exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while." 12

Though,as we have seen,Dewey is optimistic about human nature,he thinks natural impulses and desires require reconstruction. This involves inhibition and discipline. Education must move away from externally imposed inhibition,to inhibition through an individual's own reflection and judgement. We have here the application of Dewey's theory of reflection and value to character formation. Self-control comes through reflective thinking which is a combination of memory and observation.

Dewey obviously does not advocate uncontrolled expression either in individual freedom or school procedure. He believes the individual finds freedom through self control,and through association in group life and activity,by learning to work with others. Where effective thinking takes place,freedom will take care of itself.

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12) Experience and Education p 69

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12) Experience and Education p 69

We have seen that Dewey stresses the idea that the individual finds freedom to become a fully developed person, by interacting with society. And we have seen that he considers the relationship of human nature to democracy the supreme moral question of Western culture. Education :

> "is a social function, securing direction and development in the immature through their participation in the life of the group." 12

In 1900 he published a small but very influential book The School and Society. In this book he maintained that the range of education should be enlarged. The household and neighborhood system of community life and industry, having been largely broken down by the industrial revolution, the school must give children a social consciousness. Each school was to be.,

> "an embryonic community life, active with types of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society and permeated throughout with the spirit of art, history, and science." 13

Dewey gives Froebel credit for many of his ideas about teaching children in cooperative, mutually helpful living. Recognizing the plurality of types of community life Dewey sets up criteria to measure the worth of social life. They are two; interests held in common, and intercourse with other groups. Consciously shared interests and the free interplay with other forms of association, are his standards.

He believes democracy meets these two tests. It relies on mutual interest as a factor in social control, and provides free and varied contacts among its people. Such varied intercourse makes for flexibility and change. And education within a democractic society is based on far more

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12) Democracy and Education p 262
13) Ibid 263

than the need for a literate electorate. It is based on the fact of the social character of personality, and upon the need for fostering attitudes of social concern and cooperation.

(a) Critical Comments.

When we turn to the theistic systems that have borrowed from, and have criticized Dewey, we shall point out that liberal religious educators like George Albert Coe, developed their theories of religious education on the 'social' nature of man. We shall maintain that Dewey's interest in free and full development of the individual, and the cultivation of right social attitudes, has definite connections with the Christian ethic and anthropology. Dewey's insistence that the desires and impulses of man need transforming, has an affinity with the Christian emphasis upon conversion. And his emphasis upon cooperation and concern for the welfare of others has an affinity with the Christian idea of love. And the basis of democracy resting on the dignity and worth of the individual is a Christian concept. Dewey denies that there is a close historical connection between these moral values and the Christian faith. And he believes they do not need the support of theism.

The position we are defending is that Dewey's world-view is utterly inadequate, and his method of inquiry no adequate substitute, for the theistic world view he discards. To suppose that man can find freedom and self-realization, and build a free democratic society simply through reflective intelligence, is, we believe, to place a burden on education which it cannot carry. If he wishes to place so much faith in education, he must broaden its meaning to include self-realization through free activity

in an environment that includes a Being within the entire process of history,yet beyond it. Short of that,education may become a false religion. The following passage shows how completely Dewey places his faith in education based on naturalistic assumptions.

> "Faith in education signifies nothing less than belief in the possibility of deliberate direction of the formation of human disposition and intelligence. It signifies a belief that it is possible to know definitely just what specific conditions and forces operate to bring about just such specific results in character,intellectual attitude and capacity...if we have any ground to be religious about anything,we may take education religiously...there have been many worse objects of faith and hope than the ideal possibilities of the development of human nature, and more harmful rites and cults than those which constitute a school system." 14

This is admittedly a belief. And it is a belief that many shared,and are now re-examining. The trend in Gt.Britain is to turn from the idea that education divorced from religion,can solve individual and social problems and make democracy secure. And,as we shall show in our chapter on religion and general education,this faith in secular education has been profoundly shaken in the United States. Educators are beginning to see that the values which undergird democracy must be definitely taught, and many are beginning to see that these values have their roots in a theistic world-view.

5. Purpose and Aim

According to 'progressive education',the learner must participate in the formation of aims and purposes which direct his activities in the learning process. The older system failed to secure the active cooperation

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14) Education To-day p 145

of the pupil in construction of the purposes involved in his studying. The psychological basis of this is the impulse. Obstruction of the impulse converts it into desire. Yet, desire is not a purpose. Purpose involves 'end-in-view', foresight into the consequences of the act.

This is based on the assumption that there is no end and aim outside the educative process to which education is subordinate. Education is autonomous and the aims which direct activity', are ends-in-view, which serve to free activity, and meet the needs of the individual. An aim implies a forseen end, and that forseen end gives direction to activity. The criterion for good aims are :

(a) An educational aim must be founded upon the instinctive activities and needs of the given individual to be educated.
(b) An aim must be capable of translation into a method of cooperating with the activities of those undergoing instruction.
(c) Educators have to be on their guard against ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate. A truly general aim broadens the outlook; it stimulates one to take more consequences into account."[15]

Dewey applies the tests to three educational aims, development according to nature, social efficiency, and culture. He takes Rousseau as typical of the 'follow nature' school of thought. He criticizes Rousseau for the view that the structure and activities of the organs furnish both the conditions of all teaching of their use, and also the ends of development. He holds that the organ furnish the conditions, but not the ends. The ends are constructed as the organism meets problem situations.

Social efficiency was an aim in contrast to Rousseau's emphasis upon the goodness of unspoiled nature. Its aim was to effect habituation of an individual to social control. This denies the right of the individual

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15) Democracy and Education pp 126,127

to develope his capacities in freedom. And social efficiency may end in utilitarianism. And it tends to subordinate the individual to arbitrary authority.

Culture, as an aim, must correct and supplement natural development and social efficiency. It is concerned with the spirit and meaning of all activity. It is the opposite of mediocrity, and means the complete development of personality.

> "And there is perhaps no better definition of culture than that it is the capacity for constantly expanding the range and accuracy of one's perception and meanings." 16

Consistent with his democratic ideal, all people, not simply the privileged, should share in the aims and purposes and benifits of education.

(1) Critical Comments

The right of the individual to frame purposes and carry them out is basic to freedom. One of the motives behind education at the time of the Reformation, was the conviction that every person should be able to read the Bible and take personal responsibility for his own spiritual welfare. The fact that this principle was often denied by authoritarian and formal educational practices does not detract from its value, and should not blind us to the fact that its origin was at least in part a religious one. How the right of individual choice and judgement can be combined with societies interest in perpetuating itself, has always been a major educational problem. At present there is a growing awareness of the need for transmitting basic democratic convictions and ideals. This has never been a strong point in 'progressive education' as Dewey

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16) Democracy and Education p 145

admits. Often the 'progressive' educator refused to take his share of the responsibility for sharing with the young the values society cherishes.

And Dewey is rightly concerned about safeguarding education from purposes and aims imposed upon it. But we challenge the idea of educations complete autonomy. If there is no purpose aside and above man's aims and purposes, then one could perhaps build a strong case for an educational system free from all authority. How it could maintain such a position is not at all clear. Dewey recognizes the fact that education has been taken over to serve the ends of the state, and has lost its freedom in autocratic states. If there is a Mind and Purpose in control of this universe, and that Purpose has a bearing on the whole of life, then education must define its purposes with relation to the greater Purpose. I recognize the difficulties involved in this and will discuss them in following chapters. But a good case can be made from the experiences of Nazi Germany, that the ultimate ground upon which man maintains his freedom of purpose, is his conscience. And a conscience based upon religious conviction proved to be the strongest bulwark of individual dignity. We would maintain that secular education which leaves Ultimate Being, and Ultimate Purpose out of account, as known in the 'paradigmatic' experiences of the race, does not give the young a fair chance to work out a complete philosophy of life. Nor does it have any safeguard against tyranny. To base all aims and purposes upon desires and satisfactions guided by the doubt-inquiry process, is to leave them basically uncontrolled, and at the mercy of powerful interests.

6. Interest and Coercion

We have pointed out the biological basis of Dewey's psychology, which was suggested to him by William James, and has its roots in Darwinism. Applied to education it holds that the child is always in action. He is interested in and intent upon something. If the situation is novel, or there is a difficulty, then the child must 'choose'. He accepts some object or end, and for the time being identifies himself with it. When we consider how the child feels on the inside as he warms up to his desired end, we are considering the childs 'interests'. And when we look at the child from the 'outside' we see movements that tend to bring the desired end into realization. The child, we say is putting forth 'effort'.

The debate about 'interest' and 'effort' Dewey says went on because of a wrong psychology. The self was thought of as inert. So one group said the child must be coaxed into action. The other side said the child should be prodded into action. The fact is, the child does not stand uninterested and unconcerned, waiting to be coaxed or prodded.. He must be stirred by his relationship to environment to make choices. As self-hood becomes established he makes conscious choices, and chooses his means by which the ends can be attained.

When interest is dominant, the personality is unified. He has chosen the good as he sees it. In coercion, he is forced to choose, but neither choice seems good. Coercion presents a choice between two evils. The child will carry out the demand in order to avoid the punishment that would go with refusal. Inwardly he rejects, but outwardly he conforms.

So the starting place in 'progressive education' is with the child. Effort will be expended by the child, but because of interest, not coercion.

(a) Critical Comments

Dewey would be the first to warn us that teaching on the basis of the interest of the pupil is not a simple matter. We have looked at his emphasis upon experience,his idea of aims and purpose,his idea of growth,his emphasis upon freedom,and his method of inquiry. These serve to remind us to take all the complex factors of learning into account. That the child is forced by the very nature of existence to be active and take an interest in its own welfare and the world in which it lives is a sound insight,and fundamental to the teaching and learning process.

And we would point out that the problem of interest and coercion has far reaching theological implications. Not only does it apply to man's relationship to man,but it applies to God's relationship to man. The judgement and the mercy of God enter into Christian-Hebrew theology. No doubt the background of the debate among educators,is the theological debate that has been going on for centuries. Predestination and free will were aspects of the problem. Determinism and indeterminism are age long philosophical concerns.

We shall see as we discuss Dewey's theories in the light of various theistic systems,that liberal theologians tend to stress the persuasive aspects of God's relation to man,and the neo-orthodox theologians the coercive aspects. That God both wins and coerces man,seems to be a fact of common experience,and we would hold that the nature of God as Agape , means that his fundamental approach to man is Grace. And in keeping with this conviction,Christian education moves more in the realm of persuasion, inspiration, respect for individual freedom and interest,than in the realm of prodding,punishment,and threats.

7. Summary and Comments

Dewey's main concern is with method. The experimental method should be applied to all areas of human interests,and be the educators primary tool. Our contention is that education needs more than a tool. It needs a right orientation,and a purpose. Because Dewey has dropped out classical philosophy and religion, his educational aims are at loose ends. The primary interest of man,his interest in what the ultimate nature of life is,and how man can relate himself to God,is left unanswered. And it is not only left unanswered,it is dismissed as irrelevant. And not only is the relationship of man to God completely ignored,the relationship of man to man is reduced to impersonal levels through a psychological theory that minimzes intuition and perceptual knowledge.

The concept of growth becomes vague,because the context in which it takes place is vague. And progress,which is fundamentally a religious concept,is left dangling because it is not tied to its religious moorings. To say that growth is only relative to more growth and education to more education, is really to beg the question of aim and purpose.

Almost all of Dewey's valuable insights lose their validity because they are not integrated into an adequate metaphysics. We shall show that liberal religious educators found much value in his educational system and took over much of it, but they reinterpreted it in a theistic setting. This we will show,can be done because many of the insights and emphases sprung out of the Christian heritage.

The key question that Dewey's philosophy raises,is whether education which at one time was closely associated with religion,can now move out

on its own and become completely autonomous. We have noted that Gt.Britain has decided against such a course,and will devote a chapter to the question of religion in the state schools. Our contention is that democracy,based upon the dignity of the individual,has no firm foundation outside theism,and education for democracy that ignores this fact,will in the end fail.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERAL THEOLOGY AND DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

We turn now to a more direct study of the relationship of theism to Dewey's educational philosophy. First we will consider the religious educatbr,George Albert Coe, whose liberal theology found much in Dewey that could be incorporated into religious education. Then we will in later chapters evaluate two views radically opposed to Dewey,the Roman Catholic and the Neo-Orthodox.

In the United States,Dewey had a profound influence upon religious education. Much of his educational outlook was congenial to educators and theologians of the 'liberal' school. It may seem somewhat surprising that this was so,in view of the fact that Dewey became hostile to the Hebrew-Christian view.

In 1900 Dewey published The School and Society,a small book,as we have noted,that had a wide influence upon education in the United States. In 1902 George Albert Coe wrote The Religion of a Mature Mind. Dewey's writings became the dominant influence in public education in the United States,and Coe's writings became the dominant influence in religious education for at least three decades. In 1917 Coe wrote A Social Theory of Religious Education , a book quite revolutionary in religious education,and still widely used in liberal religious education training centers. Coe borrowed heavily from Dewey,and in the foreward of this book wrote :

> "Any reader who is familiar with present movements in educational thought will perceive,as this work proceeds,how much I owe to writers who have had in mind the public school rather than religious

> education. I am indebted most of all to John Dewey, who is foremost among those who have put education and industrial democracy into a single perspective." 1

We will ask what Coe borrowed from Dewey, and evaluate the theistic setting into which he placed his educational principles.

1. Common Background of Coe and Dewey, and Some Differences.

We must guard against the assumption that the religious education movement led by Coe, drew exclusively from Dewey. In fact Coe went back to many of the same educators that influenced Dewey. We noted that Dewey was well acquainted with philosophical trends in Gt. Britian and on the Continent, and was deeply influenced especially by German and British idealism, and by empiricism and the rise of scientific inquiry. In the United States, Horace Mann, Henry Barnard and many others furnished Dewey with many of his educational theories.

Coe shared the educational and philosophical background, but was more influenced by Ritschl and Schleiermacher than by Hegel. In his Education in Religion and Morals (1904) he shows a wide acquaintance with the history of education, and gives a survey of its development through Comenius, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart and Froebel. He shows how modern education has used and developed many ideas that have deep roots in the past. He summarizes the significance of the movement as follows :

(a) From being an exclusively ecclesiastical affair, education has become also an affair of the state.
(b) It has ceased to be the privilege of certain classes (clergy and nobility) and has become the right of all the people.
(c) Its scope has widened from mere instruction to the training of the whole person..
(d) Instruction itself has broadened so as to include the study of nature and of man..
(e) The material employed has changed more and more from mere symbols such as books, formulae etc., toward things which the child can

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1) A Social Theory of Religious Education, Foreword x.

observe for himself.

(f) The teacher's point of view has changed from that of the subject as he himself,a mature person thinks it,to that of the child..

(g) The notion of the process has changed from that of bestowing something upon a passive child to that of providing means whereby the child may actively and freely express himself.

(h) Finally,..education has passed beyond the individualism of both the medieval and Reformation period,and is now recognized as a social process in aim as well as origin. 2

We shall see that Coe accepts most of these principles and weaves them into his religious education outlook,and that Dewey is the more immediate source for the modern formulation of these ideas.

Coe was also well grounded in German and British idealism. He pointed out in A Social Theory of Religious Education that the educational corollary of the idealist movement :

> "is that we should not impose ready-made ideas or rules upon the child mind,but rather provide conditions favorable for spontaneous mental growth whereby what the child already implicitly is,will become explicit both as world outlook and as ethical self-guidance" 3

The theology of Schleiermacher with its emphasis upon the social element in the sphere of religious authority,and upon religion as known within experience,influenced Coe. He insists however that religion is more than the sum total of man's highest feelings,and makes it the unity and centre of the whole personality. Arthur Cushman McGiffert in The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas,says that in America,Emerson and Horace Bushnell have been the most famous representatives of Schleiermachers type of thought.

> "Bushnell gave a modern form of it currency within the more orthodox wing of American Christianity which has never been lost. That God still reveals himself to man as truly as he ever did--this has become a commonplace in many religious circles. 4

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2) Education in Religion and Morals pp 83,84
3) A Social Theory of Religious Education p 26
4) The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas pp 296,297

Coe was greatly influenced by the 'nurture' theory of Bushnell. In Religion of a Mature Mind, he says the transition from the older to the newer education came in Bushnell's Christian Nurture. He approves of Bushnell's thesis that 'the child is to grow up a Christian, and never know himself as being otherwise'. He looks upon this as the Christian application of the trend in education to study the nature of the child and nurture it.

And Ritschlian theology also influenced Coe, as it influenced the liberal movement in America generally. What McGiffert says about Ritschl's theory of authority could almost equally well be said about Dewey, and about Coe.

> "According to him we find our religious authority in the ideal we set before ourselves, or in the purpose to which we commit ourselves." 6

W.P. Patterson in the Rule of Faith says of the Ritschlian emphasis upon the Kingdom of God:

> "As employed by Ritschl, the name frequently refers to the society or fellowship of persons embraced in the Kingdom. Thus it is said that the Christian idea of the Kingdom of God 'denotes the association of mankind'. 7

Coe points out that the Ritschlian emphasis upon the ethical aspects of religion, and the Kingdom of God, influenced the entire pragmatic movement. That Dewey escaped its influence is unthinkable, but he never gives credit to the movement for any of his ideas. Coe on the other hand acknowledges his indebedness to Ritschl and other theologians, and stands within the Christian tradition.

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5) Religion of a Mature Mind pp 305, 306
6) The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas p 299
7) The Rule of Faith p 371

2. The Social Standpoint

Dewey defined education as 'a social function,direction and development in the immature through their participation in the life of the group'. This is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of Dewey's entire outlook that Coe thought applicable to religious education. Coe,following Dewey, looked upon society as the prime educator,and the basal process of education,social interaction. Social fruitfulness becomes the test of curriculum material,and the growing needs of the child to participate in society the basic consideration.

Coe puts all this into the setting of Christian theism through the emphasis upon the Kingdom of God. He speaks often of the unfinished tasks of the Kingdom,and the necessity for making these tasks the subject and aim of religious education. He equates 'social concern' with the Christian meaning of love,and makes love the central concept for religious education. He looks upon it not as a mere sentiment,but a purpose, a policy of self guidance. Conditions should be provided for children to experience love,practice its ethical demands,and make it the centre of their faith. He links parental love closely with the love of God,and insists that its application to all the areas of life would cause a revolution because of its radical nature . Closely linked to his emphasis upon love is his emphasis upon the Incarnation, ' the word made flesh'.

In his autobiography, David Cairns,the great Scottish theologian,who wrote a great deal about the central place of the idea of the Kingdom of God, admits that he would place more emphasis upon the 'gift' of the

Kingdom than upon the 'task', in his later years. Though Coe, went far beyond Dewey and recognized the validity of the theistic position, he placed more emphasis upon the 'task' than upon the 'gift'. Likewise in his idea of love, he makes much of human love, and the task of loving others, but does not say a great deal about the mercy and forgiveness of God. However, as we shall show in our treatment of neo-orthodoxy, the position we take is closer to Coe, than to the neo-orthodox view.

3. Growth as the Aim of Religious Education .

We have seen that Dewey's educational philosophy centers around the growth of the child. Coe also would have the whole teaching enterprise 'brought under the notion of growth'. He too holds the view that personality developes through social contacts, and that the process of becoming a person is never completed. Personality grows through mastery of nature, play, appreciation, friendship, affection, loyalty, opposition, suffering, overcoming sin, and worship. The influence of Dewey can be seen in Coe's idea of worship, though of course Dewey develops these ideas in another context :

> "Generalizing the personality-forming influences of such practices, we may say that worship can gather together what has been and what is, with a view to determining, both individually and socially, what shall be...it includes a consciousness of doing it with God." 8

This is Dewey's 'problem solving' in a theistic setting, bringing memory, and plans for the future, together. This linking of worship with the whole of life runs through the whole of Coe's system of religious education, and is greatly influenced by Dewey's emphasis upon continuity, and his protest against dualism.

Bushnell's influence is also apparent here in Coe's stress upon the growth of the person in the home environment, and the influence of

8) What Is Christian Education, p 128

other persons on the child's ideas of God. There is obvious similarity to Dewey's ideas of experience and growth in the following principles, and Bushnell's influence can be detected here too;

(a) The primary material for moral analysis is to be derived from the child's experienced relations with persons.
(b) Imaginative material..is to be selected on the basis of its continuity with what the child has already experienced..
(c) The natural growth of these contacts from the family hearth outward yield a principle for the gradation of material..
(d) In all this material the centre for the pupil's attention is men and women..
(e) The irreducible factors in a morally educative situation, whether it is encountered in experience or only imagination, are persons in their concrete individuality. 9

The existential nature of Dewey's thinking is reflected here. Character education is not a matter of learning moral principles, but of learning to live in concrete situations. Abstract knowledge is not as important as social contacts, And an evaluation of these contacts with the purpose of discovering what changes can be made, is central to both Coe and Dewey. We shall note later, the importance Coe attributes to the family in the growth of the child. He also holds that the church provides an essential environment for the spiritual growth of the child, and spent most of his life attempting to improve the church as an educational force. However Coe seemed to be close to Dewey in his view that public education should not be based upon religious assumptions. Coe believed that the church could exert a direct influence upon children, and an indirect influence upon the public schools, and this would be adequate. Of course, his idea of the Kingdom of God, as we have seen, called for a reform of society, which would provide a better environment for personal

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9) A Social Theory of Religious Education pp 196, 197

development. The secularization of public education did not seem to concern Coe,or other religious educators of the liberal wing of theology.

4. The Scientific Method .

Dewey,as we have seen makes the method of inquiry as developed by science,the centre of his philosophy. Coe does not concentrate so sharply on it,but he does believe that it has a large place in modern religious education. He gives several reasons for this. The scientific method helps implement good will,by helping define problems and their solution. It can take such general concepts as'love' and give them specific meaning. Maternal love for instance needs intelligent guidance. It can also help evaluate traditions by its critical attitude. And religion must know what science is saying in order to speak to the modern mind. Coe would not shelter any aspect of religious life and belief from inquiry. The all important difference again between Coe and Dewey is the context in which their ideas move. Wheras Dewey makes the scientific method the core of his entire philosophical outlook,Coe makes it a tool within the Christian tradition. Thus they represent two schools of thought that run right through our modern world,effecting every aspect of our modern culture,and most of all our educational view-point. We are developing the theory that the scientific method in the setting of naturalism leaves out a wide range of experience and fact and distorts the problem of personal growth and social progress.

5. Action in the Learning Process .

The role of action in the'knowing life' is central in Dewey. Ideas are statements not of what is,or what has been,but of acts to be performed.

Coe puts this in a Christian setting in his book What is Christian Education .

> "Wherefore our problem becomes this; What sort of practices on our part give the best opportunity for the Great Valuer of Persons, if such t ere be to disclose himself ? There is only one direction in which we may reasonably hope for an answer to this question. The remarkable words attributed to Jesus 'If any man will do.. he shall know...it means engaging in problematical enterprises." 10

Applying this idea of practice ,to teacher training he challe ges the view that teachers are trained when they get a stock of set ideas about teaching. They must observe and practice,and the laboratory method is the best method for teacher training.

And applying these ideas to character formation,he says religious beliefs are only real as they arise out of experience. Religious education should set an environment in which particular social acts may be carried out,and these evaluated in the light of Christian insights. Adults and children should carry on these activities together. Coe quotes Froebel, 'Come let us live with our children',and applies this to the whole of religious education. Purposeful activity,individual and social provides the setting for growth of character. This means far more than 'giving people something to do'. It means trying to discover the will of God for our lives and doing it.

The motto 'learning to do by doing',is very apparent in Coe's system of religious education. And the problematical situation is more than a setting out of which thought arises,it is now the setting in which all life is formed. We would hold that Coe has rightly seen that this principle is not foreign,but is intrinsic to the Christian faith. He may have obscured the complexity of the problem of right conduct,and the

10) What is Christian Education p.284

difficulties encountered in acting according to Christian principles, but his dynamic conception of thought and will within the total experience of the person, has found a permanent place in religious education.

6. Human Nature.

We found Dewey's anthropology ambiguous. He rises to heights of optimism about the powers of the human being to intelligently control himself and his corporate life. Yet he interprets man in terms of continuity with nature. The ambiguity is that nature brings man into being, makes possible his enterprises, and then annihilates him and all he has done.

Christian theology has swung from one extreme to the other with regard to man. It has swung to the Pelagian view that man through 'will power' can force himself into any direction he wants to go, and from there to the view that man is totally depraved. Coe, and Harrison Elliot, and others of the liberal wing of religious education, challenge the 'total depravity' theory. Coe summarizes his anthropology as follows :

(a) No instinct is strictly unival..every one has indefinitely many possible modes of expression..
(b) Habit forming is also human nature..it makes possible the fixing in human life of either better or worse ways.
(c) To become a 'self-criticizing self', and to form self criticizing societies, are also part of human nature, so that nature herself provides for taking the side of social aspiration as against what is unsocial in our instincts. 'As long as human nature remains what it is', therefore we may expect indefinite transformation of social life toward the highest ideals that we can conceive". 11

Here we have the pragmatic view of human nature, and Coe is seen to stand in the tradition of William James, G. Stanley Hall, Edward L Thorndike and Dewey. He attempts to arrive at a view of human nature on the basis of

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11) A Social Theory of Religious Education. pp 135, 136.

scientific investigation. The roots of this tradition go back to Comenius,Pestolozzi and others who believed there were capacities within people that could be known,and drawn out if the right environment were provided and the right methods used. We saw,in the case of Dewey,that he goes beyond the scientific evidence,and makes presuppositions about man. Coe also has his presuppositions,and they lie on the Pelagian side of the theological debate. We shall point out in our discussion of neo-orthodoxy,that we consider the position taken by Karl Barth,and the somewhat less extreme view of Emil Brunner, too pessimistic with regard to human nature. And though our position is theistic,as Coe's is,in comparison to the naturalism of Dewey,we do not share his optimism about man's ability to indefinitely transform his social life 'toward the highest ideals that we can conceive'. The power of self-criticism seems to us too closely allied to Dewey's theory of inquiry,and too far from the Christian view of the judgement and mercy of God,to state the full truth about man.

7. Transmissive Education.

On this point of the transmission of ideals and values from one generation to another,we have found Dewey unsatisfactory. He has himself admitted that 'progressive education' suffers under the weakness of not being able to decide what is of value for the future generations,and getting it over to them. He does face the issue,and such statements as the following sound like the answer :

> "Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as biological life. This transmission occurs by means of communication of habits of doing,thinking,and feeling from the older to the younger ..without this..social life could not survive. 12

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12) Democracy and Education pp 3,4.

Our criticism of Dewey was that he has swept away too much of man's philosophy and religion to give his theory adequate content. Furthermore he has placed so much emphasis upon critical inquiry and problem solving that he has failed to give proper weight to the validity of traditional values. We find his strength to lie in his criticism of authoritarianism, and his insistence upon individual freedom of thought. These same strengths and weaknesses appear in Coe. Coe admits that education must be both transmissive and creative. He sees dangers in transmissive education that appeals to fear, and uses coercion. He warns against education that makes man obedient to man, rather than obedient to God. He would apply critical methods to all traditions, and reserve the right for each generation to reconstruct the past. He is critical of creeds and doctrines passed along by authoritarian methods. In all this we would follow him. But it is evident that liberal religious educators were much stronger in their criticisms of old methods of indoctrination and compulsion, than in their full evaluation of the religious institutions and traditions, and the sharing of profound religious convictions and experiences. They were right in making the past serve the present, and not the present the past, but they sometimes failed to see how easily the present can lose its perspective and overlook the 'paradigmatic' experiences of the past.

8. The Family.

Dewey has written little about the family. He has followed Froebel however in his emphasis upon the early formative years when childhood is dependent and plastic. And in School and Society he does mention the home:

"If we take an example from an ideal home, where the parent is

> intelligent enough to recognize what is best for the child,and is able to supply what is needed,we find the child learningbthrough the social converse and constitution of the family..again the child participates in the household occupations,and therby gets habits of industry and order,and regard for the rights and ideas of others, and the fundamental habit of subordinating his activities to the general interest of the household." 13

Dewey suggests that the ideal home would have a work shop and a miniature laboratory,and there should be opportunity for the child to have a garden and fields to play in. This would be his pattern of the ideal school as well.

Coe looks upon the family as an educational institution of primary importance. The long dependence of the child upon the same few persons, and the intimacy and continuity of the relationships,give the family influence in the life of the child. Basic ethical attitudes are learned in the home. They become the later suppositions for thought and action. The church should transform the family life of its members in accordance with the principles of the faith. This implies education for parenthood for all couples to be married,and includes sex education.

And Coe emphasizes family worship,and as we have noted,he links worship with daily experience. The love that is command,condemnation,reconciliation,and the power of a higher life should be a reality in the Christian home,and worship the expression of this love.

It is significant that in the United States to-day one of the most carefully prepared systems of religious education has been worked out on the principle that the home and the church are partners in the education of children. Responsibility is placed on the parents to cooperate with the

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13) The School and Society pp 35,36

church in the religious education of the child. And it is significant that Dewey should emphasize the need for a work shop, laboratory, garden and fields to play in, and that Coe should emphasize the need for family worship. Here again, the basic difference in outlook is dramatically illustrated. And the basic problem of modern culture is sharply defined. We would suggest that Coe has the profounder insight, though he would agree with Dewey that a workshop, laboratory, garden and field all help to make a good home. But again, we would ask whether Coe gives us the answer for the public school. Dewey takes his pattern for the home and uses it in his theory of the ideal school. Coe, making family worship a vital factor in the home, does not carry this theory into the school. As we shall show in our chapter on religion in general education, Gt. Britian has placed worship in the school, and the problem in the United States is more complex and remains unsolved.

9. Democracy.

As Coe makes more of the family in general character formation and in religious education, so he places more emphasis upon it as the formative factor in education for democracy. Dewey looks to the public school for the formation of habits and attitudes to sustain a democratic culture. Coe thinks the family sets the pattern. Family discipline and life fix men's attitudes toward the basal rights of man. A family where children have rights and responsibilities according tb their age and development, and where there is genuine companionship, develops one type of citizen. A home where no child has rights that are respected, or responsibilities within their powers, and the father is a dictator, develops another type of citizen.

Coe holds that a family can educate for democracy only by being a miniature democratic society. If the family has frequent discussions, deliberates together about common concerns,the child will learn how to face problems and take responsibility. And a democratic family cannot maintain an inequality of the sexes. And in the democratic family the child is gradually less dependent upon the decisions of others. And the family joins in common enterprises,recreational and social. It develops a consciousness of dependence upon other families and society as a whole.

In A Social Theory of Education ,Coe uses the term'Democracy of God' in preference to Kingdom of God. He says he does this not because he wants to substitute a new social principle for the New Testament one, but because he believes the idea of democracy is necessary to a full understanding of Jesus' teaching about the Kingdom of God. A divine-human society,he says,is Jesus' ideal. Christians must remove the limitations within society,and build a democratic society.

We would agree with G.Coe that democracy and Christianity have much in common,and would hold with him against Dewey,that Christianity supports the principle of the dignity of man. And Coe is in line with the findings of psychology in his emphasis upon the importance of the early formative years,and therefore right in his view that the family is important in the education of children for democratic society. We cannot fully evaluate his idea of the Democracy of God,but are somewhat wary of it. It carries the implication that God may be one citizen and voter,or perhaps be the elected president of the enterprise. It seems to make man and God equals in the work of establishing a just and free society. The term,Kingdom of God,has had many interpretations,and

as A.M.Hunter says in The Work and Words of Jesus , 'If we can discover what Jesus meant by it,we have the key to the Gospels,and indeed to the whole New Testament.'[14] Hunter points out that there is agreement upon two points. One is that it means God acting in His kingly power. The other is that Kingdom of God and Kingdom of Heaven mean the same thing in the New Testament. We cannot discuss the matter fully,but would point out that Dewey might be taken to represent one extreme.He would deny God's part entirely,and look upon it as a task for man to renovate the old social order and build a new one by scientific methods. The other extreme is to think of it as a cataclysmic end of the world. We have discussed the modern belief in progress,and have taken a position with those who affirm that a sound belief in progress is bound up with the Christian faith. Liberal theology had a tendency to identify progress toward democratic ideals with the arrival of the Kingdom of God. The sovereignty of God was minimized. We have pointed out that Coe was influenced by Ritschl,and we recall that for Ritschl the Kingdom of God was 'the organization of humanity through action inspired by love'. This seems to drop out the aspect of divine act,and the decision required of men as they are confronted by the Kingdom of God as found in Christ. I would agree with Dr.John Baillie,in The Belief in Progress , that 'Christianity must always maintain a realized and a futurist eschatology in balance,if never in equipoise.'[15] He points out that if it neglects the latter it falls into utopian illusions. That was the temptation of liberals. If it neglects the former,it fails to understand the promise and opportunities of the years of grace. All of which illustrates the fact that Christian education is dependant upon theology,and theology

14) The Work and Words of Jesus p 68
15) The Belief in Progress p. 207

upon biblical interpretation.

10. Conscience and Sin .

Dewey, we found, looks upon conscience as the anticipation of the person to the reactions of those about him. As he acts they react, and he comes to know what to expect by way of reaction. He can thus imagine the reaction and govern himself accordingly. A moral order, or a personal relationship to a God of righteousness, does not come into his account.

Coe also holds that conscience develops in the social context. The power others hold over us, to determine our attitudes and standards, is very great.

> "Children as young as four years who persist in passionate attacks upon playmates in spite of repeated physical chastisement by parents have been known to struggle for self-control and to achieve it, as soon as their playmates unitedly expressed their attitude by withdrawing from the passionate children's society." 16

This according to Coe is the root of the sense of guilt and conscience. The sensitiveness we attain toward abstract right, duty, or God takes rise in sensitiveness toward the approvals and disapprovals of human beings.

> "The most exalted sense of obligation is psychologically continuous with the inner impulsion that makes us conform to social expectation in such trivial matters as the style of our shoes." 17

Dewey denies that conscience has anything to do with relationship to God, and sin is given a naturalistic interpretation. This is of course a radically new use of the term. In Education Today, he speaks about conviction of sin and act of repentence as a genuine act of faith in education. This is an example of retaining terminology and attitude of theism, while denying its basic assumptions in which the terms and attitudes have meaning.

16) A Social Theory of Religious Education p 185 17) Ibid p 172

Coe, says that when he was a boy he was taught that sin was a matter of relationship between himself and God, and not between himself and his neighbour. He came to regard this distinction as invalid.

> "I can find neither psychological, nor ethical, nor metaphysical footing for the idea that I can have relations with God in which he and I are isolated from all other society." 18

He does not approach the problem of sin from the dogmatic position of total depravity. He realizes that it involves man's total experience, which includes human as well as divine dimensions. He warns against indiscriminate condemnation, and suggests a scientific approach to the cause of anti-social conduct. Often, he suggests, children fail because of wrong treatment at the hands of their parents, or because of the environment in which they are compelled to live. We must analyse child conduct into its elements if we would help the child. He grants that there may be need for radical reconstruction of habits and attitudes, but suggests that conversion experiences also have their social implications.

> "Christian education when it is really social, is through and through an incoming of higher life, a renewing of the mind, a laying aside of lower selves. If then, one of our pupils has already formed such perverse purposes that his present need is conversion, we are still to proceed as educators. We should never turn an adolescent over to uneducational evangelism." 19

By uneducational evangelism Coe means separation of the act of surrender to God from service to men, and separation from intelligent analysis and habit formation. He warns against emotional incitements that prevent self-controlled organization of purposes.

Here again, though Coe recognizes the validity of the social influences

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18) A Social Theory of Religious Education p. 164
19) Ibid p 182

on conscience and moral conduct, his thought moves on a different level than Dewey's naturalism. We have already stated our preference for the position that God cannot be known apart from the total context of relationship to other persons and to nature. Coe strongly emphasizes this truth, and builds his entire educational view on it. And we have agreed that no profound interpretation of conscience is possible if the vertical dimension is ignored or denied.

11. Summary and Evaluation.

Religious educators of the liberal wing of theology in the United States drew ideas from the same sources as educators of the 'progressive education' movement, and took many of them straight from Dewey. We have taken Coe, as perhaps the most outstanding and influential Protestant religious educator, who borrowed heavily from Dewey and acknowledged his indebtedness. Dewey and Coe are much alike in their social theory of education. Social interaction is the basic process. The scientific method is fundamental to Dewey's system of education, and plays an important but less basic role in Coe. The close relationship of thought to action is accepted by both. Human nature is capable of indefinite improvement, but in Coe, man is not entirely on 'his own'. Coe gives the family a more important place in his view of character formation, and links the family with the church for a full spiritual training. Both men believe in the democratic ideal, and Coe links it very closely with the Christain emphasis upon the value of the individual and the idea of the Kingdom of God. Conscience is for both a social concept, but for Coe it is also a religious one.

The main, and very important distinction between the two educators is

Coe's acceptance of theism and Dewey's denial of it. This colors their entire educational outlook. Coe draws much of his inspiration from the prophetic movement of the Hebrew-Christian heritage. And he emphasizes the Christian idea of love. The Incarnation means for him a continuing experience of the presence of God in individual and corporate life. He is concerned about the educational task of the church, and thinks of it as an embodying of the spirit of love, and accepting the task of building the Kingdom of God on earth. The church is the human-divine agency for the transformation of society.

Our view is that Coe made a great contribution to Christian education when he took Dewey's social theory and placed it within the Christian concept of 'love'. He shared the strength of the liberal movement which insisted that love toward God could not be thought of as being completely separate from love toward man.

But Coe also shared the weakness of the liberal movement. We have criticized Dewey for underestimating the strength of the forces of evil and resistence in man and society. Coe shared this optimism. In the light of the events of the past ten years it seems naieve for Coe to say 'we may expect indefinite transformation of social life toward the highest ideals we can achieve'. Coe knew, as we have shown, that love is no mere sentimental glow, but he oversimplified the problem of applying the absolute ethic of love to the complex problems of politics and economics. Therefore one misses in Coe the emphasis upon the need for mercy and forgiveness, and the radical nature of the love of God in its judgement upon individual and corporate evil.

We agree with both Dewey and Coe, that the self comes into being in

interaction with its total environment. But we think Coe with his theistic outlook has a more profound understanding of the nature of that total environment. Both Dewey and Coe are right in urging a scientific study of personality and of society. Both sociology and psychotherapy have made great contributions to human welfare. But we believe Coe has most to offer for an adequate view of human nature and its problems, when he refuses to accept the dichotomy between science and religion. He sees no conflict between man's responsibility and man's dependence. He does not think a man must choose between being scientific and being religious. He does not think man's ethical concern becomes less and less the more he lives by faith in God, but takes from the prophetic movement his inspiration to do something about the ills of society.

In the previous chapter we suggested that many of Dewey's ideas could fit quite naturally into a theistic framework. His emphasis upon cooperation and concern for social welfare, his suggestion that impulses needed transforming, the dignity and worth of the individual, his faith in a free and democratic society, all, as Coe has shown, can be taken up into a religious world view. And we have seen how, in a theistic setting, these ideas find a solid footing.

CHAPTER SIX

NEO-ORTHODOX THEOLOGY AND DEWEY'S NATURALISM

Continuing our theistic critique of Dewey's educational philosophy, we turn to neo-orthodoxy. In the United States this movement has brought radical criticism to bear upon Dewey, and all religious educators of the liberal wing who accepted many of Dewey's ideas. Of the three leaders, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr, Niebuhr has had most to say in direct opposition to Dewey's naturalism, but both Barth and Brunner have influenced American as well as British thought, and both of them reject not only Dewey's naturalism, but natural theology as well. There are important differences among neo-orthodox theologians. Some of these will come out in our discussion. Nothing like a full treatment of the neo-orthodox position can be stated here, but certain aspects of it that bear directly on our problem will be included. Since the writings of Sören Kierkegaard had a decisive influence on the movement, we will begin with him. Strangely enough we find certain philosophical affinities between Kierkegaard and Dewey, though of course there are very radical differences in their world-view.

1. Similarities In Kierkegaard and Dewey.

(a) Hegelianism Rejected.

We have noted the profound influence of Hegel on Dewey's thought. He rejected much of Hegel's philosophy as his thought developed toward pragmatism and naturalism. He no longer followed Hegel in his assertion that in principle all reality can be mediated through categories of philosophical thought. Sören Kierkegaard, Hegel's most formidable critic

also radically challenges this basic Hegelian assumption,and claims that each existence has its own inner reality opaque to objective thought. He denied,as does Dewey,that there can be a system of ideas which at the same time can be a system of existence.

(b) Philosophical Scepticism

Dewey rejects the idea that man can through perception and through reflection upon experience,come to a knowledge of the nature of Reality. Kierkegaard holds that the transcendent is not only outside our categories,but also outside our experience. He holds to the Kantian radical distinction between phenomena and 'things in themselves'. We may note in passing that Barth,following Kierkegaard,draws the same fixed line between theology and philosophy. Thus for Barth philosophical scepticism becomes a part of the foundation of theology.

(c) Existentialism.

We saw that Dewey combines a scientific positivism,with existentialism. There are alogical experiences out of which,and for whose sake, the thinking process is carried forward. Their meaning cannot be communicated. They do not yield data out of which a metaphysical system can be built. The existentialism of Kierkegaard was a strong protest against narrow and anti-personal forms of rationalism. For him,the essential nature of an individual is hidden to external observation, and cannot be mediated in any direct communication.

(d) Decision.

For Dewey,all thinking takes place when a problematical situation arises,where there is a fork in the road and a decision must be made.

For Kierkegaard, 'spirit' exists in making decisions. The relationship of individuals is a decision of will,and the thinking involved is existential thinking. We shall see that Dewey and Kierkegaard differ fundamentally as to the total context in which decisions take place, and therefore differ in their interpretation of the character of the decisions.

(c) Events.

Dewey is interested in the eventual nature of experience. He even says that what is usually called matter is that character of natural events which is perceptible. Existential events are unique and particular, and their meaning can never be fully articulated. Events are of far more importance than any attempt to describe their nature. So also in Kierkegaard,it is the single event that matters. The real is not an idea,but an event.

2. Differences in Kierkegaard and Dewey.

(a) Self-consciousness .

Self-consciousness does not play an important part in Dewey's existentialism. He claims to hold to an objective view of the 'self'. We believe Kierkegaard has a much profounder view of the 'self', because he has found an ultimate objectivity. He says 'It is the God-relationship that makes man a man.' He believes that self-consciousness cannot explore its own depths until it finds self-transcendence. Thus, Dewey and Kierkegaard differ fundamentally in their anthropology. Dewey refuses to isolate man. Man must be aware of his wider relationship but for Dewey,this is nature. Kierkegaard insists that man does not rightly know himself as man,until he attains creature consciousness.

Man is a self,because of a synthesis,a synthesis of infinity and finitude,of temporality and eternity,of freedom and necessity.

These two radically different anthropologies have far reaching consequences. We have shown how deeply Dewey's anthropology is woven into his educational outlook. We note here the difference in the concept of freedom. Man is free, according to Dewey, when he expresses his real nature. And his real nature consists in desires and impulses which can be controlled and guided by inquiry,to full realization and fellowship with other persons. According to Kierkegaard's view,man is free only when he comes into a right relationship with God,by a decision.

(b) Individualism and Decision.

On the nature of the individual in relationship with other persons, Dewey and Kierkegaard are at opposite extremes. Kierkegaard wanted the words 'the solitary individual' inscribed on his tomb. All meaning found within the social process in minimized. He finds no real doctrine of the church. The soul is poised on the knife edge of lostness,and all meaning is compressed into the 'moment' of decision.The existential situation in which man finds God is of a different order from all other experiences. There is fundamental discontinuty between this one experience and all other social intercourse. The continuum of conditions and consequences in time is set aside. Thus in his search for God, Kierkegaard found it necessary to break his engagement with his fiance,[12] stand aloof from the church,and take little interest in the social and political problems of his day.

In stark contrast,and we believe more profound,is Dewey's view.

The individualism of Kierkegaard is the type that turned Dewey against 'supernaturalism', to a natural and humane interest in his fellow man and the social order. I would not say that Kierkegaard found God and lost his fellow man,and that Dewey found his fellow man and lost God. I think however,that Coe represents the soundest position by holding love of God and love of neighbour together in his entire philosophical outlook. Dewey's social theory would,I think,gain depth,and his view of evil be far more realistic if he grasped the insights of theism. And Kierkegaard would be more helpful in our attempt to define an educational philosophy if he had not set up such a shapp dualism between decision in the 'one moment',and the many decisions of daily life.

(c) Dualism .

For Kierkegaard,all commensurability of the finite and infinite is impossible. He even finds no way of holding together the historical events of Jesus life,and theological concepts about his divinity. He says :

> "The historical fact that God existed in human form is the essence of the matter;the rest of the historical detail is not even as important as if we had to do with a human being instead of God. ..If the contemporary generation had left behind them nothing but these words "we have believed that in such and such a year God appeared among us in the humble form of a servant,that he lived and taught in our community,and finally died", it would be more than enough." 1

In his Christology there is a fundamental dualism between the divine and human. There is the further dualism of reason and faith,with metaphysical scepticism as its logical result.

Dewey spent his lifetime battling against all forms of dualism. And I think he could make a good case against Kierkegaard. But Dewey does not

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1) Philosophical Fragments p 87 (Translation by Swensen 1936)

provide an adequate alternative by his naturalism and pluralism. We have shown how vague his philosophy of process,organism,and continuity in a naturalistic setting,leaves his epistemology and metaphysics. And we have suggested that it limits the range of his understanding of the individual and history. Kierkegaard,I think,has exaggerated the 'Otherness' of God to the point of an absolute dualism between God and man. He thus gains the vertical dimension at the expense of horizontal. Dewey has denied the 'Otherness'of God. He thus gains an apparent continuity in his ethical outlook,but loses the tension that corrects man's striving,and provides him with a sense of direction.

The problem of epistemology is confused,we believe,rather than clarified by Kierkegaard. His existentialism is of far greater depth than Dewey's because it moves in the dimension of theism. There can be no more basic experience than self-consciousness that culminates in consciousness of God. This level,Kierkegaard reaches and explores with utter honesty and brilliant insights. But he brings little to us that can be used for a philosophy of education. He is so concerned to stress the 'decisive moment',and to detach it from all that went before and all that follows, that it yields little for a sound epistemology except that it points to a depth of experience where man's deepest knowledge is found.

He points in the direction of the epistemology we are defining,as an adequate basis for religious education. Pestalozzi has said "the nearest relation of man is his relation to God'. Kierkegaard has shown that this relationship is the crucial fact of all human striving,and is the final wisdom. He has also rightly shown that this is not primarily a relationship of acceptance of doctrine,or creed. It involves the whole self in decisive

response to the 'Other'.

I have identified myself in this study, with those like Professor John Baillie, and G.A.Coe, who believe that God is present in all events and relationships of life, and can be known there. He can also be known according to this view, outside the Christian tradition and community. And I have held that by reflection on his experiences, man can know that he has been in relation to God, and can communicate that knowledge.

Kierkegaard sounds certain warnings that must be heeded. We saw that Dewey discriminates between educative and non-educative experiences, but we showed that his tests were not adequate. Kierkegaard makes a far more penetrating analysis of human experience, by centering attention upon the central event of Christ's life. His warning to us with our broad view of God's presence in all life, in all history, is that all experiences are not of equal value for religious education. We still insist that the Christian life is not a matter of a decision in a single moment, which decision is detached from all that went before and all that follows. Countless decisions are made from birth to death, and they all effect one's relationship to God. But, we accept enough of Kierkegaard's position to admit that some decisions are far more life-determining than others. And the situations in which these decisions arise are closely bound up with the religious tradition and community of life and thought. And for Christians the center of that tradition is the life of Christ. Wisdom is not an abstract process of thought aside from decision. Both Dewey and Kierkegaard have said these things, and they belong in our educational outlook.

3. Human Nature

Neo-orthodox theologians,and the tragic events of our time,have reopened the debate about the nature of man. Barth takes his stand on a theory of 'total depravity'. Before man is able to know God,he must be recreated. Until that happens,he is no more able to respond to God than a stick or stone can respond to God. The imago dei is completely destroyed,and there is nothing in human consciousness to which God can address his appeal. There is no Anknüpfungspunkt between God and man's nature,until the old nature has been replaced with something totally different and altogether new.

This discontinuty,separating God from man,is seen best in the neo-orthodox view of sin. Brunner,who claims to have moved away from Barth's theory of 'total depravity',but whose position is very difficult to distinguish from Barths,says of the problem of sin :

> "This line of separation between God and the world,which naturally applies to man also,stands out more boldly in the concept of sin, if it is understood in its terrible meaning,which it has in the Christian dogma of 'the fall' and 'original sin'. 2

Neo-orthodox theologians differ somewhat in their interpretation of the meaning of sin. Brunner looks upon it as being self-trust. Niebuhr, following Kierkegaard,makes anxiety the fundamental condition out of which sin arises. Because of insecurity man is tempted to take flight from himself,or make himself more secure than he has a right to be.

What is the bearing of this on Dewey's anthropology and upon a sound theory of religious education ? Dewey denies the validity of the doctrine of imago dei,and the doctrine of 'the fall' and original sin' are superstitious myths. He,as we have seen,stands close to the Greek philosophers in the view that 'ignorance' is man's basic fault. And

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2) The Theology of Crisis p 12.

man's social predicament is simply 'cultural lag'. His faith is in a scientific approach to an understanding of and control of human nature. Psychology, sociology, and the other sciences can solve the personal and social problem.

A theory of religious education that completely accepts Dewey's point of view and overlooks the problems of sin and social evil is certainly superficial. We agree with neo-orthodox theologians that Dewey's analysis of the human predicament lacks profundity. And, as we have noted, liberal religious educators absorbed much of the ethical optimism of men like Dewey.

Yet, I think there is middle ground between a complete faith in man and scientific method, and a rigid theological approach to an understanding of human nature. The scientific approach, as we have suggested, is valid in its own proper field, and it can be of immense use within a theistic frame work. But as W.E. Hocking has so convincingly shown in Science and the Idea of God, we have now had experiments in both psychology and sociology and can see the results of science working within a naturalistic world-view. His conclusion is that psychiatry fails to reach the deepest levels of human problems until it recognizes that 'God is the law of normal mental life.' And he thinks we have in Russia an experiment in substituting a social enthusiasm for traditional religion, and making society perform the essential functions of Deity. He says :

> "Like God, Society protects us and comes to our aid, so far as its knowledge and resources allow. But how far do they allow ? Society has its cruelty, arising from its limitations, the more severe because it intends so well. It is never perfectly just because there is an appalling amount it never knows and can never find out." 3

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3) Science and the Idea of God. p 69

In contrast to the secular approach to anthropology and sociology, stands the neo-orthodox approach which often falls into the error of doctrinaire assumptions about man and society. Its stress upon the wickedness of human nature may be enervating, and in some cases disastrous. Man at times needs a sound self-trust, and a challenge to know and help himself.

Here then we have the two extremes. The naturalistic outlook which is optimistic about man, and concentrates upon emancipating him from pre-scientific moralistic ideas and religious fetters. It fails to see that many of man's most serious problems arise out of an exaggerated self-sufficiency. The other view is dogmatic and doctrinaire, making a theological approach to the understanding of man and society.

These two approaches, the scientific and theological, are not integrated in educational theory in the United States, because our entire culture fails to make this integration. A recent article in Religion and Life, called 'Neo-Orthodoxy Goes To Kindergarten', points out that in the New Curriculum of the Presbyterian Church in the United States the two views are in conflict. [3]

There is much work to be done in religious educational philosophy and curriculum at this point. Our own view is that if the religion of childhood is comprehended mainly under the doctrine of redemption from sin, with great emphasis upon the sinfulness of the child, children may be forced into unfortunate molds. The Christian religion is redemptive, but we hold to the view that redemptive influences may be at work in homes, communities, and churches, and through them life is enlarged, quickened and

3) Religion In Life, Winter Number 1950-1951. Edith Hunter 'Neo-Orthodoxy Goes to Kindergarten.'

transformed. The positive aspect of religion, its power to enhance and fulfill life, is minimized in neo-orthodoxy. Kierkegaard, and those who accept his views, tend to stress the self-denying, negative aspects of religion. The church rite of baptism of children, I believe carries the meaning, that the imago dei has not been destroyed, and that the child is a child of God, able to respond very early to a spiritual environment.

Liberal educators, following sound psychological principles, have rightly reminded us of the creative aspects of a right home, church and community environment, and the energy releasing aspects of the Christian faith. They have taken Dewey's concept of growth, and placed it in a theistic setting. We would not suggest that they have always seen the importance of crucial decisions, and the prior grace of God and its importance in the process. And this brings us to a discussion of the meaning of 'love' in the neo-orthodox view.

4. The Theology and Ethic of Love .

We have seen that Coe considered Dewey's social theory of education so close to the Christian idea of love that he incorporated much of it into his theory of religious education. In spite of Dewey's anti-theistic bias, I believe Coe was right in thinking that he took a great deal of the spirit and content of the Christian religion into his educational system and outlook. I referred to Christopher Dawson's thesis that the moral idealism characteristic of the Western mind is the fruit of the age-long tradition of religious faith and spiritual discipline. Now I would quote a statement from Reinhold Niebuhr which bears out the same point.

> "If one were to make a charge against modern evolutionary relativists it would be that they usually implicitly accept some version of the Christian norm which they explicitly deny." 4

We may state the problem as follows. Do the efforts of man to increase values in this life bear a positive relation to the Agape of God, and the Kingdom of God ? Dewey would not call this a relevant question, because of his naturalism. But as we have seen, Coe reinterpreted Dewey on theistic lines and gives a positive answer to this question. Bishop Nygren in Agape and Eros, denying the validity of the secular and liberal interpretations of love, has written brilliantly on this problem.

Biship Nygren concludes that the motif of Christianity differs radically from the nomos motif of Judaism, and the eros motif of Hellenism. In Judaism, God loves the man who keeps the law. In Hellenism, eros is the ascent of the soul out of fleshly desires into God. In contrast, the Gospels speak of 'unmotivated, self-giving love of the merciful God.' Thus, according to Nygren, eros is always calculating love oriented toward the self. Since Agape and eros come from opposite sources, one from the human self, the other from God's mercy, they cannot be fused.

M.C.D'Arcy, in The Mind and Heart of Love , holds that in Agape the love of God is made known. But he challenges Nygren's separation of Agape and eros on the grounds that it makes Agape a completely separate reality and power, which makes man's love irrelevant to it. He says :

> "The love of self is not swept away by the love of God; it forms a nucleus which develops even more richly its own form, the greater the sweep beyond it. The love of self is a true love; it is necessary for the permanent selfhood and splendour of our finite beauty;

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4) Faith and History p 213.

> it is not just a part of another love;it is a co-efficient of it; the animus and the anima give each other mutual assistance and love; the essential self and the existential self together make the 'I', the person;Eros and Agape are not enemies,but friends." 5

Here then are the two positions. Nygren obscures all the positive relation between man's striving,and the love of God. D'Arcy makes eros and Agape completely friendly. I think there is another possible view. Nygren identifies the Agape of God too exclusively with the level of God's redemptive activity,and too little with the activity of creation. D'Arcy makes the opposite error. Nygren criticizes Thomas Aquinis and his followers for taking over the Greek idea of creative love,and losing sight of the redemptive love as known in Christ. In this I think he is right. But he can in turn be criticized for making love of man toward God a dark riddle.

Dewey,as we have said,is out against all dualism. He would have a case here against Nygren. But his error lies in his failure to recognize the possibility of the desires and impulses of men being influenced by a divine Agape. He thus runs the danger of making man his own God. But I do not think Nygren can help us in our educational theory. He,like Kierkegaard,can warn us against the danger of obscuring the creaturliness of man. Though his emphasis upon God as Agape is sound,he makes it so utterly 'Other' than man,and man's love so thoroughly opposite to Agape, that the relationship between man and God becomes a complete mystery. That,of course,is precisely the conclusion he would have us accept. God is 'hidden'. And no doubt he is more 'hidden' than liberal theologians sometimes thought. But still,to make man's best efforts and desires

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5) The Mind and Heart of Love. p 304.

irrelevant to a knowledge of God,seems to limit the creative working of God in human experience,and minimize the reality of the imago dei.

Reinhold Niebuhr does not accept the view,held by other neo-orthodox theologians like Nygren that man's efforts are irrelevant to God's purposes. He has spent his lifetime showing the errors of the liberal oversimplification of the ethic of love,and attempting to show how a sounder ethic can be applied. His thinking is paradoxical as the following treatment of agape shows :

> The perpetual relevance of the norm agape to the structure of human existence lies in the fact that it is both the fulfillment of the self's freedom,and the contradiction of every actual self-realization in so far as every actual self-realization is partly egoistic and therefore a premature closing of the self within itself." 6

Niebuhr has criticized Dewey's optimism about man,and his theory of social evil. He has criticized the liberal theologians for their endeavors to build the kingdom of God on earth,and failing to see how deep seated are the evils of Western civilization. Dewey's social and educational theories have been under Niebuhr's fire,mainly because he considers them superficial in their analysis of the human predicament.

My own view is that the liberal interpretation of the meaning of Agape had great merit,but serious over simplifications. The emphasis upon love as concern for the welfare of persons,as goodwill even toward one's enemies,as effort to establish an order in which there is more equality,was valid. I think it is a sound insight to make love the dynamic and goal of religious education. And I would hold that Dewey's career,motivated by profound concern for an educational system in which

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6) Faith and History pp 202,203.

individual dignity and freedom come into their own,is an inspiring example of what can be accomplished by a man of good will and brilliant mind. And on the assumption that Agape holds this world in unity,and creates man and transforms his desires,I would maintain that Dewey's religion far exceeded his metaphysics. In terms of Agape and eros , I believe Dewey's work has more Agape influencing it than he recognizes.

And though I previously said it seemed suprising that in view of Dewey's anti-Christian bias,men like Coe should have borrowed so heavily from him in building their religious education theories,I think we have now come upon the answer. Coe,by a sound instinct saw that the profound social concern,the insights into the need of combining theory with action,and other aspects of Dewey's thought were products,at least in part,of the religious heritage of Western culture. What is becoming clear,however,in this study,is the vagueness and error in the naturalistic metaphysical structure Dewey built. Neo-orthodoxy has restored the vertical dimension,so lacking in Dewey,and overlooked by many who carried his ideas over into education. Coe I would say,did not overlook it,but he tended to exaggerate the horizontal aspects of theology.

There is a significant movement within theology to-day re-interpreting theism in terms of the central Christian belief that deus est caritas. It cannot ignore Dewey's insistence upon the contingent temporal events, and the ideals and labors of man having real significance. It can accept the fact of change which he so rightly insists upon,yet take this up into a larger belief in an enduring Reality. Agape,which is eternal and

everlasting, created the world, and acts creatively and redemptivly within history and within individual life. This is a biblical conception. And this brings us to a consideration of the biblical emphasis in religious education.

5. The Bible In Religious Education.

There are many biblical references in Dewey's writings. He is of course aware that the classical tradition was a synthesis of Greek and Hebrew-Christian thought. And as we have shown, he makes a sweeping rejection of the entire tradition. He seems to make little effort to evaluate the constructive contribution of the Hebrew-Christian heritage to Western Culture. The meaning of history as found in the biblical tradition finds no place in Dewey's world-view.

The progressive movement in education has shared Dewey's lack of an adequate philosophy of history. We have discussed this somewhat, but now enlarge upon it. In Experience and Education he said :

> "But the achievements of the past provide the only means at command for understanding the present". 7

But when one studies his writings to discover what constitutes the achievements of the past as he perceives them, one finds the religious and most of the philosophical tradition swept aside. The only substantial achievement he allows, is the forging of the instrument of the scientific method. Dewey admits that,

> "the weakest point in progressive schools is in the matter of selection and organization of intellectual subject matter." 8

The cause of this weakness we believe goes right back to his world view, and from there to his epistemology, and theory of value. He denies

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7) Experience and Nature p 93
8) Ibid p 95

the supernatural,and thus rules out all tradition associated with belief in the supernatural.His phenomenological epistemplogy denies that in the past men have come into a knowledge of Reality. Therefore tradition is of no fundamental importance in helping men relate their lives to Reality now. Experience for Dewey is either alogical or inferential, and in no sense ontological. Therefore all claims to knowledge arising out of a direct relationship with a Reality other than society and nature,are invalid. The knowledge that one person has of another,by way of intuition,is also minimized by Dewey,and self consciousness is almost dropped out in favor of a behavioristic tendency. Thus there are no 'paradigmatic' experiences to guide present thought and conduct. And the biblical view which emphasizes the crucial importance of certain events,a Heilsgeschichte,is completely outside Dewey's view,and the meaning of history. it represents foreign to his thinking.

Both liberal and neo-orthodox theologians agree that the Christian religion had its origin in historical facts. At the center of the Christian religion are the events recorded in the Bible,and the core of these is the life of Christ. Both schools of thought recognize the validity of the historical approach to the Bible. But there are many points of disagreement. We mention only a few crucial ones. Liberal theologians stress the importance of the 'historical Jesus'. We have seen that Kierkegaard minimizes this,and Barth and Brunner follow his lead. They stress the theological approach to the Bible. The liberals take a historical approach to the understanding of Bible teaching. The neo-orthodox wing holds that they can be understood only by the believer who accepts them as divine revelation. They believe there is an authoritative unity in an authoritative

revelation in the New Testament. Liberal theologians emphasize the differences within the New Testament writers. And they stress the historical situations out of which the biblical interpretations arose.

We have noted that a sound theory of religious education is bound up with biblical interpretation and theology. The conflict of opinions about the Bible is an age long phenomena. In our chapter of the relationship of religion to general education we will come upon it again. Dewey is not interested in getting the biblical interpretation of life and history into the public schools,but he does point out that one of the difficulties about teaching religion in the schools is the disagreement among church groups as to what should be taught and how it should be interpreted.

I cannot go fully into this very complex issue,upon which there is no consensus of opinion among biblical scholars. I would agree with Professor D.M.Baillie in his book God Was In Christ, in his contention that the human,earthly life of Jesus is a fact essential to a sound Christology. I think liberal educators are right in insisting upon the importance of the earthly life of Jesus and the historical setting of his life. They are right in challenging a rigid,dogmatic,authoritarian approach to the Bible. It is a fundamental Protestant belief,that every person should examine the scriptures for himself,and think through his own position. The Roman Catholic educator,as we shall see has his one 'infallible' pontiff,and authoritarian church,and he must accept their dogmas,their scriptural interpretations,and teachings . But for the Protestant,there is no pontiff,no authoritarian interpretation of religion which all church members must accept. The essence of biblical truth

is not in creeds,not in final statements which are to be accepted as revealed truths. The late Archbishop of Canterbury,William Temple,in Nature Man and God,suggests that revelation is not to be thought of as immediate communication of truths as they existed in the divine mind, but the typical locus of revelation is events,and awareness of a divine activity may be mediated through the interaction between minds and events in the world process.

Neo-orthodoxy has rightly insisted upon the central and definitive character of the supreme events of revelation in Christ. How that divine activity,at that point in history,may be appreciated and 'come home' to the experience of the present seeker after God,is the crucial issue of religious education. Dewey has helped us to get away from abstract reasoning unrelated to experience,and he has stood against all authoritarian methods. But he has no clear philosophy of history,and 'sacred history' is far removed from his view. Liberal theology serves to remind us of the importance of ethical action on the basis of prophetic insights,and has emphasized the total context in which spiritual growth takes place,making a large place for the influences of the home,the church,and the community.

6. Conclusions.

Certain conclusions emerge from this chapter that have a bearing on the philosophy of religious education. We need not accept the complete philosophical scepticism of the naturalists,or of the extreme neo-orthodox wing. We may grant that their existentialism moves on different levels.

Kierkegaard gives abundant evidence in his writing that his self-consciousness has culminated in a consciousness of relationship to God. This possibility, I believe, lies at the centre of a sound theory of religious education. But Kierkegaard's way of complete despair in the shattering 'moment', has not been the only road men have traveled in their search for God and their discovery of him. Kierkegaard is stating a biblical insight in the paradox of finding freedom by surrender. And neo-orthodoxy serves to remind us that paradoxical thought has a definite place in theology.

Both the continuity and discontinuity of man's relationship to God can best be seen in a right understanding of the relationship of Agape to eros. We do not have to take the dualistic view of extreme neo-orthodoxy. We can think of God as being on both sides of the relationship, within man prompting him to love his neighbour and God, and beyond man as the giver of life and the final controller of destiny. We believe it is false to confine the meaning of love to man's experience, and false to separate God's love completely from the daily, normal, natural experiences of human life.

And a right perspective on the problem of sin and forgiveness is achieved by holding together the creative and redemptive activity of Agape. We are thus saved from a shallow optimism about human nature that thinks of self realization and social progress as a simple possibility, and from an exaggerated emphasis upon man's inability and depravity. Religious education curricula in the United States have not been well integrated because of the tendency for different schools of thought

to press their point of view to the exclusion of all others. Thus those who believe that a scientific approach to the understanding of human nature and social problems is fruitful, tend to claim it as an exclusive method. And those who take the theological approach tend to become doctrinaire and dogmatic, and fail to appreciate the contribution that the sciences can make. This is, of course, the profound problem of our culture, and religious education has the task of attempting an integration.

In the use of the Bible we have passed through a period of historical criticism, which most theologians now accept as valid. But there is no consensus of opinion about the interpretation and use of the Bible in religious education. It should be possible to avoid both the rigid authoritarian approach, and the leveling down of the Bible that obscures the centrality of Christ. Liberal educators have shown the importance of all experiences and decisions. Neo-orthodox educators have emphasized the importance of crisis, and the supreme crisis of man confronted by God. To combine the values of both is far from a simple matter, but is essential to a sound philosophy of religious education.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ROMAN CATHOLIC EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND DEWEY'S NATURALISM

We have pointed out that Dewey considers Christian theism and classical philosophy as being almost synonymous. He is of course aware of the break that came in the Reformation, and the many attempts to revise and show the errors of scholasticism. He considers his naturalistic world-view an adequate substitute for all these attempts at a revised theism. We have shown that he actually borrows much from theism and the Christian tradition, but never explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness. We have noted that he wages a running battle against classical philosophic systems. We will now turn to his criticisms of scholasticism, and the replys made by the Roman Catholic church, and the Church's criticism of Dewey's naturalistic educational views.

This will afford not only another evaluation of Dewey's system, but will bring us to face the issue of authoritarianism, which Dewey so rightly opposes. In both Gt. Britain and the United States, the problem of public education is made difficult by the fact that a strong minority of Roman Catholics live in these countries. The Roman Catholic philosophy of education differs fundamentally from that accepted by the non-Catholic majority. Dewey has effectively raised the important points at issue. Though we do not accept Dewey's alternative, certain points of strength become more apparent when his view is held along side the Roman Catholic system.

1. The Roman Church and Its Educational Position

(a) The Church's Claims.

In brief outline, we will set forth the church's present claims with

regard to education. When Dewey pleads for autonomy in education,it is against such authoritarian claims that he is contending. And in our attempt to define a theistic position in education,we must remember that the Roman Church does not set up its claims alongside other positions. It sets up exclusive claims. In the Catholic Catechism as drawn up by Cardinal Gasparri,this is made clear :

> "The Church founded by Jesus Christ is distinguished from other churches which claim the name of Christian by its unity,holiness, catholicity and apostolicity,which,conferred by Jesus Christ on His Church,are to be found only in the Catholic Church,whose head is the Roman Pontiff." 1

The power of teaching is the right and duty of this one true Church. This power rests in the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops in communion with him. And the Church is infallible in this office of teaching in truths of faith and morals that are revealed in themselves,or connected with revelation. Cardinal Gasparri makes clear how this excercise of power effects the baptised and the non-baptised.

> "..in the case of those who are baptised the church not only states her doctrine but imposes it on them as obligatory,with the result that they are bound to accept it not only because God commands it, but also in obedience to the authority that the church has over her subjects;wheras in the case of those who are not baptised the Church simply sets her teaching before them in the name of God, with the consequence that they are bound to study it and embrace it,not because the Church imposes it on them but because God commands it." 2

We will discuss some of the implications of this view in further detail in our chapter on public education,and show how the problem has been approached differently in the United States and in Gt.Britian. We may note here that Paul Blanshard in American Freedom and Catholic Power ,

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1) The Catholic Catechism p 100
2) Ibid section 142

calls attention to the fact that one implication of this position, is that Catholics in the United States are forbidden to send their children to a public school when a Catholic school is available. He cites a dictum from Pius IX :

> "Where a Catholic parochial school exists, parents ordinarily violate the general Canon law of the Church (Canon 1374) if they send their children to public or non-Catholic schools. If they persist in this violation they sin gravely and cannot be absolved until they make proper adjustment with the Ordinary through the Pastor. (Statute 117) 3

Blanshard also shows that the authority of the Church in education is exercised by the Church holding all school property through a system of priestly ownership. Dewey, who places great faith in the public schools, sees a threat to their very existence in the position taken by the Roman Church. His advocacy of complete autonomy, which we believe goes too far, can only be understood in the light of his opposition to all ecclesiastical domination. But he also objects to certain theological and philosophical assumptions of the Roman Church.

2. Theological and Philosophical Assumptions .

The Catholic Church teaches that every child that comes into the world is a child of Adam. God created Adam with his human nature, consisting of a human body and an immortal soul, and gave him in addition, that to which no man has a right, a supernature. This is superadded to nature. Because Adam disobeyed God, the conditional gift was withdrawn, and Adam was left on a natural level. The restoration took place through Christ who atoned for Adam's sin. The Roman Church accomplishes the work of Christ by the supernatural powers it has by succeeding Peter as

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3) American Freedom and Catholic Power. p.61

head of the church. Supernatural life is given through the sacraments.

Dewey,as we have shown,holds that man in on the natural level. He thus objects not only to the dualism that separates man's natural from his supernatural life,be objects to all supernaturalism. In this,we have both criticized and agreed with him. We cannot fully discuss the Roman view that baptism restores a lost supernatural gift to an otherwise fallen nature. This kind of supernaturalism we also reject. But as we have shown,we think Dewey has reacted too violently against all supernaturalism and has thus lost the insights of theism. And though he allows a place for the church as a means of celebrating man's highest achievements and stirring men to high ideals,we think this is also too violent a reaction against the authoritarian claims of the church.

But our main concern is now with Dewey's rejection of the 'true' philosophy,and the criticism Roman Catholic educators make of Dewey's system. Redden and Ryan,in A Catholic Philosophy of Education ,maintain that the modern confusion and bewilderment which characterizes education can only by overcome when the true philosophy,the Philosophia Perennis, is generally accepted. They quote H.Bellow to show exactly what they mean:

> "..the church claims to be in exclusive possession of the only philosophy which explains man's place in the Universe,reveals man's relation to his Creator,and gives him a rational account of his own nature. Therefore Her Doctrine is absolute and in her eyes unquestionable...Those minds..who can hardly conceive that the claim exists and who certainly never connect the Catholic Church with any universal philosophy are fundamentally ignorant...4

It is well known that scholasticism,especially as formulated by the great medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinis is considered by the Catholic

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4) A Catholic Philosophy of Education pp 4,5.

Church as being the true philosophy. Bertrand Russell, in History of Western Philosophy, grants that St. Thomas was remarkable for his ability to take Aristotle's system and adapt it to Christian dogma. Yet Russell is one of a long line of philosophers who have rejected Thomism. Many theistic philosophers are among these who have rejected scholasticism. Professor John Baillie, in Our Knowledge of God, criticizes the inferential nature of the Thomistic arguments:

> "But now if we share neither St. Thomas's Aristotelian epistemology nor his Neoplatonic absolutism, there would appear to be no particular reason why we should accept his view that our only knowledge of God is of an inferential and analogical character." 5

When Roman Catholic educators, from their point of view, evaluate the naturalistic philosophy of Dewey, they bring against it the general charge that it is based on a false doctrine of evolution, that its psychology is behavioristic, and that its pragmatism denies the existence of God and other basic Christian beliefs. We will consider these charges in detail as Redden and Ryan set them forth.

3. The Roman Catholic and Naturalistic Debate Over Educational Theory.

(a) The Soul.

Teaching that the soul is the abiding, substantial spiritual principle in man, the source of all his activities, created by God, Catholic educators point to the following fallacies in experimentalism:

> "The creation of the soul is denied. The mind is said to evolve from nature rather than to be a power placed in man by God. No satisfactory explanation of the origin of mind is given. Hence, according to the theory of continuity with nature, man differs from the brute

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5) Knowledge of God p 169.

only in degree or quantity". 6

From our study of Dewey's naturalism we would agree with Catholic educators that he gives no 'satisfactory' theory of the origin of mind. There is no doubt however, in my mind, that Dewey has issued a direct challenge to the traditional view of the soul that thinks of it as a 'substance' and minimizes the factors of growth. He is right in saying:

> "there is no ready made self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another." 7

But we believe that there is a more satisfactory view of the soul or self than either scholasticism or naturalism have given us. John Oman, in The Natural and the Supernatural, in his account of the growth of the 'self', accepts much of the evolutionary outlook. But he supports the position that we took in our criticism of Dewey, that we must account for something which is in advance of its natural environment, manages it, and is not merely its product. Something that is an active, organizing form whose continuity does not depend on continuity of material. And for something by whose highest values the world is understood and managed, and which shares these values.

(b) Origin of Ideas.

Scholasticism holds that that there is an 'active intellect' and a 'passive intellect'. Active intellect performs the initial cognitive act whereby the material representation of the material object is stripped of its physical and individuating qualities, and the essence extracted. The passive intellect then possesses, transforms, and elaborates

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6) A Catholic Philosophy of Education pp 522, 523
7) Human Nature and Conduct p 138.

the essence. Catholic criticism of Dewey's view is as follows :

> "The experimentalist holds that 'mind' develops organically. Hence, the origin of ideas is a purely sensuous process; all complex mental processes are functions of behavior; and their resultant is knowledge in the strict sense of the word". 8

St. Thomas Aquinis took the Aristotelian view of universals, and a representative theory of the truth of abstract ideas. In perception of the physical external world he was like other medieval thinkers a realist. But his epistemology was inferential with regard to non-sensible realities. Thus God could not be directly known. The idea of God must be a concept made up of abstractions derived from our experiences of the external world. In addition to this natural way of knowledge there was the supernatural way through the agency of the church.

In our chapter on 'Epistemology' we criticized Dewey's epiphenomenal theory of mind, and took our position with those who assign to mind a much more noetic and autonomous role. We also questioned his identity of perceptual and conceptual experience, and held that perceptual experience included the possibility of being in touch with Reality. We now see that the Roman Catholic theory, taken from Aquinis is also inferential with respect to non-sensible realities. This theory we also reject. Ever since Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, scholastic epistemology has been shaken in its easy confidence that it could pass from the realm of sensuous experience into the realm of pure universal forms. Our position is that knowledge of God is not arrived at by inferential thinking on the basis of sensuous experiences, but God is known in a direct relationship.

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8) A Catholic Theory of Education p 523

(c) Truth

For scholasticism the proper object of the intellect is truth. And the truth can be stated in formal propositions. When the terms of a proposition are unchangeable, the truth is unchangeable. In the judgement, truth is grasped perfectly by the intellect. An immediate judgement motivated by objective evidence cannot be false.

The fallacies of experimentalism are that :

> "All truth is relative and is the outcome of tested consequences of experience. Its validity is determined by its pragmatic or instrumental value. Metaphysical and eternal truths based on essences of things and the absolute and unchanging norms of the eternal law, and imprinted in man's conscience, are denied." 9

Dewey considers the essence of scholasticism to be :

> "a highly effective systematization of the methods of teaching and learning which are appropriate to transmit an authoritative body of truths." 10

Against this system, where religious faith is given to a body of propositions as true on the authority of the church, and the use of reason to demonstrate the reasonableness of giving such credit, Dewey sets his method of inquiry and discovery. There is much to be said for Dewey's criticism. John Bennett, in Orientation in Religious Education , warns against the tendency in Catholicism to think of truth in terms of the acceptance of authoritarian propositions, and also against the tendency in Protestantism to think of the Bible as an infallible system of truths. We accept his view that Christianity is a historic movement based upon the historic events of Christ's life, death, and victory over death, and religious education must be related to these events.

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9) A Catholic Philosophy of Education p 524
10) Democracy and Education p 327

Bennett says :

> "The explanation of the meaning of what happened should not be crystalized in intellectual formulas to be accepted uncritically. What is most important is that each person be brought into the Christian movement,where he can see for himself what has happened and receive guidance from the response of others,both past and present,as he seeks to understand the meaning of the central events for him." 11

This is nearer the existential view of Dewey than to scholasticism,but as we have shown,Dewey's existentialism moves in a limited context because of his metaphysics. It is opposed to all doctrines of infallibility,whether they be Catholic or Protestant.

(d) Freedom of the Will.

For scholasticism,freedom of choice is an endowement from God,by virtue of which,man can or not will the act. According to Catholic educators,the error in Dewey's view is as follows :

> "Freedom of the will as an inherent power of man is denied. Personal accountability cannot be attributed to man but rather is resident in the social sanction,in the pragmatic results of experience. The effects of original sin and their consequences on man's conduct are negated." 12

It is true that Dewey does not look upon freedom as an endowement of the Creator,because he does not think there is a Creator. Therefore man is not accountable to God. On the matter of indeterminacy there is a basic ambiguity in Dewey. By making mind a byproduct of physical interaction,he leaves man at the mercy of physical forces. But he assumes,contrary to his naturalistic metaphysics,that man can control his own destiny:

> "Intelligence on the other hand is associated with judgement:

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11) Orientation in Religious Education. Editor Lotz. p.27
12) A Catholic Philosophy of Education p 525

> that is,with selection and arrangement of means to effect consequences and with choice of what we take as our ends. A man is intelligent not in virtue of having reason which grasps first and indemonstrable truths about fixed principles in order to reason deductively from them to the particulars which they govern,but in virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate." 13

William James brought out the ethical claims of indeterminism by his discussion of 'judgements of regret'. If all we regret really had to happen,then we are driven to pessimism. The only escape would be through the denial of the reality of evil.

This problem of human freedom,determinism and indeterminism,has,as is well known,been central in Catholic-Protestant discussion. St.Augustine defended free will but said freedom did not imply the abidity to do good. He meant by this that whatever man does,he chooses,even though he cant make the better choice. The Reformers however did not accept this view. They denied free will. Luther debated with Erasmus in the treatise Enslaved Will,and held that the will was truly in bondage. Calvin said that man acted voluntarily,but that did not mean he had free will.

Redden and Ryan futher explain the Catholic view as follows:

> "In consequence of original sin,the will is weakened,and hence needs discipline and guidance under the direction of the intellect, IN scholastic philosophy one learns that the will is a blind faculty and needs the light of the intellect." 14

Another Catholic educator draws the contrast between Calvin's view of human nature and the Catholic view :

> "Human nature was not depraved because of Adam's sins,as Calvin held, but deprived of this supernatural life of grace." 15

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13) Quest for Certainty. pp 203,204.
14) A Catholic Philosophy of Education p 266
15) Year Book,National Society for the Study of Education. Univ.of Chicago Press. (Forty first year book) page 260

Redden and Ryan describe the free act of volition in the following manner:

> "The act of free volition then begins with a clear understanding of the nature of what is to be done and its consequences. Deliberation follows. Here, motives and desires are present; advantages and disadvantages are recognized; reasons for and against a particular mode of conduct are analysed, synthesized, and judged. Then follows the very essence of the act of volition, namely, the consent of the will enlightened by the intellect; the choice of a definite course of action. In consequence of this choice the individual performs the act itself." 16

This all seems quite simple and easy, and one might ask why religion needs to enter into character formation at all, if man can enlighten his will by his intellect and perform whatever acts he desires to perform. This is Aristotles' idea of deliberate choice in accordance with reason. To be fair to the Catholic view we must put it in the larger theological and philosophical setting. The Catholic educator would remind us that the 'fall' rendered the will less able to do good. Baptism cleanses the soul of original sin, but the effects of sin remain. Discipline and training overcome these effects. The Church administers the sacraments and sets divine truths before the believer. Freedom of will thus seems to be a matter of degree. Baptism restores the will which is less able to do good since it lost its supernatural gift.

This account seems to me to deserve much of the criticism Dewey levels against it. It divorces will and intellect from the total self, and makes them formal powers apart from character. Man acts according to the structure of his character. Dewey brings this out, as we have seen, in his indentification of habit and will. Erich Fromm, in Man For Himself, states this position as follows:

"The will is not an abstract power of man which he possesses apart

16) A Catholic Philosophy of Education p 269

> from his character. On the contrary the will is nothing but the expression of his character. The productive person who trusts his reason and who is capable of loving others and himself has the will to act virtuously. The nonproductive person who has failed to develope these qualities and who is a slave of his irrational passions lacks this will." 17

We agree, that volition and choice must be seen as part of the total structure of character. We have, however, criticized Dewey's view of will, conscience, and decision, because they move within the limited framework of naturalism. Thus Dewey, like Erich Fromm and all humanists who reject the theistic world-view, is left with a final reliance on man. We consider the theistic framework much more adequate in the light it throws upon character formation. The Roman Catholic sacramentarian view, added to the scholastic account of free will, is to us less satisfactory than the one we have been developing on the lines of Agape and eros. We have rejected the view of 'total depravity', and we have accepted the liberal theological position that man finds God in the experience of love. The question of man's complete freedom of will, so that he can 'on his own' choose the right and do it, seems to us from the theistic point of view, to be meaningless. Our view is that man never does anything completely on his own. His character is formed by his total home and community enivronment. Even if the home is explicitly atheistic, that does not mean that divine influences are entirely lacking from that home. Because the formation of character includes the influences of other people and divine aspects, absolute freedom is impossible. Dewey realizes that in connection with the natural setting in which man moves. He realizes it also in connection with habit formation. He holds that within that framework

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17) Man For Himself p 233.

man has enough freedom to realize his desires and purposes,if he goes about it experimentally,and with faith in his fellow man and himself. We also would stress a margin of freedom in which momentous decisions can be made,the most crucial being centred around the events of Christ's life,death,and continuing life. If man asserts his freedom apart from this total environment,which includes recognition of higher claims and powers and right relation to them, he falls short of full self-realization, and his social life ends in disorder. This does not detract from the importance of freedom in countless daily decisions,but it is central I believe to an adequate theory of freedom of will.

(e) The Determinants of Morality

Roman Catholic educators claim that in experimentalism,goodness and badness are determined solely by the circumstances resulting from experience,and thus change as experience and circumstances change. Social approval and disapproval are the sanctions. In scholasticism an act is moral when in conformity with the eternal law of God.

> "What determines whether a moral act is good or bad ? The answer is,the determinants;the object (purpose) of the act itself;the circumstances surrounding the act; and the purpose intended by the person placing the act. All these must be good,if the act is to be good. If one is bad,the act is bad. 18

We have shown the limitations of Dewey's ethic and theory of values. Have we here a positive alternative ? As Reinhold Niebuhr has so well shown in The Nature and Destiny of Man ,casuistry,based on the concept of natural law and coupled with the Church's authority in matters of

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18) A Catholic Philosophy of Education p 526

morals,is too rigid and sure of its absolute validity. We believe the Roman Catholic Church is justified in challenging Dewey's relativistic naturalistic ethic,but Dewey is right in challenging the Roman Church's ecclesiastical and scholastic approach to ethical problems. Our view is that morality finds its final determinant in a moral order beyond society,yet within all life. The reality of this moral order cannot be grasped in its entirety by a church,and passed along in infallible rules. Dewey is right in insisting that the dignity of human life is fundamental to morality,and our view is that this is a basic moral principle because the structure of the cosmos grounded in a Personal Will,makes it so. Man's apprehension of that Will in terms of his own responsibility,and his social obligation,is also less than perfect and infallible. Especially in the implementing of his ethical insights,and making them relevant to his complex problems,man can never be sure he is expressing the 'moral law'. He is saved from self righteousness,and from a rigid desire to enforce his views arbitrarily,not by considering all moral law and obligation to be functional and pragmatic,but by remembering his finiteness and tendency to deception. Religious education therefore is not the handing on of final moral rules on the authority of the church. It is the attempt,within the church and the social order,to discern the Will of God,and live by this insight. And not only live by the insight,but within the mercy and judgement of God,by which moral energy is given,and moral failures forgiven.

(f) Democracy .

In the United States,Roman Catholic educators have been concerned to

show that The Roman Catholic Church is not inimical to the democratic ideal,and that American Catholics support political democracy. Ryan and Redden point out three implications of the Catholic view of democracy:

(1) The acknowledgement of a supreme Being from whom come all natural rights and duties;and to whom all men have obligations..
(2) The recognition of Jesus Christ and His divinity,from which divinity flow the worth and sanctions of his teachings.
(3) Christian charity applied in political life and social life amid the welter of social changes. 19

They criticize Dewey for making democracy an inclusive way of life, and failing to relate society to a higher order.

"No limit is set,by a higher law of values,to the adjustments to be made in case of conflict between institutions and individuals. There is no interrelation between democracy and religion." 20

We too have criticized Dewey's social and political theory for being cut off completely from religious tradition in which the value of the individual finds its support,and which gives an adequate context for freedom and democratic ideals. However,we think Dewey has a case against the Roman Catholic Church in this issue of democracy and education. Education in a democracy,Dewey claims must be free. Though,as we have said,education should not be completely autonomous in the sense of all rejection of religion,it must be free from autocratic,rigid controls. Paul Blanshard in American Freedom and Catholic Power, gathers evidence to support the view that the Roman Catholic church does not support academic freedom. He quotes Father Wilfred M.Mallon,S.J. Before the National Catholic Education Association in 1942,Father Mallon said :

"Freedom to teach what is true is without practical applicability

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19) A Catholic Philosepphy of Education p 287
20) Ibid 528,529.

> unless we have a norm..The Catholic college norm must be not only natural knowledge,but the deposit of divinely revealed truths immeasurably more certain than any truth arrived at by mere human deduction or experiment because we have for them the guarantee of the infinite knowledge and veracity of God..We reserve the right to dispense with the services of the staff member whose life and utterances on the campus or off of it undermines the purposes for which we exist." 21

We have already questioned the approach to truth that thinks in terms of propositions in which infallible truth is conveyed upon the authority of the Church. Blanshard points out some of the truths a Catholic teacher must assent to. We cannot list them all but have chosen four :

> (1) The Pope is the infallible leader of mankind,and when he speaks for the Church in matters of faith and morals,he cannot make a mistake.
> (2) The Virgin Mary returned to the earth six times in 1917 and told three peasant children of Fatima,Portugal,what the Western world should do to avoid destruction by Soviet Russia.
> (3) The Reformation was a backward step in human history,and many of the worst evils of fascism and communism flow from it.
> (4) The rights of the church as educator are prior to and superior to the rights of the state as educator,and no government has the legal right to infringe upon this divine prerogative." 22

Blanshard further points to many restrictions,especially in the field of the social sciences . And we have already noted the fact that the Church would,if schools could be provided,send all Catholic children to parochial schools. In view of the crucial role played by the public schools in the United States in providing a 'melting pot' for racial and national differences, we do not think the Catholic Church gives the answer to education in a democracy. Dewey showed profound insight in his discussion of authority when he said:

> "As far as the idea of organized authority is concerned,the pathos of the collective life of mankind on this planet is its exhibition

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21) American Freedom and Catholic Power. p 76
22) Ibid p 22

> of the dire need for some authority;while its ever mounting tragedy is due to the fact that the need has been repeatedly betrayed by the very institutions that claimed to satisfy it." 23

We have noted Herbert Butterfield's warning in Christianity and History, that the church often claims too much as champion of liberty, and the democratic form of government. Not only does the church often claim too much credit for support of toleration and political liberty,it tends to minimize and overlook the other side of the picture,the fact that often the church abused its authority and power and stood on the side of intolerance and tyranny. Butterfield is speaking not only of ecclesiasticism in the Roman Catholic Church but of all ecclesiasticism.

4. Critical Evaluation

(a) The Church and Education .

This debate between Dewey's naturalism, and theism,as embodied in the Roman Catholic Church,has for one thing,focused attention on the place of the church in education. In A Common Faith ,Dewey has made his position about the church clear and explicit.

> "The transfer of idealizing imagination,thought and emotion to natural human relations would not signify the destruction of churches that now exist. It would rather offer the means for a recovery of vitality. The fund of human values that are prized and that need to be cherished,values that are satisfied and rectified by all human concerns and arrangements,could be celebrated and reinforced,in different ways and with differing symbols,by the churches." 24

There are two aspects of Dewey's thought about the church that are very surprising. One is his entertaining the idea that existing churches might be persuaded to give up their belief in the supernatural,and embrace a purely humanistic,naturalistic religion. It is of course a fact that

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23) Problems of Men p.103
24) A Common Faith p 82.

a minister here and there has adopted a purely naturalistic basis for his religion. But for a philosopher of Dewey's stature to seriously suggest that Christian churches give up all belief in a Power greater than Society and Nature, is almost unbelievable. He completely underestimates the strength of the Christian theistic tradition. The other surprising aspect of his thought about the church is that he equates it with authoritarianism and an exclusive claim to truth.

> "The surrender of claims to an exclusive and authoritative position is a sine qua non for doing away with the dilemma in which churches now find themselves in respect to their sphere of social action." 25

We grant that there are certain final assumptions the church makes about the importance of certain historic events, and the nature of Reality. But as we have shown, Dewey also has his final assumptions. Our position is, as shown in the chapters on the liberal and neo-orthodox movements, that there is a strand in theology and in the life of the church, which gives fundamental support to free inquiry, human dignity, and social progress. We have tried to show wherin these two movements within Protestantism are strong and wherin they are weak, and wherin they provide help in our search for an adequate philosophy of education. We agree with Dewey's criticism of ecclesastical exclusiveness and authoritarianism, but we do not think these are intrinsic to the Christian faith. Nor do we think doing away with all belief in the supernatural solves the problem of abuse of authority.

There are many aspects of the problem of the relationship of the church to education which we cannot include in this study. We will however consider some of the issues in connection with religion and

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25) Ibid p 83

general education,because on this subject Dewey has taken a definite stand,and thrown out a fundamental challenge to the church and the theistic view.

(b) Epistemology.

In our discussion of neo-orthodoxy we criticized the absolute distinction between reason and revelation. St.Thomas Aquinis,though differing from the neo-orthodox theologians in his view of revelation,and the place of the church in bringing revelation 'home' to men, does not disagree in the absolute separation of reason and revelation. In this,neo-orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism are in agreement. There are,as is well known, basic conflicts between Karl Barth,for example,and the Catholic Church with regard to natural theology. Barth sweeps aside Catholic philosophical orthodoxy with its basic conceptions of 'natural law' and 'natural theology' and its rationalism. But the point we would make with regard to epistemology is that both Catholicism and neo-orthodoxy reject that strand of theology and philosophy with which we are identifying ourselves,which holds the view that in personal experience,in immediate awareness,God can be apprehended. We reject the neo-orthodox position that revelation is sui generis,so that neither a historic or philosophical enquiry is relevant to it,or any analogies between human experience and revelation applicable. Likewise we reject the Catholic view that knowledge of God in the natural sense,comes through inference arising out of our knowledge of the things of nature,with the revealed supernatural life added as superstructure. Religious education based upon this view,as we have seen,involves accepting infallible propositions about life and conduct, and placing one's life under the obedience of an authoritarian Church.

Dewey points in the right direction,but does not go far enough. He points away from absolute dualism,but stops short of theism. He points toward experience as the basis and test for knowledge,but stops short of the possibility of religious experience,because he denies the theistic belief in God. He points toward the kinesthetic data in the phenomenology of experience, but sees no significance in describing these as responsive states to that which is beyond man and nature.

(c) Freedom of Will.

Naturalistic philosophers have layed great stress upon the complex nexus in which character is formed. They have also rejected all formal accounts of will which abstract it from the total personality. But when they reject such theological concepts as 'the fall' as superstitious myths, and sweep aside man's relationship to the supernatural and leave man 'on his own', we believe they oversimplify both psychology and ethics. We would agree with Roman Catholic educators that freedom of will is an endowement from God,and in this respect stand closer to them than neo-orthodox views that make 'original sin' the cause of man's total loss of freedom to know God and do his will. But scholastic philosophy and psychology seems to separate will and intellect from the total personality and make them abstract powers. Our view is that these must be seen in the total context of personality. We act in accordance with what we are. And what we are is the result of a very complex set of factors. Here the sciences,psychology,sociology,and the physical sciences,may help us in the understanding of personality development. And,as we have emphasized before,theology can help us

providing it does not become rigidly dogmatic and authoritarian. In our judgement this is the chief difficulty with the Roman Catholic system. It has accepted the Thomistic scholasticism,and insists with all the power of its ecclesiastical authority,that this philosophy is final and true. This,as we shall see in our next chapter, complicated the problem of religion in education in the public schools. That Protestantism always escapes rigid dogmatism,we do not claim,as shown in our discussion of neo-orthodoxy. It is one of the strengths,we believe of the liberal theistic movement,that it believed in free and fearless inquiry. It accepted the results of scientific inquiry in so far as they seemed valid,and in such questions as the nature of free will,was open minded toward any facts empirical science could offer. As we have shown,it often layed aside its own insights,and accepted what were quite tentative conclusions in the sciences,rather than insisting upon the validity of its own insights gained from its traditions,and from its own philosophical discipline. The most fruitful approach,we believe,to the fundamental problem of free will and the more basic problem of character,is carried on in terms of Agape and eros. It is true,as we have seen that the interpretation of these concepts differs widely. This should in itself serve to remind us of the danger of rigid dogmatism.

The bearing of Agape and eros on the problem of free will, is that the problem must be seen in a wider context than either an authoritarian church,or a naturalistic philosophy provides. It places it in a personal context, in an 'I-Thou' setting. It does not remove all authority,for man is under an authority greater than all institutions. He is under the authority of one whose nature is Agape. This means that man does not have

absolute control of his own destiny. And it means that he must find freedom in relationship to Agape. Agape seeks to influence eros, and as the Christian tradition teaches, will go to any length of suffering to help remove all obstacles that hinder man from freedom. There is a negative aspect to Agape from man's point of view, in that if man chooses to deny the claims of Agape, and distorts eros into self love, he does not find freedom, but finds bondage within his narrow self. This is, then, the problem of religious education, which I think both Dewey and Roman Catholic educators are attempting to solve. The end they both seek is man's free choice of the good, and the acceptance of responsibility for personal destiny. Dewey, as we have argued, falls short of a right solution because he attempts to reduce man to social and natural dimensions. Catholicism falls short of the solution because it claims exclusive and authoritarian control binding men to its obedience, rather than setting them upon the path that leads to freedom through direct confrontation by Agape.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RELIGION IN GENERAL EDUCATION

On both theoretical and practical grounds, Dewey thinks there should be no theistic religion incorporated in the educational philosophy of general education, or be directly taught in the public schools. He grants that religion is a universal concern. It should therefore find its place in the educational process. But, as we have seen, when Dewey talks about religion, he is reading into that term a meaning quite different from any of the three theistic positions we have studied in relation to his world-frame.

In Education Today, he says we have to teach something as religion, and it cannot be simply an abstract essence. He agrees with Plato that virtues cannot be taught without a reorganization of social life, and suggests that the modern problem is more complex than the problem Plato faced. For there is even less agreement now as to the nature of religion. Christians do not agree among themselves. And there are Jews and others who do not agree with the Christians.

As we have seen, Dewey offers as a substitute, a completely autonomous educational system. It should be free from theistic religion in any and all forms. This claim to autonomy we have challenged on its theoretical side, attempting to show that Dewey's position related education to naturalistic assumptions, and value judgements, and left education without adequate metaphysical grounding . It, therefore, under Dewey's influence, is not absolutely free but bound to his presuppositions.

In the United States there has now been ample time to see Dewey's theories at work. His influence has been tremendous.

A.N.Whitehead has said of Dewey:

> "John Dewey is the typical effective American thinker;and he is the chief intellectual force providing that environment with coherent purpose." 1

Whitehead says Dewey accomplished for his day what Augustine,Aquinis, Bacon,Descartes,Locke,and Compte achieved for theirs.

In this chapter I will come to gripe with Dewey's charge that Christianity is so sectarian that no possible plan for a theistic influence upon education could succeed. Though in many ways the situation in Gt.Britain differs from the United States, light will be thrown on this problem by including a brief survey of the British system. For Gt.Britain facing similar problems,has found a way of keeping its entire educational system much closer to the Christian tradition than the United States.

1. Which Religion ?

In England,it was not until 1870 that publicly provided schools came into being. Legislation then was confined to elementary instruction for children under thirteen years of age. No national system of education was then established. A variety of agencies provided schools,chief among them the Church of England. Non-Conformist groups and the Roman Catholic Church also built schools. They all provided religious instruction. The sectarian issue was faced in the 1870 Act,known as the'compromise bill' . Religious instruction was covered by the Cowper-Temple clause,which provided that 'no catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught.'

In the Balfour Act of 1902,non-provided schools were eligible to

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1) The Philosophy of John Dewey p 478 (Library of Living Philosophers edited by Paul Arthur Schlipp)

receive state aid,but the cost of capital expenditure in buildings was thrown on the body to which the buildings belonged. In provided and board schools,religious instruction was regulated by the Cowper-Temple clause, and in non-provided schools,the provision of the trust deed regulated religious teaching. In 1926 the Church of England and the free Churches developed a plan called the 'Agreed Syllabus' plan. This minimized the disagreements between Anglican and Free Church schools . The 'Agreed Syllabus' plan became compulsory in the 1944 Act.

Scotland,since the Reformation,has been strongly influenced by the tradition of Calvin and Knox toward a strong interest in education. In his Book of Discipline for the Scottish Church (1560), John Knox expresses a concern for education that has been part of the Scottish tradition since that day:

> "That everie severall churche have a school-master appointed,such a one as is able at least to teach Grammar and the Latin tung,yf the town be of any reputation. Yf it be upaland..then must either the Reider or the Minister take cayre over the children..to instruct them in their first rudimentis and especially the catechisme." 2

This plan did not go into effect,but the Church took over the superintendence of education. By decree of the privy council in 1616,and by further legislation in 1633 and 1646,the Church was given an important share in the management of the schools. In the Encyclopaedia of Education (Monroe) the efforts of the Church on behalf of education are summarized:

> "Through the persistent efforts of ministers,assemblies,synods,kirk sessions,town councils and Parliament,there was gradually worked out in Scotland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a system of education which was religious,democratic,making education necessary and possible for rich and poor alike,from elementary school to university and probably as near to deserving to be called national

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2) From the History of Education E.P.Cubberley p 335

as any system of the same period in an equal area." 3

The final state organization of education dates from the Scottish Education Act of 1872. This act empowered the newly established school boards to continue the custom of giving instruction in religion. The Education Act of 1918 and the Local Government Act of 1929 confirmed 'use and wont', and further supported the teaching of religion. In a report of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland, Secondary Education, published in 1947, a strong statement appears giving support to the teaching of religion in the schools:

"We share the opinion, widespread throughout Scotland, that since we inherit a Christian tradition and the Christian Church is nationally recognized in Scotland, Christian instruction should find a place in every secondary school". 4

Thus, we see that a purely naturalistic basis for education has never gained approval in England or Scotland. A frankly theistic, Christian position has been taken. And a non-sectarian plan has been developed. And worship has now been made compulsory. In both England and Scotland the problem of the Roman Catholic parochial school, and the Roman Catholic unwillingness to accept an 'agreed syllabus' plan, has been met by incorporating the Catholic schools into the State system. Roman Catholic schools receive state aid, but are allowed a good deal of autonomy, and complete autonomy in religious instruction.

2. Which Religion in America ?

As has been admitted, many aspects of the system worked out in Gt. Britain

3) Encyclopaedia of Education, Paul Monroe Vol V p 300
4) Secondary Education, Advisory Council Of Education p.119

cannot be exported to the United States. But there are two major factors in the British plan and outlook that have a bearing on the fundamental issues Dewey has raised. One is the rejection of secularism as the ground upon which education is based. The other is the agreement reached by diverse Church groups on an acceptable plan for including the teaching of religion in the schools.

Though 'religious education' and 'education' were synonymous in the colonial period,by the close of the second quarter of the nineteenth century the American public school system was established,and the teaching of religion was on its way out of the schools. Tax support was withdrawn from church and private schools. The control of the church over the schools was minimized and gradually eliminated. One reason for the change lay in the rise of national power and control over education. And the other reason,is the one that Dewey mentions,the sectarianism of religion. The strife in Massachusetts,where the famous educator Horace Mann tried to keep religion in the schools in a non-sectarian form,was a Congregational-Unitarian controversy. In the nineteenth century the rapid increase of Roman Catholics in the United States,raised the issue of state support to parochial schools. In 1842 the New York legislature ruled that no school teaching religious sectarian doctrine or tenets should receive state aid. No state admitted to the union after 1858, except West Virginia,failed to insert a similar provision in its constitution. Between 1884 and 1912,thirty eight States wrote into their constitutions clauses forbidding the use of public funds by private or parochial schools.

As sectarianism complicated the problem of religious teaching in the nineteenth century,it continues to complicate it in the twentieth. The Federal census for 1936 reports 256 religious denominations within the continental United States. Out of a population of approximately 134,000,000 in that year,67,300,00 were listed as church members. About 23,000,000 were Roman Catholics,4,600,000 Jews,1,200,000 Eastern Orthodox and 38,500,000 Protestants in 245 denominations. This is enough to show the magnitude of the sectarian problem.

The government of the United States cannot decide the issue of religion and education through the method of an established church. In the First Amendment to the Constitution,the Congress laid upon itself the prohibition, 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.'. The common sense practical interpretation of that law has meant that the state may not establish or favour any one religion or interfere with the free exercise of any religious faith,except to safeguard public morals and order. According to recent court decisions,many services which indirectly aid the schools,such as school lunches,bus transportation,scholarship assistance,non religious text-books,have been classed as'welfare',and must be granted to all children regardless of religious affiliation. Present practice is to permit the states to determine whether bus transportation and nonreligious textbooks shall be granted to children attending parochial schools. The Supreme Court,in the Champaign Illinois (McCollum) case,decided that the use of public school buildings for religious purposes on released time was a violation of the First Amendment.

A tabulation made in 1941 showed that in 12 states the law explicitly required the reading of the Bible,in 6 it permitted it,in 18 states the law's silence made it possible,and in eight states it was expressly forbidden,and in 4 the ban was assumed. 5 Some states permit the use of the Bible,the Lord's Prayer,and the teaching of the Ten Commandments.

The sectarian problem,as we have indicated is complicated by the fact that in principle the Roman Catholic Church in the United States does not favour the public school system,and would,if it could,exercise final authority over all education. To be a fit place for Catholic students a school must meet the Church's requirements:

> "it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organization of the school,and its teachers,syllabus and text books in every branch,be regulated by the Christian spirit,under the direction and maternal supervision of the church." 6

Dewey's concern for autonomy and freedom in the schools must be understood against such authoritarian claims. And Protestant resistance against the attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to secure state aid for parochial schools must also be seen against such authoritarian claims, and against the Church's hostility to the public schools. Most Protestants follow Dewey in his view that the public schools are vital to American unity.

A change is taking place in the Protestant view of religion in the schools. Liberal Protestantism's position of keeping religion out of the schools is being challenged. A Commission appointed by President Truman in 1946,which included educators and religious leaders from all major denominations maintained that religion :

"is held to be a major force in creating the system of human values

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5) N.C.Miller, "Teaching the Multitudes". p4 Beacon Press 1944
6) Pope Pius XI Washington National Catholic Welfare Congress 1930

> on which democracy is predicated,and many derive from one or another of its varieties a deepened sense of human worth and a strengthened concern for the rights of others." 7

This commission held that such principles did not depend on a single religious sanction or authority. But they did not suggest how the sectarian problem was to be met.

Likewise the Harvard Committee in the study General Education In a Free Society,faced the problem,and came to the conclusion that the sectarian problem was insurmountable:

> "given the American scene with its varieties of faith and even of unfaith,we did not feel justified in proposing religious instruction as part of the curriculum." 8

This committee saw no reason,however,why some of the teachings of the prophets,and other Biblical teachings could not be incorporated as moral and ethical material.

Must we conclude then that Dewey is right in both his assumptions ? We have shown the complexity of the problem of teaching religion in the public schools of the United States. Two important commissions turned away from the problem and left it unanswered. The British plan,of incorporating the Roman Catholic schools in the plan of tax supported schools, seems unacceptable to the majority of Americans who strongly support the public schools. They insist that if public tax money was given for parochial schools many sects would take advantage of the precedent and establish their own schools. This would destroy the present public education system and put in its place a series of competing,and probably inferior school systems. It is generally agreed that the public school system in the United States has been an important instrument in achieving

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7) Higher Education for American Democracy. Presidents Commission. Vol 1
8) General Education in a Free Society p 76

national unity.

Must we then accept Dewey's assumption that sectarianism means not only banning religion from the public schools,but means a non-theistic approach to education? If the present situation continues,it really means the acceptance of a secular educational system,and that is not in fact a neutral system. In 1934 President Nicholas Murray Butler voiced the conclusion that many Americans had reached when he said :

> "so far as the tax supported schools are concerned,an odd situation has been permitted to arise. The separation of church and state is fundamental in our American political order,but so far as religious instruction is concerned,this principle has been so far departed from as to put the whole force and influence of the tax supported school on the side of one element in the population,namely,that which is pagan and believes in no religion whatsoever..The government's indifference to religion must not be allowed to become opposition to religion." 9

3. The Possibilities For Teaching Religion in the Public Schools

Meeting Dewey on his own ground,accepting the idea that religion cannot be separated from culture,we take a stand with those who claim that the Judeo-Christian tradition has played a large part in forming Western culture,and Western culture cannot survive if it abandons its spiritual foundation. Professor M.L.Jacks in God in Education has said :

> "Democracy is in danger because it is abandoning the spiritual basis of its own welfare. The liberty which it professes is liberty without an end..the individual whom it spoils is an individual without a purpose..the democratic state needs discipline and authority..only the democratic authority must by definition come from within and cannot be imposed from without,and the discipline must be the self discipline of the man who believes in himself because he believes in God.. 10

Not in the spirit of authoritarian dogmatism,but in the light of the need for the kind of education Professor Jacks is pleading for,the following positive proposals are now being put forward in the United States.

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9) Annual Report of the President of Columbia University 1934 pp 22-24
10) God in Education pp 44-45

In the decentralized school system of the United States, there are communities where there can be Bible reading and prayer, the singing of a hymn, in short, a devotional service. This as we have pointed out cannot be carried out in all states for some states prohibit the reading of the Bible.

In schools below the college or university level, the social studies offer many opportunities for a recognition of the part religion has played in the history of mankind, and the importance of religion in the present community, national, and international life. The American Council on Education created a committee on Religion and Education which studied the entire problem of religion's place in general education, and on the point we have now raised made the following comment :

> "In the study of the various phases of community life-government, markets, industry, labor, welfare, and the like—there would seem to be no tenable reason for the omission of contemporary religious institutions and practices." 11

This same commission makes the suggestion that Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish scholars might assist teachers of English to select materials from the religious classics. And they maintain that it can hardly be contested that the Bible itself is second to no other book in its influence on the modern world. They face the difficulty in some schools with regard to the various versions of the Bible. And suggest that this might be overcome by having each child use the version of his own communion. Or biblical narratives might be retold.

Another important commission also constituted by the American Council

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11) The Relation of Religion to Public Education. Committee of the American Council on Education. From Harner "Religion Place in General Education" p. 138

on Education made a survey of all basic text books used in colleges and universities. The point the commission made was that if religion received fair treatment in all fields of study where it had a bearing, the total impression on the mind of the student would be a greater knowledge of religion, and respect for its importance in all phases of life. Their conclusion is as follows:

> "religion is a neglected field of reading and study on the part of college students. The lightness of touch and even ignorance with which intellectual issues having a religious bearing or import are dealt with would seem little less than astonishing when the expansion of scholarship in general is taken into account." 12

Another approach to the problem at the level of higher education is the inclusion of courses of religion in the colleges and universities. It is well known that church related colleges offer courses in religion, but it not so well known that state supported universities also offer such courses. For example, the University of California, (Berkeley), offers 17 courses in religion. The University of Colorado offers 24, and the University of Massachusetts offers 6.

We cannot discuss all phases of this problem, but must mention another plan, the week day schools of religion. Some time during the school day pupils are released to go to a near by church for a class in religion. A recent study indicated that there were 2,000,000 boys and girls attending such classes. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Champaign case, ruled against having such classes in the school building, but the other plan of holding the classes in the church continues. Not only does this plan have intrinsic value, it indicates the fact that many parents are not satisfied with a completely secularized school system.

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12) College Reading and Religion. Into x.
13) 1947 Yearbook International Council Religious Education p 76

We have brought together enough evidence to show that there are ways of teaching religion directly,and ways of giving it its proper place in the general educational system. The illusion of neutrality, in fact,has opened the way for the anti-theistic bias in education which has been given strong support by Dewey's naturalistic outlook. This illusion of neutraility has been supported also by the belief held by many liberal religious educators that a Christian society was coming into being which would instill a Christian spirit in the schools. A more realistic appraisal of the difficulties involved in transforming society is now possible,and more direct methods of giving religion its rightful place in education are being explored.

4. The Teacher and the Teaching of Religion .

A very vital aspect of this issue,is the training of teachers. Dewey refers to Plato's conviction that the professed teachers of virtue,the sophists,were not in fact the ones fit to teach virtue. Guarding against any lack of appreciation for the professional teachers of our own day, Dewey suggests that if Plato were to return,and take part in the current discussion about teaching religion,he would raise questions about who was to teach. He then asks:

> "Where are the experts in religion ? and where are the authoritative teachers? There are the historians,but I fear the day has not come when the history of religion can be taught as history..There are preachers and catechists,but,unless we are committed to some peculiar faith and institution,it is not exhortation or discipline of this sort that constitutes religious instruction." 14

Dewey then makes some observations about teaching religion that are very pertinent,and would be recognized as valid observations by many

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14) Education To-day p 83.

modern educators. He discusses the differences between a teacher who is a specialist in the sense of knowing the content of the Bible,and the religious doctrines of some church,and the teacher who can relate religion to the entire educational process. Educators in Gt.Britain are aware of this problem. The report of the Consultative Committee on Secondary Education of 1939,and the report of Secondary Education of the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland of 1947,both face this issue. The importance of the teacher's attitude toward religion,and the teachers ability to evoke a response from the pupil,as well as the importance of a religious spirit pervading the entire school,is recognized in these reports.

The Commission appointed by the American Council on Education, which has been referred to,points out that the difference:

> "between acquiring information about a subject and having a meaningful learning experience is real and substantial.". 15

And the importance of the teacher in relating religion not only to education but to life is emphasized. They contend that there are many teachers qualified to teach religion,and many others that would welcome the opportunity to become better qualified if the opportunity were offered. Two dangers are noted. One,the tendency for teachers deeply interested in religion to be sectarian. Two,the lack of information and equipment on the part of many teachers in matters of religion.

On the basis of this study,my conclusion at this point would be that the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of education need to be re-examined. Though Dewey's influence on educational theory is probably not as great today as it was twenty years ago,we have already given the

15) The Relation of Religion to Public Education. p.138

judgement of A.N.Whitehead on the formative and profound effect of Dewey's thinking on American culture. Teachers College,Columbia University, where Dewey taught,and where his influence was very great,has been one of the outstanding teacher training centres in the United States. And Dewey's numerous books have been widely used in teacher training centres. There have,of course,been many other philosophers who have left their mark on the American mind. But none has,at least within the twentieth century,so profoundly affected the public schools,as John Dewey. Dean Luther A.Weigle, of Yale University Divinity School,says of Dewey:

> "In the twentieth century another powerful factor was added,which bore more purposely and directly upon the exclusion of religion from education.This was the popular vogue of pragmatism,instrumentalism,and experimentalism-to use the successive names which the movement bore--and there was the tremendous influence of this pragmatic view in education,together with the fact that in the thought of its greatest protagonist,John Dewey,this point of view was associated with opposition to Judeo-Christian theism."16

As we have seen in this study,Dewey not only takes an anti-theistic position against all traditional forms of Christianity,but develops his own metaphysics on naturalistic lines. His epistemology is phenomenalistic. His theory of values pragmatic. His logic is based upon a doubt inquiry process which makes thought merely functional. His educational aim is growth and progress in a democratic society. A reaction was bound to follow. I have indicated in previous chapters a theistic critique of Dewey's assumptions.

In the forty-first year book of the National Society for the Study of Education,the major schools of thought in American education are set forth by exponents of the different views. The movements set-forth are the experimentalist,realist,idealist,Aristotelian and Roman Catholic.

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16) Orientation in Religious Education p.91 Edited by Lotz

As one studies this supposedly comprehensive study of the major educational systems in the United States,one is struck by two facts. First,the experimentalists are conceded to have the major influence. Two,the thinking being done to-day by Protestant theologians and philosophers has not made itself felt on American educational philosophy. Without in any way making an exhaustive analysis,I indicated in my chapters on the liberal and neo-orthodox positions,that there was an alternative view,which retained the insights of both systems. Men like Professor Charles Hartshorne of Chicago University maintain that a radical and systematic revision of Thomism from top to bottom is now in process among Protestant theologians and philosophers,and that a new theism is emerging. I think men like Coe,in their revision of Dewey's philosophy,had a great deal to offer in the building of an adequate philosophy along theistic lines,but their main influence was upon the religious education within the churches. As Christian thinkers set themselves anew to the task of forging an adequate philosophy of education,with the view of affecting the outlook of education not only inside the churches,but general education,I believe men like Dewey and Coe will make valuable contributions to such an educational theory. Teacher training,and the teaching of religion in the public schools, depend upon this basic task.

5. Summary and Comments.

We have seen that Gt.Britain has never accepted the view that education should be free from theistic religion. The problem of sectarianism has been solved by an 'agreed syllabus' plan,which all major groups

accept,with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church. It has its own schools,which are included in the national system of education,but have complete control of religious teaching. Gt.Britain moved into a strong, positive position with regard to worship and religious instruction in the Parliamentary Act of 1944,making both compulsory. The teaching is non-sectarian and non-authoritarian. We concluded that the problem in the United States does not yield to a like solution because of differences in political,racial,and religious factors. There is however,widespread questioning of the present position in the United States. Neither the extreme authoritarian position of the Roman Catholic Church or the secular view taken by Dewey seem acceptable to a great many parents and educators.

There are possibilities for strengthening and devising methods whereby a better appreciation can be gained of the part religion has played and is playing in Western culture. Some schools are free to have worship,all schools are free to give religion its rightful place in social studies,the religious classics can be used to enrich the present curriculum,and the Bible can be read as literature. Religion might be given the emphasis it deserves in all courses without curtailing academic freedom. And in many Universities courses in religion are now being taught. And the plan of week day religious education, supplements the church schools,and serves as a reminder that something is lacking in the public schools.

Vital to the whole problem of religion in the schools is the attitude and training of the teachers. Since most of the religious teaching must

go beyond 'teaching about' religion,and become part of experience, a knowledge of the 'content' of the Bible and doctrines is not enough. And basic to the entire problem are the theological and philosophical implications. In place of the dominant naturalistic metaphysics,and pragmatic philosophy based upon naturalistic assumptions,there must be a philosophy of education along theistic lines. Some of its main lines we have tried to indicate. But it is all part of the larger problem of the integration of the scientific view and method with the religious view. This is the basic problem of Western Culture,a problem that has arisen over a long period,which has many complex factors. There are indications that a new theism that grapples with the enormous significance of modern science is emerging. It dare not overlook Dewey's emphasis upon inquiry,the dynamic nature of the learning process,the existential side of his outlook,the need for knowing the nature of the child,man's responsibility toward working out his problems,the value of the scientific method,and the importance of the democratic way of life. These ideas are all deeply embedded in the educational outlook of the leading educators in the United States. Theism,we believe,has the framework in which these concepts belong,and without which they have no adequate grounding. When this fact is recognized fully,religion will find its place again in general education.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

1. Naturalism and Christian Theism.

We have seen that Dr.Dewey works out his philosophy on the basis of naturalism and rejects Christian theism. In so far as he deals directly with Christian theism,it is mainly of the Roman Catholic type,and the scholastic philosophical system identified with it. He has,of course,a wide acquaintance with the whole field of philosophy,and was greatly influenced by Hegel. Though Protestant thinkers like G.A.Coe borrowed many ideas from Dewey,Dewey does not directly evaluate the religious educational theories of Coe and other liberal educators. And though the neo-orthodox theologians take note of Dewey's work and have criticized it,Dewey has not returned the compliment. Thus we must conclude that he has looked carefully at the Roman Catholic educational theory,but has not done the same for Protestant revisions and substitutes for scholasticism. He has lumped all theistic systems under the general term 'supernatural' and has rejected them in favour of a naturalistic view.

However,we have shown that his rejection of Christian theism is not as complete as his explicit statements would indicate,or his naturalistic viewpoint suggest. This complicates his educational theory. For example, his belief in the dignity and worth of the individual does not receive fundamental support from his epiphenomenal account of the mind-body relationship. Likewise his optimistic theory of progress and his ethical concern do not receive formal backing in his pragmatic theory of value. Both the dignity of the individual and hope for a better social order

seem to have their roots in the Christian tradition. If they come from another source,we have been unable to discover it in Dewey's writings.

Though we would not assert that all that is constructive in Dewey's educational system has its roots in the Christian tradition,we conclude that Dewey goes far beyond his naturalistic metaphysic in working out his total educational system. And the lines on which he moves are in some cases in the direction of Christian theism. This accounts for the fact that men like Coe,could,from a theistic perspective,incorporate a great deal of Dewey's educational philosophy in their systems of religious education.

Roman Catholic and neo-orthodox theistic systems are far less congenial to Dewey's educational views than liberal theology. We believe Dewey has a strong case against the ecclesiastical authoritarianism and the dualism of Roman Catholic supernaturalism. And though men like Dr.Niebuhr and others of the neo-orthodox movement have effectively challenged the ethical optimism of Dewey,and have shown the importance of the Christian tradition in an adequate interpretation of man's predicament,much of Dewey's criticism of supernaturalistic dualism is relevant to neo-orthodoxy. Our own position is that there are many sound insights in the liberal view,which can be corrected by neo-orthodoxie's emphasis upon God's judgement and man's need for forgiveness. Liberalism tended to overlook the equivocal nature of man's ethical actions,and the radical nature of man's sin. We have been unable to discover a Protestant epistemology that has wide acceptance,and suggest that Dewey has a great deal to offer all who are concerned with this problem.

2. Epistemology .

We agree with Dewey that man stands in nature,and makes decisions within concrete situations. Knowledge is not primarily formal and static, but dynamic. We cannot separate knower from known object,or mind from body,or thought from action. And there are,as Dewey so strongly urges, kinesthetic elements in the phenomenology of experience. This makes the process of 'knowing' far less simple than 'copy' theories,or 'naive realism' recognized. And the relationship of knower to known object,and the interaction between them is of utmost importance.

So much for areas of agreement. Our basic disagreement arises out of basic assumptions. Dewey has made fundamental decisions about the nature of the world which do not arise out of his logic of inquiry,and which affect his epistemology. He places the problem solving process in a naturalistic framework and thus draws certain conclusions about epistemology which,from a theistic perspective,seem entirely unwarranted. Dewey has made a reflective judgement that man stands completely oriented in nature.

But if this is not the whole story,then Dewey's epistemology is faulty. If man stands not only within the conditioned,but also in a relation to the Unconditioned,it can be held that his most important decisions are those he makes within his relationship to the Unconditioned, and all other decisions are effected by them. This is our view. In spite of Dewey's light treatment of metaphysics we maintain that man is interested not only in manipulating and controlling his environment, but in knowing the nature of it that he may enter into right relation to it. We have concluded that man can know something about the nature

of Reality. Interaction at the deepest level of man's environment is interaction with the Unconditioned. Not with an Unconditioned which is in all aspects unaffected by human actions,but which in essential nature is not relative to man's purposes and existence. We hold this knowledge to be intuitional,but not intuitional apart from the phenomenology of experience. And this knowledge is not so unequivocal that dogmatisms can be founded upon it. Nor is it intuitional in a mystical sense,if mysticism is thought of as being detached from the concrete decisions of life.

We may summarize the theistic positions we have examined with regard to their epistemology. The decision that is crucial for the Roman Catholic view is the decision to accept or reject the Church and its authority. If one accepts the Church,then supernatural grace will by means of the sacraments raise one out of unequivocal darkness into unequivocal light. This we find unsatisfactory. The extreme neo-orthodox position makes one decision crucial,the decision to recognize that man stands under divine judgement. All other decisions are of a radically different order. Knowledge is thus outside the historic sphere of decision. This we also found unsatisfactory.

The liberal position we believe emphasizes the truth that the love of God is known in concrete decisions and actions. It's weakness lies in the tendency to minimize the transcendent nature of Reality,and the dependence of man upon God. It became too pragmatic in the sense of setting man the task of producing the fruits of religion,and often overlooked the dependence of man upon the mercy and forgiveness of God.

3. Educational Autonomy.

Dewey emphasizes the theory that science began to make real progress only after it broke away from dogmatism and authoritarianism, which were closely allied in the middle ages with supernaturalism and the Church. Education, which is the application of the scientific method and outlook to all areas of life, must demand the same sort of autonomy. It must free itself from all authoritarian institutions, and all supernaturalistic dogmatism. It can discover its own ends, set up its own purposes, and must refuse to be controlled by any external authority. It must declare and achieve complete autonomy.

Our conclusion is that this is a dangerous half truth. It has validity as a challange to autocratic threats to freedom of thought. It expresses one aspect of the Protestant claim to freedom of conscience, and it sums up the modern scientific spirit of inquiry with its fearless search for facts. But it is a dangerous half truth in that it carries its claim for autonomy back to the individual, then leaves the individual standing in nature and society with no grounding in the Unconditioned. Our contention has been that Dewey's view of man standing within nature and society, with the equipment of the logic of inquiry to rely upon for the fulfillment of individual and social life, leaves out a dimension absolutely necessary to a sound view of man and destiny. From the theistic perspective it can be seen that man's assertion of freedom and autonomy can become man's most fatal error. If it is true that man's fundamental relationship is with the Unconditioned, then he cannot claim to be self governing and self sufficient. He must find freedom by resigning some of his sovereignty. By cutting education off from these insights, Dewey leaves it exposed to

interests and powers against which it is unable to maintain its freedom.

One of the great gains of the modern world is the freedom it has gained for all the arts and sciences from domination and control of authoritarianism. A relative freedom must be maintained for these and for education. But when education claims absolute autonomy it carries the modern spirit too far. How shall it keep from being swept along by the current of the contingent, to be destroyed by nature and time, unless it has an anchor in the transcendent ? Religious education can claim the kind of autonomy which leaves it free from complete control by all earthly powers, that it may serve God as the ultimate. But secular education, with freedom only to promote individual and social growth, may easily be overcome by the very forces it seeks to control and change.

In the framework of Dewey's naturalism, where events, situations, histories hold man and all his institutions in their power, and which finally destroy him, it seems futile to press the claim of educational autonomy. Where everything is relative and transitional and where there is no ultimate fulfillment, on what basis can education claim to stand above the forces and counterforces of history ? Certainly man cannot stake a valid claim for autonomy in Dewey's view that intelligence sprang from the interaction of physical energy, and being found useful, developed until it finally fashioned the scientific method. If that is the complete story about the mind of man, then what basis has it for claiming autonomy against the physical forces that brought it into existence, or against the irrational force which will ultimately destroy it ?

4. The Self

In his anthropology, the divergence between a naturalistic philosophy

of education and religious education can be clearly seen. In educational theory no question can be raised that does not soon come round to the fundamental question of the nature of man. We may first summarize the range of agreement with Dewey's view. We have accepted his view that man stands within nature. As far as it goes this is sound. And his strong insistence that man is a social creature is also beyond dispute. These facts have a bearing upon the idea of will and conscience,and psychology cannot ignore biological and social factors. And the insistence upon individual differences is also accepted as of supreme importance for education. And though,as we have maintained,Dewey is not entirely consistent in his view of the indeterminate nature of the individual, he rightly maintains that man is responsible for his decisions and actions. We find further agreement in his idea that educators who think of the person in terms of basic interests,and aim to guide and stimulate these interests,are reaching persons on a deeper level of motivation than those who rely on coercive and authoritarian methods.

These are important point of agreement. However,there are basic points of disagreement with Dewey anthropology. His theory of experience,upon which he bases his system,fails at the most crucial point. There is an area,he says,where experiences are immediate and significant,but nothing more can be said about them. Our conclusion is that Dewey is more vague at this point than he needs to be. His vagueness,we hold,arises out of his denial of man's fundamental relationship to the transcendent Unconditioned Reality. We have used the terms Agape and eros, taken from

the history of Christian thought,to suggest a Reality and a relationship higher than man's relation to society and nature. Man is created imago dei . He stands within nature,but transcends it. He stands within society, but transcends society. He is capable of religious experience,of making decisions with regard to Ultimate Reality. Through intuition he may know that he is in relation to God,and though his expression must be analogical rather than literal,he may communicate his knowledge of God.

This takes us well beyond Dewey's naturalistic theory of will, conscience and character. They have biological and sociological implications,but have also the transcendent factor which escapes those who take a radical behavioristic approach to personality. Dewey minimizes self-consciousness,and speaks of the individual reacting with his environment in quite impersonal terms. We must conclude that this is due to his lack of understanding of the self in its self-transcendent dimension. This makes the important 'I-Thou' trend in philosophy and theology a closed book to him.

5. History

From a theistic perspective we may follow Dewey part way in his idea of history,and then find ourselves going beyond him. The Christian biblical view emphasizes the importance of historical events,and decisions within time. We have noted Dewey's criticism of the Greek view of the insignificance of history,and the Greek emphasis upon the real as the changeless. The symbol of the circle with its eternal recurrence is entirely unacceptable to Dewey. In this we are in agreement. Decisions within the contingent situations of time are of supreme importance to his entire outlook. In this we are also in accord. But we cannot accept

his idea that meaning must be discovered through the doubt inquiry process working within the naturalistic framework where everything is contingent. We maintain that Dewey makes his moral judgements about history. He assumes that man should through intelligent endeavor find self realization and build a democratic society. These judgements do not arise out of his doubt inquiry logic. As we have noted, we believe many of Dewey's value judgements have their roots in the Christian tradition.

Christian theism asserts that man's decisions in history are of great importance. Man is not a creature of necessity. By his choices he makes history and life become meaningful. So far Dewey would agree. But theism goes on. It maintains that history, as known in the biblical tradition, is laden with special meaning for the whole of life. It provides the clue to the whole drama of mankind. This is admittedly a matter of belief and faith. And we would maintain on the basis of this study, that Dewey also interprets history through belief. He has the negative belief that no significant clue to history is found within the Christian tradition, and the positive belief that naturalistic ideas provide the key to the understanding of history and the universe. He has no objective evidence of this that is conclusive.

The point for education is that if a good many people in society find a key that unlocks life's fundamental meaning in the Biblical Christian tradition, then an educational system which ignores this fact and this view, is not adequate. We have maintained that in such matters there is no such thing as absolute neutrality. Dewey's position is not neutral with regard to religion. It is anti-theistic, except in

so far as it unconsciously accepts theistic assumptions or values.

6. Theology and the Scientific Method

Because he denies the validity of theistic concepts,and because of his espousal of the scientific method in a naturalistic framework for the solution of all problems,Dewey has been among those philosophers who have widened the gulf between religion and science. And he has,by his interpretation of education as the method of science applied to all areas of life,and fully capable of evolving its own ends,driven a wedge between religious and secular education. He has been a powerful force in creating the view that a full acceptance of the scientific method means a complete rejection of the theological approach.

We have granted the validity of his charge that theology often ends in absolute dualism,separating mind from matter,thought from action,the eternal from the temporal,God from man. But,we do not think he has solved this problem by denying all transcendent Reality,and assuming that man's interests are entirely practical,and that man is content with manipulating and controlling himself and his world. Perhaps he is here reflecting the culture of which he is a part. Other philosophers have observed that we Americans in spite of our idealism and religion, are too much absorbed in the foreground of life.

Our position is that in the understanding of certain experiences the scientific method is valid. But in other experiences,concepts drawn from other traditions are necessary. Experimentalism may easily be distorted into a new dogmatism,by claiming to be the only valid approach to life. We have admitted that both Roman Catholic and neo-orthodox thinkers are inclined to make absolute claims. I would say that Dewey is quite as

dogmatic about his naturalism and logic of inquiry,and that a spirit of humility must temper these dogmatisms before they can narrow the gulf which now separates them. They might both,then,seek a sounder epistemology. Our study has indicated that such an epistemology must take a full account of the phenomenology of experience,make allowance for the fundamental nature of man's relationship to ultimate Reality,allow for the factor of intuition in perceptual experience,and strike a balance between certainty and humility. I do not think that one system of logic,and certainly not the logic of inquiry covers the complex methods and attitudes by which man comes to know himself and his universe. As an epistemology emerges that takes all the complex factors of the knowing process into account,education may cease to be the battleground on which dogmatic theism and dogmatic naturalism strive to vanquish one another. We would not underestimate the difficulties involved,for this is one of the most deep rooted problems of western culture.

7. Religion in General Education

From our brief survey of the situation in Gt.Britain and the United States,we conclude that practical ways can be found for making religion vital to education,providing it is thought to be significant to the educational system. In England and Scotland a secularized education has not been acceptable,and in recent years strong legislation has strengthened religion in the schools. In the United States there are additional difficulties,sectarian and political,but we have seen that ways are open for making religion play a far stronger role without violating the principle of separation of church and state.

Thus, though we may grant Dewey's contention that sectarianism played a large part in the secularizing of American education, we do not consider this the most basic problem. It is true that sectarianism greatly complicates the issue. The most crucial aspect of this is the Roman Catholic rejection of the principle of public schools. We found the British system of including the Roman Catholic schools in the general system not transferable to the American scene. If tax support is given to Roman Catholic parochial schools in the United States, other denominations will want such support, and the public school system will be undermined.

Dewey has not attempted to provide a philosophical foundation for education that would retain the theistic outlook and avoid the sectarian difficulties. He rejects theism explicitly, and constructs his system on naturalistic lines. The fact that implictly he retained some theistic attitudes and assumptions, made it difficult for liberal educators to see the full importance of the anti-theistic bias.

The cultural crisis of Western democracy has made men rethink the basis of education. This bears out one of Dewey's theses. When man is disturbed he is stirred to take thought of his problems and find a way through his difficulties. Dewey is right in that philosophy must not escape to ivory towers above the fray. And we would agree that religion cannot flee to a world of ideal forms, or into supernaturalistic beliefs and institutions above the contingent struggles of mankind. Education will for many years have to grapple with the issues Dewey has raised. We conclude that education can be fair both to the scientific spirit and to the religious tradition deeply woven into the fabric of society.